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ABSTRACT 
 
CHRISTIAN WATT: Explaining Postwar Strategic Cooperation between the United States 
and Its Former Adversaries 
(Under the direction of Mark Crescenzi) 
 
I present a bargaining theory of strategic cooperation—which I define as voluntary, deep, 
and enduring cooperation—that focuses on the influence of credible commitment problems 
to explain variation in the qualities of strategic cooperation.  I argue that variations in a 
relationship’s qualities of cooperation are primarily explained by credible commitment 
problems at the international and domestic levels.  I identify three sources of credible 
commitment problems at the international level (spoiler problems, competitor problems, and 
other international conditions) and five sources of credible commitment problems at the 
domestic level (disinterest, trust, reconciliation, state capacity, and political unification 
problems) that might undermine a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.  I test my theory 
against a restricted universe of cases that is comprised of the U.S. wars from World War II to 
present, arguing that the two most likely sources of domestic credible commitment problems 
in these U.S. postwar contexts are reconciliation problems and political unification problems 
within the former U.S. adversary.  My case analyses largely support my theory.  This has 
substantial policy implications.  My theory should now be tested on a broader array of 
strategic cooperation contexts to improve its generalizability. 
 
 
Disclaimer clause: the views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not 
reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, 
or the U.S. Government.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 “If you love someone, set them free. If they come back they're yours; if they 
don't they never were.”—Richard Bach 
 
In All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten, Robert Fulghum presents 
sixteen principles that describe how one should live and what one should do.
1
  Four of the 
most relevant to this study are: don't hit people; put things back where you found them; clean 
up your own mess; and say you're sorry when you hurt somebody. How many of these 
principles are violated when states war against each other?  Reflect on Bach’s quote above.  
Considering the likely gross violations of Fulghum’s principles and the resultant lingering 
animosity that war often generates, if the victor sets the loser free, will the loser voluntarily 
“come back”?   
Now consider this kindergarten scenario:  imagine you are six years old and playing in your 
school sandbox when the biggest kid in class comes up to you, accuses you of doing 
something terrible (which may or may not be true), beats you senseless, picks you up by your 
collar, wipes the tear- and blood-caked sand from your face, offers you a smile and a 
lollipop, and proposes that the two of you immediately embark upon a long-term friendship.  
Under what conditions would such a friendship even be plausible?  This mind experiment 
captures the essence of U.S. foreign policy at the nation-state level where, in certain 
circumstances, the United States has reached out to its former war adversaries, sometimes at 
                                                 
1
 Fulghum 1988, 2-3.   
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great cost,  in an attempt to establish an enduring, highly-cooperative, voluntary 
relationship—the ideal so-called “strategic partnership” of recent policy vernacular.2  Those 
like me see this postwar objective as very ambitious, considering its intended polar change in 
the relationship between the former belligerents—from war adversaries to close partners—
and wonder when it could have a reasonable chance for success.  Under what conditions can 
the United States establish such enduring, highly-cooperative relationships with its recent 
war adversaries? 
The Puzzle, Research Question, and Scope 
Strategic partnership, as termed in contemporary policy circles, is one form of a broader 
set of highly cooperative ventures that I define as strategic cooperation.  For the purposes of 
this study, I define strategic cooperation as voluntary, deep (non-trivial, important, intense), 
and enduring cooperation. 
In the spectrum of postwar conflict resolution outcomes, war sometimes results in 
continued open hostility, rivalry, or a stable ceasefire.  However, war sometimes results in a 
voluntary, highly-cooperative relationship as embodied in my definition of strategic 
cooperation.  This is perhaps a counterintuitive postwar outcome—a voluntary, highly-
cooperative relationship between former adversaries shortly after war.  In the context of just 
U.S. wars, we see varied outcomes with regards to strategic cooperation.  This is the heart of 
my puzzle.  Sometimes postwar strategic cooperation between the United States and its 
former adversaries is nonexistent (e.g., as seen with Vietnam and Serbia).  Sometimes 
postwar strategic cooperation between the United States and its former adversaries achieves 
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 See Appendices A and B for examples of contemporary postwar strategic partnership agreements. 
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astonishingly high levels of cooperation (e.g., as seen with Germany and Japan).  And 
sometimes strategic cooperation between the United States and its former adversaries 
struggles at best to achieve even modest levels of cooperation (e.g., as we are seeing with 
Iraq and Afghanistan).  Strategic cooperation between former adversaries is often not 
attempted, and when it is attempted, it clearly varies in its ambition and realization of 
cooperation.  Why?  What explains this variation in postwar strategic cooperation outcomes 
between the United States and its former adversaries? 
As have defined strategic cooperation, it includes two important qualities of 
cooperation—depth3 and endurance.  Focusing on depth and endurance of cooperation, the 
primary aim of my dissertation, then, is to address my puzzle (the variation in postwar 
strategic cooperation outcomes between the United States and its former adversaries) by 
answering my more narrow empirical research question: what explains the variation in the 
qualities of cooperation between the United States and its former adversaries?   
By addressing this puzzle, I hope to provide a predictive framework that illuminates the 
dynamics of strategic cooperation in general and, more specifically, predicts the qualities of 
postwar strategic cooperation between the United States and its former adversaries.  This will 
enable U.S. policymakers to better assess the costs, benefits, and risks of this postwar 
strategy choice and thereby, ideally, reduce loss and suffering in the future for all parties.  As 
a byproduct of this project, I hope to spark academic interest in this important national policy 
topic.  Finally, I hope to generalize as much as possible with this project.  That said, it is 
                                                 
3
 In line with Downs et al. (1996), who conceptualize a “treaty's depth of cooperation as the extent to which it 
requires states to depart from what they would have done in its absence,” I conceptualize a strategic cooperation 
arrangement’s depth of cooperation as the extent to which it requires states to depart from what they would have 
done in its absence (383).   
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beyond the scope of this project to generalize beyond U.S. postwar contexts.  The United 
States is unique.  It is an atypically wealthy world power with global reach—it has much to 
offer a former adversary vis-à-vis security and economics.  Also, as a democratic 
superpower, the United States is perhaps atypically amenable to voluntary, cooperative 
relationships as compared to other world powers that have a higher tendency towards 
realpolitik.   
Why do these questions matter? 
It is important to address these questions and achieve a better understanding of postwar 
strategic-cooperation dynamics for several reasons.  First, these questions are highly policy 
relevant in the contemporary strategic environment.  At this moment, the United States 
continues its attempts to establish effective postwar strategic “partnerships” with Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  That is, this ambitious conflict resolution outcome, reminiscent of U.S. efforts 
with Germany and Japan after World War II, has reemerged as a contemporary and likely 
future U.S. postwar strategy.
4
  Also, this policy relevance rises to the highest levels of 
national command.  For instance, U.S. President Barack Obama recently flew to Afghanistan 
to personally sign and announce the strategic partnership agreement between the United 
States and Afghanistan.
5
 
Second, and more importantly, strategic cooperation in the postwar context is 
dangerous—it often puts former adversaries in close proximity to each other and requires 
them to cooperate in a non-trivial and enduring manner.  In this way, the pursuit of postwar 
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 See Gates 2010 and Panetta 2011.   
5
 This agreement was announced during a live Presidential television address to the American people on May 1, 
2012.   
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strategic cooperation can cost lives and other resources (on both sides) more so than other 
postwar strategies that pursue abandonment, domination, or less-cooperative institutional 
arrangements.
6
    
Third, we do not have a sufficient understanding of strategic-cooperation dynamics in 
these contexts.  It is unclear when strategic cooperation is a viable postwar strategy—
whether, in contemporary times, the conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan are even conducive 
to higher qualities of cooperation.  We simply do not understand its dynamics nor could we 
adequately predict the success of future postwar strategic cooperation efforts.   
We have given much attention to how wars start, and a bit to how wars end,
7
 but we have 
not yet given adequate attention to the conditions under which wars can resolve into 
voluntary, enduring, and deeply cooperative relationships.  Regardless, our policymakers 
commit lives in attempt to achieve postwar strategic cooperation.  In this respect, scholarship 
on this topic is overdue and could bring much needed insight into this re-emergent, costly, 
and risky U.S. foreign policy choice.  Policymakers need to understand and consider the 
dynamics of postwar strategic cooperation before committing lives and resources in pursuit 
of postwar strategic cooperation, and the academy has a duty to enable this. 
  
                                                 
6
 Such efforts can be extremely costly in terms of lives, dollars, and national attention.  Consider U.S. 
partnership efforts in Afghanistan, for instance.  62 ISAF (International Security Assistance Forces) service   
members were killed in 2012 as a result of “insider attacks” by their Afghan “partners” (see Armed Forces Press 
Service, 2013).  35 of these dead were Americans, including several Special Forces troops.  Many more were 
wounded in such attacks.  This vulnerability of U.S. troops is in large part due the “partnership” mindset.  If 
securing Afghanistan was the only objective, this could be done with much less risk to U.S. troops (i.e., U.S. 
troops could use a much more forceful and segregated posture with their Afghan trainees).  Also, the United 
States is currently negotiating with Afghanistan in regards to its post-2014 force structure in Afghanistan.  
Some of the higher troop levels that have been considered as part of this potential partnership package exceed 
20,000 personnel—no cheap endeavor.   
7
 See Reiter 2009, 1.   
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My Argument 
This study presents a bargaining theory of strategic cooperation and focuses on the 
influence of credible commitment problems to explain variation in a relationship’s qualities 
of cooperation.  My argument is that variations in a relationship’s qualities of cooperation are 
primarily explained by credible commitment problems at the international and domestic 
levels.  A state’s government must be willing to and have the opportunity to credibly commit 
to a strategic cooperation agreement in order to promote deep and enduring cooperation.  
From my theory, I identify three sources of credible commitment problems at the 
international level (spoiler problems, competitor problems, and other international 
conditions) and five sources of credible commitment problems at the domestic level 
(disinterest, trust, reconciliation, state capacity, and political unification problems) that might 
undermine a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.  I argue that the two most likely sources 
of domestic credible commitment problems in U.S. postwar contexts are reconciliation 
problems and political unification problems within the former U.S. adversary.  In these 
contexts, if former adversary leaders or their winning coalitions have reconciliation problems 
with the United States, the relationship’s qualities of cooperation will more likely suffer.  If 
those leaders and their winning coalitions do not have reconciliation problems with the 
United States, then the relationship’s qualities of cooperation depend primarily on the 
presence of political unification problems within the former adversary state.  Where political 
unification is higher, the qualities of cooperation will more likely be higher.  Where political 
unification is lower and influential domestic actors resist cooperation with the United States 
(likely the case), the qualities of cooperation will more likely be lower.   From a policy 
perspective, former adversary reconciliation and political unification are the most 
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challenging sources of credible commitment problems for the United States to mitigate.  
They, in turn, are crucial domestic variables that U.S. policymakers should consider in their 
cost, benefit, and risk analyses before committing U.S. resources in attempt to pursue 
postwar cooperation with a former adversary, particularly when the vision for that 
relationship’s depth and endurance of cooperation is ambitious (i.e., strategic). 
Relevant Literature 
What is the current contribution of the literature in explaining variation in U.S. postwar 
strategic cooperation outcomes?  Some studies help explain certain aspects of postwar 
conflict resolution outcomes, but all fall short in explaining the variation we see in strategic 
cooperation outcomes.  Two of the most relevant theories to this study are John Ikenberry’s 
institutional theory on rebuilding after war and Charles Kupchan’s theory on state 
rapprochement.  Ikenberry’s theory helps understand why states might desire a postwar 
institutional arrangement such as a strategic cooperation agreement—it explains incentive.  It 
also highlights the importance of credible commitments to these bargained agreements.  
Kupchan’s theory helps explain how states reorient identities, for instance from enemy to 
partner—it explains process. 
Institutional Theory on the Rebuilding of Order after War 
The closest theory that relates to postwar strategic cooperation between former 
adversaries after war comes from John Ikenberry’s work on institutional agreements between 
former adversaries after war.  In After Victory, Ikenberry develops a theory for the interests 
of and the dynamics between the victor and the vanquished after war.  After a war concludes, 
the winning state has three choices: use its power to dominate the weaker state, abandon the 
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weaker state and return home, or use its power to create a mutually acceptable postwar order 
with the weaker state.  Success of the latter, more cooperative choice is contingent upon an 
institutional arrangement that provides the defeated state assurances that the victor will abide 
by its commitments.
8
  
There are several reasons for the victor to prefer a cooperative postwar arrangement to 
the extent of being willing to exercise “strategic restraint” and thereby restrict itself with an 
institutional agreement.   Such an arrangement might reduce the need for instruments of 
coercion, for example military force, and thus lower the costs to maintain order.  Such an 
arrangement might also preserve for a longer time some of the victor’s current gains, 
assuming that the victor realizes it will not have an indefinite power advantage.
9
 
If the victors are willing to exercise strategic restraint, there are also several reasons for 
the vanquished to prefer a cooperative postwar arrangement.  Such an arrangement may 
improve the loser’s bargaining position, which would otherwise be based simply on power 
differentials that are currently in favor of the victor.  The incentives of such bargains, 
financial or otherwise, may include temporal advantages that are critical for the 
vanquished—immediate gains in the midst of devastation may have higher appeal than future 
freedom of choice.  Finally, such an agreement may assuage fears that the victor will 
abandon the vanquished to wallow in the chaos and despair of postwar catastrophe, or fears 
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 Ikenberry 2001, 4, 50. 
9
 Ikenberry 2001, 18, 53-56. 
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that the vanquished will be dominated by the victor or by another rival should the victor carry 
through with abandonment.
10
 
Interestingly, the greater the power disparity between the victor and vanquished, the 
higher the incentive to institutionalize the arrangement.  This is because victors can use their 
amplified power to create more advantageous arrangements and the increased disparity 
likewise increases the fear of abandonment and domination for the vanquished state.  Such 
power disparities are influenced by the “extent to which the old order was destroyed by the 
war, the decisiveness of the victory, and the degree to which the winning state was 
responsible for winning the war.”11  
Thus, there are several incentives for both the victor and the vanquished to establish an 
institutional arrangement after war, although clearly not all do.  Also, while Ikenberry’s 
theory highlights the incentives for a basic institutional arrangement after war, it stops short 
of explaining the conditions under which states can achieve the most cooperative 
arrangements (e.g., strategic cooperation with high qualities of cooperation) and does not 
explain why such highly cooperative arrangements are seldom achieved.  For example, the 
United States would often seem to support Ikenberry’s model of the victor with a high power 
advantage in pursuit of an institutional arrangement.  However, the United States has 
frequently attempted a particularly ambitious and highly cooperative variant of institutional 
arrangement with its former adversaries after war—strategic cooperation—as seen in all 
cases from World War II to present except Korea (which is technically an armistice), 
Vietnam, Serbia, Iraq 1991, and those under Soviet domination (e.g., Hungary, Romania, and 
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 Ikenberry 2001, 51-57. 
11
 Ikenberry 2001, 51, 74.   
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Bulgaria after World War II).  The reasons for this U.S. preference could be numerous—for 
instance to create an ally to help maintain regional stability and to balance against other 
threats.  At other times the United States has not attempted strategic cooperation with former 
adversaries, although it may have preferred it (e.g., the Eastern Bloc World War II cases).  If 
the United States prefers postwar cooperation and is willing to exercise strategic restraint 
through a highly cooperative strategic cooperation arrangement (instead of, for instance, a 
more dominating arrangement), and former adversaries need help mitigating postwar 
economic and security deficits, what prevents a mutually-acceptable postwar strategic 
cooperation relationship?  When strategic cooperation agreements are reached, what explains 
the variation in their outcomes?  Ikenberry’s theory alone cannot solve my puzzle.   
Theory on State Rapprochement 
Theories on state rapprochement and reconciliation are also relevant to this study.  In 
How Enemies Become Friends, Charles Kupchan offers a framework to understand the 
mechanics behind state rapprochement.  His model is broken down into four phases.  In the 
first phase, one state (the initiating state) initiates the rapprochement with a unilateral act to 
accommodate its rival (the target state)—extending the olive branch, if you will.  In phase 
two, the target state reciprocates with its own concessions and accommodations for the 
initiating state.  If the target state does not reciprocate, the initiating state may pull back the 
offer.  Else, during the third phase, a pattern of concessions and cooperative activities follows 
that reinforces the good will generated in earlier phases and causes the rivalry to abate.  In 
11 
 
the final phase, states generate new narratives of each other to change the identity of their 
former adversary from rival to friend.  This begets a stable peace.
12
 
While Kupchan offers a theory to articulate the phases of reconciliation between rival 
states (which might help explain the phases of reconciliation between war adversaries), he 
stops short of explaining the conditions under which states can achieve the most cooperative 
reconciliation outcomes (e.g., strategic cooperation agreements) and does not explain why 
such cooperative arrangements are seldom achieved.  What conditions influence the rival 
state’s willingness to accept or reject the initiating state’s rapprochement offer, let alone a 
strategic cooperation offer?  What happens to strategic cooperation outcomes if the citizens 
of a prospective partner state fail to “re-identify” a rival group (even at its government’s 
urging) from enemy to non-enemy, let alone to enduring partner?  When does rapprochement 
lead to relationships with higher qualities of cooperation?  Kupchan’s theory alone also 
cannot solve my puzzle.  
Dissertation Flow 
With this foundation to begin a study of strategic cooperation, the rest of this dissertation 
will flow as follows.  In Chapter 2, I present my theory of strategic cooperation, to include 
theory and hypotheses dedicated to both general strategic cooperation and strategic 
cooperation specifically in the U.S. postwar context.  In Chapter 3, I present my research 
design.  In Chapter 4, I present my case study of the postwar relationship between the United 
States and Germany, which tests my theory against circumstances where both international 
and domestic conditions were favorable for higher qualities of cooperation (West Germany) 
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 Kupchan 2010a, 16-50. 
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and where international conditions were unfavorable and domestic conditions were favorable 
for higher qualities of cooperation (East Germany).  In Chapter 5, I present my case study of 
the postwar relationship between the United States and Iraq after 1991, which tests my theory 
against a case where both international and domestic conditions were unfavorable for higher 
qualities of cooperation.  In Chapter 6, I present my case study of the postwar relationship 
between the United States and Iraq after 2003, which tests my theory against a case where 
international conditions were favorable but domestic conditions were unfavorable for higher 
qualities of cooperation.  This case allows us to see how my two key domestic variables—
former adversary reconciliation and political unification problems—influence qualities of 
cooperation in the U.S. postwar context.  I conclude my study in Chapter 7, in which I 
present brief case studies of the postwar relationship between the United States and Serbia 
and a counterfactual of the postwar relationship between the United States and Iraq after 
2003.  I do this to further demonstrate how variations in former adversary reconciliation and 
political unification problems influence qualities of cooperation.  I also provide specific 
recommendations for the academy and policymakers. 
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CHAPTER 2: A THEORY OF STRATEGIC COOPERATION 
 
In this chapter, I present my theory for the condition(s) that cause variations in the 
qualities of strategic cooperation between the United States and its recent war adversaries.  
My argument is that variations in a relationship’s qualities of cooperation are primarily 
explained by credible commitment problems at the international and domestic levels.  A 
state’s government must be willing to and have the opportunity to credibly commit to a 
strategic cooperation agreement in order to promote deep and enduring cooperation.  From 
my theory, I identify three sources of credible commitment problems at the international 
level (spoiler problems, competitor problems, and other international conditions) and five 
sources of credible commitment problems at the domestic level (disinterest, trust, 
reconciliation, state capacity, and political unification problems) that might undermine a 
relationship’s qualities of cooperation.  I argue that the two most likely sources of domestic 
credible commitment problems in U.S. postwar contexts are reconciliation problems and 
political unification problems within the former U.S. adversary.  In these contexts, if former 
adversary leaders or their winning coalitions have reconciliation problems with the United 
States, the relationship’s qualities of cooperation will more likely suffer.  If those leaders and 
their winning coalitions do not have reconciliation problems with the United States, then the 
relationship’s qualities of cooperation depend primarily on the presence of political 
unification problems within the former adversary state.  Where political unification is higher, 
the qualities of cooperation will more likely be higher.  Where political unification is lower 
14 
 
and influential domestic actors resist cooperation with the United States (likely the case), the 
qualities of cooperation will more likely be lower.   From a policy perspective, former 
adversary reconciliation and political unification are the most challenging sources of credible 
commitment problems for the United States to mitigate.  They, in turn, are crucial domestic 
variables that U.S. policymakers should consider in their cost, benefit, and risk analyses 
before committing U.S. resources in attempt to pursue postwar cooperation with a former 
adversary, particularly when the vision for that relationship’s depth and endurance of 
cooperation is ambitious (i.e., “strategic”). 
In the remainder of this chapter, I first explain my theoretical perspective.  I then theorize 
on how strategic cooperation works in general.  Next, I identify several theoretical sources of 
credible commitment problems at the international and domestic levels that could influence a 
relationship’s qualities of cooperation.  From this, I derive four testable and falsifiable 
general hypotheses about strategic cooperation.  I then narrow in on strategic cooperation 
considerations that are specific to the context of this study—U.S. wars from World War II to 
present—and use this process to focus my general hypotheses to my interest area and assist 
with forthcoming case selection and policymaking recommendations.   
Theoretical Perspective 
The theory that I present in this chapter is pragmatic towards the “isms.”  It is, at heart, a 
rationalist theory based upon the widely-proliferated bargaining framework.  Thomas 
Schelling noted that “most conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations,” and this 
insight applies to my study of conflict that resolves to varied levels of cooperation.
13
  The 
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 Schelling 1960, 5.  See also Reiter 2009, 2. 
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bargaining approach led me to consider problems of unenforceable commitments between 
states—that is, credible commitment problems.  This inspired my commitment-based 
explanation of strategic cooperation outcomes that hinges on the insight that prospective 
partners who are fearful of credible commitment problems are less likely to enter into or 
follow through with strategic cooperation agreements.
14
  While this credible commitment 
construct may perhaps be an imperfect fit for some components of my theory,
15
 it is 
nonetheless a useful conceptual tool to help grapple with abstract phenomena and identify the 
potential problems that might undermine a bargain for cooperation.  By proceeding with the 
premise that states must credibly commit to an agreement for cooperation in order to promote 
deep and enduring cooperation, we gain leverage on this puzzle, perfect fit or otherwise.   
My theoretical perspective relies on a few important assumptions.  First, states are 
important actors, but states are not the only important actors in this story.  A state, 
corporately and through its government, declares war, commits to treaties, and importantly to 
my study, enters strategic cooperation agreements.  However, subnational actors are also 
important in that they make strategic choices, sometimes on behalf of state interests and 
sometimes on behalf of their own interests, and this dynamic might have significant influence 
on a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.   
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 See Reiter 2009, 5.  This analytical approach is modeled upon Walter 2002 and Reiter 2009.   
15
 A purist might argue that a “credible commitment problem” requires the current conditions to support the 
honoring of commitments while a possible future condition may not support the honoring of commitments, 
thereby creating a time-inconsistency problem.  I take a looser theoretical approach with the perspective that 
current conditions might support the affirmation (e.g., signing) of an agreement while future or current 
conditions might not support the honoring of that agreement, thereby creating a credible commitment problem.  
Also, deadlock preferences—“the absence of mutual interest”—might be another way to describe some of the 
components of my theory (see Oye 1985, 7).   
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Secondly, anarchy is unavoidable, and this necessarily creates a situation where state 
compliance with international agreements, such as a strategic cooperation agreement, is not 
automatic.  There is no world government to enforce strategic cooperation promises.  This 
creates uncertainty as to whether a pledge for strategic cooperation will be honored, even if 
made—that is, whether commitments to strategic cooperation are credible.16  This dynamic 
has an increased opportunity to affect a strategic cooperation arrangement’s qualities of 
cooperation because of the enduring nature of the intended relationship.    
Third, state power certainly matters in postwar conflict resolution outcomes, especially 
when it comes to a state’s capacity to offer incentives for cooperation or a state’s need to 
seek external support through cooperation.  However, power is not the only attribute that 
matters in this credible commitment story—other attributes could take precedence over actor 
preferences and decisions, especially over the course of an enduring relationship. 
Institutions, for instance, may matter more or less to the credibility of commitments over 
the course of an enduring relationship.  Recall that strategic cooperation, as I have defined it, 
is a voluntary arrangement—state actors eventually have substantive choices about how 
deeply and enduringly they will cooperate.  Thus, institutions may be important to help 
resolve collaboration and distribution issues.  Institutions can reduce transaction costs and 
thereby increase the payoff of cooperation.  Institutions can help resolve problems of 
information deficits and asymmetries by enhancing transparency through monitoring and 
reporting.  Institutions can facilitate cooperative reciprocity by discouraging backsliding 
when they have the ability to identify and punish defectors.  Importantly, institutions can help 
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 See Reiter 2009, 23-50 for a similar approach to the topic of anarchy.   
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overcome certain time-inconsistency problems by insulating leaders from domestic pressures 
to renege on an agreement.  All of these factors combine to help mitigate trust issues and 
institutionalize strategic cooperation arrangements so they can survive the inevitable 
“jostling” over the course of an enduring relationship.17   
Identities may also matter to the credibility of commitments over the course of an 
enduring relationship.  While I assume that states and actors are rational, their primary 
preferences may waver between material and ideational concerns at any given time.  
Materialism and ideation are both important and both are considered in my theory.  One 
could envision circumstances where short-term preferences would favor material concerns 
but long-term preferences would bend towards ideational concerns—a Maslowian scenario of 
sorts where one does what one must in order to survive today in hopes that one might be able 
to improve one’s circumstances tomorrow.  For example, a weak state might cooperate in the 
immediate aftermath of war to reap available benefits (e.g., material aid) to mitigate 
immediate security deficiencies.  However, once that weak state is self-sufficient with respect 
to security (i.e., has regained enough power to neutralize an internal or external threat), 
ideational preferences over religion, ethnicity, culture, or regime-type, for instance, may 
inspire alteration to the status quo, thereby altering the qualities of cooperation.  For some 
actors, ideational concerns may outweigh all others outright, regardless of immediate security 
or survival concerns.  Importantly, as I will demonstrate later, the material benefits of 
strategic cooperation are often great, particularly after war.  However, states do not always 
agree to such cooperation.  Nor, when states do agree to cooperation, do states always “do 
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 See Martin and Simmons 1998, Keohane and Martin 1995, and Keohane 1984 for explanations of these and 
other merits and limits of institutions.   
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cooperation” well, even when there are obvious gains to be made.  Materialism is clearly not 
the only driving factor of strategic cooperation outcomes! 
A last assumption is that structural factors and actors are both important to strategic 
cooperation outcomes—both must be supportive to enable the highest qualities of 
cooperation.  When able, I give privilege to structural factors and how structure influences an 
actor’s opportunity or willingness to commit to strategic cooperation.  This is in hopes to 
improve the predictive power of my theory.  
This pragmatic and somewhat eclectic theoretical perspective suggests that I should 
consider a great many conditions that could influence a relationship’s qualities of 
cooperation.  Strategic cooperation agreements are intended to be enduring—a great many of 
these considerations might take primacy at one point or another and have a large influence on 
strategic cooperation outcomes.   
How to Make Strategic Cooperation Work: the Ingredients 
Cooperation between nations, especially the deep and enduring cooperation associated 
with a strategic cooperation agreement, takes effort—it is not without cost.  Therefore, there 
must be some incentive to engage in strategic cooperation—something to gain.  Further, 
since strategic cooperation is voluntary, both sides in a strategic cooperation arrangement 
have a vote on whether its intended cooperation will commence and whether it will 
continue.
18
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The Incentive for Strategic Cooperation 
Accordingly, a strategic cooperation arrangement must generate what David Lake terms a 
“joint production economy”— an efficiency from cooperation that produces a net gain.19  
This gain, however, could be material or otherwise.  There are several potential benefits of 
strategic cooperation, including benefits to a state’s economy, security, and intangibles such 
as status and legitimacy.
20
  Using security as an example, Lake explains that: 
“When joint production economies exist, the pooling of resources by two 
polities produces more security than the sum of their individual efforts; the 
two polities can thereby enjoy more security for the same cost or the prior 
level of security at less cost to themselves.  Joint production economics are 
necessary for polities to cooperate at all: as cooperation is costly…there must 
be some benefit that is not available through unilateralism.”21   
Importantly for this study, Lake finds in subsequent work that weaker (subordinate) states 
tend to spend less on their security than they would otherwise when they participate in 
security arrangements (often a component of strategic cooperation) with stronger states.
22
   
Similarly, Alexander Cooley studies the politics of basing troops on foreign soil (which is 
also sometimes a component of strategic cooperation) and finds that “a foreign military 
presence can offer internal security and a guarantee that the host regime will survive an 
internal threat.”23  Aside from economic gains for certain domestic actors, Cooley finds that 
oversees U.S. basing arrangements (and I would argue strategic cooperation arrangements as 
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well) “can also provide intangible benefits such as prestige, legitimacy, and association with 
the United States and the West.”24  
These benefits are in addition to the benefits that an institutional agreement such as a 
strategic cooperation agreement can bring, specifically to the postwar environment.  As noted 
previously, Ikenberry argues that a vanquished (weaker) state might improve its bargaining 
position, garner crucial immediate gains (e.g., reconstructive efforts), and assuage 
abandonment concerns (and thereby increase security) through such an arrangement.  A 
victorious (stronger) state can reduce the need for costly coercive instruments and preserve 
gains for a longer period through such an arrangement.  Theoretically, then, the spectrum of 
weak to strong states has potential gains from, and incentives for, strategic cooperation, and 
as we see often in the U.S. postwar context, even the most powerful state in the system has 
found incentive to pursue such cooperation. 
Clearly not all strategic cooperation is of equal value to a given partner.  For example, the 
robust U.S. strategic cooperation arrangement with Germany after World War II greatly 
increased U.S. economic influence in Europe at the expense of then-peer-rival Russia.  This 
cooperative arrangement may well have greater utility to the United States than U.S. strategic 
cooperation arrangements with any number of Caribbean states that have produced more 
modest gains for U.S. influence at the expense of lesser-rival Cuba.
25
  As Lake explains, 
“The greater the gains from joint production, in turn, the more likely polities are to 
cooperate.”26  There may also be disincentives for cooperation that countermand the 
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incentives for cooperation, and I will discuss many of these disincentives later.  But as long 
as there is a joint economy—as long as there is a net gain of some sort from cooperation—
there is an incentive for strategic cooperation, and as I explained, there are numerous reasons 
for a joint production economy of some sort to exist.   
The Mechanics of Strategic Cooperation: Commit, Cooperate, and Achieve 
In accordance with bargaining theory, if prospective participants in strategic cooperation 
have something that they would like to gain from a strategic cooperation agreement, they 
must credibly commit to that agreement to signal to their own agents to cooperate with the 
other participant and to facilitate reciprocal cooperation from the other partner—states must 
credibly commit to the cooperative relationship to promote cooperation, let alone deep and 
enduring cooperation.
27
  This credible commitment is the foundation upon which the 
cooperation is built.  Then, throughout the course of the enduring relationship, the states must 
“do” strategic cooperation—states must cooperate towards mutual interests in an enduring 
and non-trivial (deep, strategic) manner.
28
  These recurring demonstrations of cooperation 
serve two purposes.  First, they serve to further their immediate arrangement objectives (e.g., 
build joint-use facilities).  Second, they serve to signal continued commitment to the 
relationship.  Ultimately, this cooperation yields the fruits of the arrangement—states, 
working together, achieve results.  Depending on the success of the relationship, these results 
may be net gains or net losses, and may coincide more or less with each participant’s 
intended purpose for the arrangement.  This relationship is graphically depicted in Figure 1 
below.   
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Figure 1: General Strategic Cooperation Framework 
In this study, as I have previously discussed, I focus on the ambition and realization of 
the depth and endurance of a relationship’s cooperation—its “qualities of cooperation”—as a 
tractable measure of these strategic cooperation results.
29
  These qualities of cooperation 
themselves reflect key cooperation purposes and are perhaps the most important aspect of a 
supposed strategic-cooperation relationship.  Further, by utilizing these qualities of 
cooperation as my dependent variable, I am able to compare qualities of cooperation across 
cases, whether or not a strategic cooperation relationship was attempted.      
As conceptualized in the simplified model in Figure 1, the cooperative relationship is like 
a beam held up by the credible commitment of the participating nations to their cooperative 
arrangement.  The cooperative relationship itself is comprised of the cooperative 
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contributions of the participating states to the arrangement.  That cooperation produces an 
output of results—the fruits of the cooperation—which is represented in the container above 
the output vector.
30
  This model represents a strategic cooperation relationship with higher 
qualities of cooperation.  It is in balance.  Both states have credibly demonstrated full 
commitment to the arrangement and are holding up their end of the beam.  Both states are 
demonstrating full cooperation towards cooperative goals.  The output signal is strong 
(thick), demonstrating that the sum of their joint efforts is greater than the sum of their 
individual efforts—synergy.  The strategic cooperation arrangement is highly ambitious (the 
container above the output vector is large) and the strategic cooperation is yielding favorable 
results—a high proportion of these ambitious cooperative goals are being achieved.  That is, 
this strategic cooperation arrangement has both a high level of cooperative ambition and a 
high level of cooperative realization.   
To more practically illuminate the nuances of the linkage between commitment, 
cooperation, and strategic cooperation outcomes, consider this analogy of engaging in 
strategic cooperation with a specific state as compared to leasing a new car from a specific 
dealership.  To achieve the ultimate purpose of the relationship—the lessee gets a new car 
and the dealership gets the lessee’s money—the lessee and the dealer must first obligate 
themselves by signing a legally-enforceable leasing agreement (i.e., both states must credibly 
commit to the strategic cooperation agreement).  Then, both entities must do those things 
necessary to complete the transfer of the vehicle and maintain the vehicle warranty—
registration, insurance, payments, oil changes, and so forth (i.e., agents of both states must 
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cooperate through continued action and, thereby, reinforce that credible commitment).  Then, 
in all likelihood, the result will be a successful long-term lease (i.e., a strategic cooperation 
arrangement with higher levels of cooperation).   
The credibility of commitments can vary and there are several mechanisms that can 
strengthen the credibility of commitments.  Some of the possible mechanisms to strengthen 
credible commitments include costly signals, credible contracts, institutions, and third party 
guarantees.
31
   
Costly signals send the message that one is “committed to the cooperative relationship”—
the more costly the signal, the more credible the signal.  Costly signals in more routine 
contexts might include an engagement ring in conjunction with a wedding proposal, earnest 
money for a home-purchase offer, or collateral for a loan.  In the strategic cooperation 
context, irreversible investments can serve as a costly signal.  For instance, if a prospective 
participant completes a high-value infrastructure project on the other’s territory, the resultant 
asset, which might be vulnerable to nationalization, can improve the credibility of the 
prospective participant’s commitment to the cooperative relationship.  Additionally, in 
strategic cooperation contexts, costly signals often take the form of public pledges by state 
officials.  For instance, the strategic cooperation agreement between the United States and 
Iraq is embodied in the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and 
Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq (a.k.a., the SFA).   
U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker signed the SFA in 2008 and that SFA is available online to 
the public, along with updates to its implementation progress.  Sending an even costlier 
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signal, President Obama recently traveled to a combat zone and addressed the United States 
(and, thereby, the world) on live television from Bagram Airbase, Afghanistan to announce 
his signing of the U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement.
32
  Such signals are costly 
because they are transparent and public (aside from being potentially dangerous, politically 
costly, and/or financially expensive).  They announce to all interested parties that the 
cooperative relationship is “on.”  This stakes the reputation of the sender (the individual and 
the state) on the conduct and success of the relationship.  It also provides the receiver (the 
other participant) leverage—since the promises of relationship have been made public, others 
will know if the sender backslides on its promises.  Backsliding, therefore, could be costly to 
the sender in other ventures and, accordingly, such costly signals provide reassurances to the 
receiver that the sender’s commitment to the relationship is credible.   
A credible contract may or may not accompany the costly signal, and may or may not be 
backed by the strength of credible institutions or third party guarantees.  A contract (e.g., a 
strategic cooperation agreement) with reasonably achievable aims reinforces the idea that the 
contract is feasible.  This contract is more credible than a contract with impossible goals.  For 
instance, a contract for a million-dollar home loan from a bank to a buyer would lack 
credibility if that buyer was broke, unemployed, undereducated, had a terrible credit rating, 
and had no prospects for future income.  Even if both parties agreed to sign (commit) to the 
contract, there is little hope that the buyer would ever achieve the capacity to fulfill the 
contractual obligations (i.e., the loan payments).  Additionally, a contract with enforcement 
mechanisms is more credible than a similar contract without such mechanisms.  Credible 
institutions and third party guarantees can reinforce the idea that the contract is enforceable 
                                                 
32
 May 1, 2012.   
26 
 
and therefore protected.  For instance, strong domestic institutions that respect the rule of 
contractual law might better protect the agreement in the future so that the contract will not 
be subject solely to the whim of an individual leader’s preferences.33  Institutional strategies 
like “cost-sharing” (splitting the cost of subcomponents of the contract so that those 
components fail without joint effort) and “tit-for-tat” (each participant gives a little at a time, 
waiting for reciprocation) can also help contractual credibility.  Pertinent to my specific 
research question, credible U.S. commitment is more likely than credible former adversary 
commitment.  This is because consolidated democracies, in general, offer the most credible 
contracts while states under transition are the most uncertain.
34
  While the United States is a 
consolidated democracy, its former adversaries almost never are.  Rather, those former 
adversaries are often in political transition after war (e.g., democratizing like Germany, 
Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan), which is the least favorable scenario for credible contracts.   
Lastly, some strategic cooperation agreements are more loosely specified than others.  
Consider the differences in language between the renowned NATO Article 5 (invoked for the 
first and only time thus far after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001) and the sole 
paragraph on defense and security cooperation from the SFA between the United States and 
Iraq, as depicted below: 
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe 
or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and 
consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in 
exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties 
so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other 
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to 
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restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”—Excerpt from 
North Atlantic Treaty Article 5 (emphasis mine) 
“In order to strengthen security and stability in Iraq, and thereby contribute to 
international peace and stability, and to enhance the ability of the Republic of 
Iraq to deter all threats against its sovereignty, security, and territorial 
integrity, the Parties shall continue to foster close cooperation concerning 
defense and security arrangements without prejudice to Iraqi sovereignty over 
its land, sea, and air territory.”—Excerpt from SFA (emphasis mine) 
As seen in this example, some strategic cooperation agreements may lack some of the 
binding language of other interstate contracts.  Since some strategic cooperation agreements 
can be vague, open to wide interpretation, and therefore hard to enforce from a traditional 
credible contract perspective, credibly committing to strategic cooperation may be more 
heavily dependent on costly signals such as costly public affirmation of the relationship and 
recurring and enduring demonstrations of cooperation.  When credible commitment to the 
relationship is in question, cost sharing and tit-for-tat strategies may help mitigate concerns.   
Undermining Strategic Cooperation Outcomes: Credible Commitment Problems 
While there are often joint economies to be gained from a strategic cooperation, 
cooperation is not always attempted.  Nor, when strategic cooperation is attempted, do those 
cooperative relationships necessarily exhibit the same depth and endurance of cooperation, 
particularly in the postwar context. What explains these variations in strategic cooperation 
outcomes?  I argue that variations in a relationship’s qualities of cooperation are primarily 
explained by credible commitment problems at the international and domestic levels. 
Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr provide a framework that helps to systematically 
theorize the potential variables that might influence a state’s ability to credibly commit to a 
28 
 
strategic cooperation arrangement.
35
  While states might have much to gain from strategic 
cooperation, they must also have the opportunity and the willingness to credibly commit to a 
cooperative agreement.  Else, their ability to send costly signals that they are committed to 
the cooperative relationship, initially and through recurring acts of cooperation, will be 
impaired.  This will be perceived by the other participant and, in turn, decrease that 
participant’s willingness to contribute to the cooperative relationship.  In such circumstances, 
a relationship’s depth and endurance of cooperation will suffer—one or both of the 
participants will backslide on the arrangement.
36
  As such, I consider in this study a great 
many potential variables from a wide range of literature that might affect the opportunity or 
willingness of a state to credibly commit to strategic cooperation.   
Robert Putnam’s framework for two-level games, which analyzes the dynamics of 
international agreements at the international and domestic levels, is useful to this study as 
well.
37
  Reflecting on Putnam’s insights, one must consider the wider international audience 
(which might include a range of states from friendly to hostile towards the participants or the 
cooperative arrangement) and domestic audience (which might likewise include a range of 
populations from friendly to hostile towards the participants or the cooperative arrangement) 
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and how this dynamic might affect a state’s opportunity and willingness to credibly commit 
to a strategic cooperation agreement.  A state’s agents (e.g., its leaders) might voluntarily 
defect from a cooperative relationship of their own accord (i.e., they lack willingness), or 
they might involuntary defect when they are unable to deliver on promises because of 
international or domestic forces (i.e., they lack the opportunity).
38
  Cooley observes this as 
well in his study on the politics of basing, explaining how this dynamic might affect a 
bargaining situation: 
“rulers of host countries are involved in two sets of hierarchical political 
relationships, or nested hierarchies, in that they manage relations with the 
sending
39
 state while simultaneously providing public goods and selective 
incentives to their domestic political clients and supporters, who are also 
known as the ‘selectorate.’ These dual imperatives interact in a two-level 
game in which rulers use base-related [or, for this study, we could substitute 
“strategic-cooperation-related”] issues and resources for their domestic 
political purposes but can also invoke domestic constraints in their 
negotiations with the sender.”40   
With all of this in mind, I consider variables that emanate from both the international and 
domestic levels that might affect the opportunity or willingness of a state to credibly commit 
to a strategic cooperation agreement.   
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s selectorate theory is also applicable to this study.41  
Reflecting on the insights of selectorate theory, one must consider both the state leadership 
and other influential subnational entities as one considers the opportunity and willingness of 
a state government to credibly commit to a strategic cooperation agreement.  Selectorate 
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theory compliments Putnam’s theory in that it specifies several important types of actors at 
the domestic level that might influence a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.  Importantly, 
it assumes, as do I in this study, that leaders want to stay in power.
42
  Strategic cooperation 
can provide a variety of benefits, resources, and opportunities to leaders in achieving those 
ends.
43
   
The selectorate is the enfranchised portion of a state’s residents that has a formal role in 
selecting its government’s leadership.  The selectorate can be large or small.  For instance, in 
a consolidated democracy with widespread suffrage, the selectorate could be quite large in 
proportion to the resident population.  In an autocracy, the selectorate may be quite small, 
perhaps just a few powerful elite.  The winning coalition is the subset of the selectorate that 
controls whether a leader remains in power.  The winning coalition may be large or small as 
well.  For instance, in a consolidated two-party democracy, the winning coalition may be as 
large as the simple majority (i.e., 51%) of the voting population.  In an autocracy, the 
winning coalition may be quite small, consisting of only a handful of powerful elite with the 
power to suppress the preferences of the masses.  Large winning coalitions often encourage 
leaders to provide more public goods to stay in power, while small winning coalitions often 
encourage leaders to provide more private goods to their smaller pool of vital supporters to 
stay in power.  Importantly for this study, selectorate theory draws one inward to look at 
leaders, those who keep leaders in power (i.e., the winning coalition), other influential 
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domestic actors who might challenge the leaders and winning coalition based on their own 
strategic cooperation preferences, and how all of these types of actors are rewarded or 
punished by a given strategic cooperation agreement.   
Selectorate theory highlights the possibility that a strategic cooperation agreement could 
become politicized.  As Cooley finds with respect to hosting foreign bases, strategic 
cooperation with a particular state might mean different things to different actors, and a 
single actor’s views might change considerably over time.44  A given strategic cooperation 
agreement might represent a welcomed opportunity for prosperity or security to some, while 
at the same time representing unwanted competition and meddling to others.  In the postwar 
environment, a given strategic cooperation agreement might represent a welcomed linkage to 
a liberator from oppression to some, while at the same time representing an untoward, 
lingering tie to an oppressor to others.  As a practical example from U.S. history, when 
basing presence is a security byproduct of a strategic cooperation agreement, that basing 
could be seen as an endorsement of a political regime to some, or a “symbol of violated 
national sovereignty, U.S. imperialism, and political struggle” to others.45  Other actors might 
be completely ambivalent to the cooperative relationship. This dynamic creates cleavages 
that can be exploited politically by actors who are in or out of the winning coalition or 
selectorate.  Leaders, then, must be vigilant to appease their winning coalition or that 
winning coalition might defect and allow the selectorate to replace those leaders with others 
who match their strategic-cooperation-willingness level (e.g., pro-strategic cooperation or 
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otherwise).  Leaders must also be mindful of other influential actors who might use a 
strategic cooperation issue as an opportunity or motive to challenge the leader.   
Accordingly, while I consider state behavior, I also consider the behavior of several other 
important actors that matter to this story.  As a review, external (international) actors that 
have the power to influence the cooperative relationship matter, and these actors can promote 
or undermine the relationship.  Domestic leaders—those policymakers who make the 
decision to commit to the cooperative relationship (e.g., a president or parliament)—and their 
winning coalitions matter as well.  For autocracies, the winning coalition could be a small 
group whose loyalty can be secured with private goods.  For democracies, this is typically a 
large group that demands public goods.  Other influential domestic actors that have the 
opportunity and willingness to influence the cooperative relationship also matter.  They may 
have their own interests that conflict with those of the state, its leaders, or the winning 
coalition, and they may be able to challenge the government for the loyalty of the population 
and effectively undermine a strategic cooperation agreement.  They might also resort to 
extra-legal means to intimidate or exploit, and in so doing, undermine the cooperative 
relationship.  A recent example might be Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq whose followers violently 
challenged both the Iraqi government and U.S. forces, and in doing so, the U.S.-Iraq 
cooperative relationship.  
To summarize, as I weigh the theoretical insights of Most and Starr, Putnam, and Bueno 
de Mesquita et al., I consider many potential sources of credible commitment problems 
extracted from many types of literatures (e.g., bargaining, nation building, alliance, and 
rapprochement literatures), emanating from multiple levels (e.g., international and domestic 
levels), and contingent upon the preferences and dynamics of several important actors (e.g., 
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leaders, their winning coalition, and other influential domestic actors).  I prioritize, narrow, 
and simplify those variables in a structured and methodical way using Most and Starr’s 
framework—what most affects a state’s opportunity and willingness to credibly commit to 
strategic cooperation agreements and, in turn, cooperate to achieve desired results?   
I identify eight sources of credible commitment problems at the international and 
domestic levels—my independent variables that affect my dependent variable of a 
relationship’s qualities of cooperation.  At the international level, I find three potential 
sources of credible commitment problems: spoilers, competitors, and other international 
conditions.  At the domestic level, I find five potential sources of credible commitment 
problems: disinterest, trust, reconciliation, state capacity, and political unification
46
 
problems.   
 To avoid confusion, I caution the reader that these independent variables should not be 
assumed as “good” or “bad” for a relationship’s qualities of cooperation based on the 
normative connotation of their labels.  Much of my terminology to label the sources of 
credible commitment problems was chosen to best match extant literature (which talks about 
reconciliation, not irreconcilation; trust issues, not mistrust issues; political unification, not 
political disunification, and so forth).  “Trust” is normatively good.  “Spoiler” is normatively 
bad.  “Other international conditions” is normatively neutral.  Yet problems in any of these 
“sources of credible commitment problems” would be “bad” for a relationship’s qualities of 
cooperation.  For instance, the act of reconciliation may be normatively good for cooperation, 
but the related source of credible commitment problem is a lack of or a deficiency in 
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reconciliation that would undermine a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.   The 
independent variable’s “reconciliation” label is simply used to identify the source-type for 
the credible commitment problem in a way that is parsimonious, natural, and familiar.    
Figure 2 below graphically depicts the effects of these sources of credible commitment 
problems on my original model depicted in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 2: General Strategic Cooperation Framework with Credible Commitment 
Problems 
As conceptualized in the simplified model of Figure 2, the introduction of credible 
commitment problems to the strategic cooperation framework causes a breakdown in 
credible commitment, cooperation, and ultimately strategic cooperation results.  A credible 
commitment problem from any of the sources in the red container at the bottom of the model 
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could undermine the relationship at its very foundation—the opportunity or willingness of 
one or both of the participants to credibly commit to the strategic cooperation relationship.  
This model represents a strategic cooperation relationship with lower qualities of 
cooperation.  State B has credible commitment problems causing State B’s end of the beam 
(i.e., the cooperative relationship) to fall.  State B’s deficiency in credible commitment 
causes State B’s cooperation to fall off—the progress towards achieving immediate 
cooperation objectives is faltering, and State B’s opportunity and willingness to recurrently 
signal credible commitment through cooperation towards the relationship is undermined.  
The strategic cooperation output signal is weak—the states are not achieving the desired joint 
economies.  The cooperative relationship is highly ambitious (the container above the output 
vector is large) but is yielding unfavorable results—a high proportion of its ambitious 
cooperative goals are not being achieved.  That is, this strategic cooperation arrangement has 
a high level of cooperative ambition but a low level of cooperative realization.  Further, State 
B’s credible commitment problem is sensed by State A and, accordingly, State A feels the 
increasing burden of the relationship’s load.  State A also observes State B’s commensurate 
drop-off in cooperation, the reduced output signal, and the unfavorable cooperation results.  
State A must decide how to respond to State B’s credible commitment problem.  State A then 
reduces its own commitment and cooperation.  The degenerative cycle might then repeat, 
depending on the circumstances, and further erode the relationship’s qualities of cooperation.   
International sources of credible commitment problems 
I identify three sources of credible commitment problems at the international level that 
might undermine a relationship’s qualities of cooperation: spoilers, competitors, and other 
international conditions.  Credible commitment problems from any one of these sources 
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could significantly undermine strategic cooperation results or even preclude an attempt of 
strategic cooperation outright. 
 A spoiler is a state that has both the opportunity and the willingness to preclude the 
possibility of strategic cooperation by force or coercion.  This creates an opportunity problem 
for both of the prospective strategic cooperation participants—even if they are willing to 
cooperate, a spoiler might preclude such cooperation at any time of its choosing.  An 
example of this would be the Soviets in the aftermath of World War II and throughout the 
Cold War.  The Soviets simply would not have allowed the United States and Eastern Bloc 
nations to engage in strategic cooperation at that time.  A spoiler is not synonymous with 
threat, enemy, or nemesis.  North Korea is currently an enemy of the United States and a 
threat to South Korea, but lacks the opportunity (power) to spoil the fruitful cooperation 
between Washington and Seoul.  After World War II, the United States was neither enemy 
nor threat to Germany (quite the opposite), but was a spoiler to any potential strategic 
cooperation between the Russians and Germans in the Western zones it occupied.   
A spoiler could undermine credible commitment to strategic cooperation agreements, and 
thereby degrade a relationship’s qualities of cooperation, in several ways.  It could, for 
instance, physically block the costly signals of commitment to the arrangement or the 
commensurate recurring acts of cooperation between the prospective participants by 
controlling physical access to territory, post, the media, and so forth (e.g., to deny access for 
agreement negotiations).  A spoiler could also use violence, credible threats of reprisal, or 
other forms of intimidation to prevent or coerce a prospective participant from committing to 
and participating in a cooperative agreement.  If State B from my model has a spoiler as a 
source of credible commitment problems, State A has good cause to fear that State B would 
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renege on its promises in the future and involuntarily defect from the cooperative agreement 
due to interference from the spoiler (that is, if the spoiler allows the prospective participants 
to communicate and come to terms for a strategic cooperation agreement in the first place).   
A competitor is a state that has the opportunity and the willingness to provide a more 
desirable outcome for one of the prospective strategic cooperation participants (I will call this 
participant the target state)—a better offer.  This creates a willingness problem for the target 
state—even if it has the opportunity to engage in strategic cooperation with the other 
prospective participant, the target state might willingly succumb to a competitor’s higher bid 
at any time of the target state’s choosing.  Importantly, there must be an element of 
exclusivity to the competitor’s offer—something that precludes the target state from strategic 
cooperation with both the competitor and the other prospective participant.  The U.S. 
cooperative relationship with Germany after World War II was not entirely exclusive.  
Germany has enjoyed close cooperation with both the United States and the United Kingdom 
since that time.  However, had West Germany pursued strategic cooperation with Russia 
after World War II, it is entirely conceivable that the United States would have forced West 
Germany to “choose sides” or lose U.S. support.   
A competitor could undermine credible commitment to strategic cooperation, and thereby 
degrade a relationship’s qualities of cooperation, in several ways.  It could offer better 
security or economic advantages to the target state—for instance, the sale or transfer of 
superior hi-technology weaponry (public goods) to U.S. partners during the Cold War that 
was contingent upon those states keeping their alignment clear and keeping their distance 
from U.S. rivals.  A competitor could also undermine strategic cooperation at a subnational 
(private goods) level.  For instance, a competitor might offer exclusive rents to key 
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policymakers or members of the target state’s winning coalition (if that state’s laws allow or 
if there is corruption) that could not be equaled or exceeded by the other prospective 
participant and that would be forfeit if that strategic cooperation were to transpire.  If State B 
from my model has a competitor as a source of credible commitment problems, State A has 
good cause to fear that State B would renege on its promises in the future and voluntarily 
defect from the strategic cooperation agreement to capture a higher payoff from the exclusive 
cooperation rents of the competitor.     
Other international conditions may also be international sources of credible commitment 
problems.  This is a regrettable but necessary “catch all” category, and issues that arise from 
this source of credible commitment problems could create an opportunity or willingness 
problem for one or both of the prospective participants of a cooperative agreement.  For 
instance, the regional geopolitical situation may be such that strategic cooperation between 
the two prospective participants causes undesirable second and third order effects, perhaps by 
conflicting with existing alliances and international agreements for one of the participants.  
Perhaps one of the states is considered a “pariah” and any cooperation with it would bring 
fears of contributing to regional or global instability, empowering a threat, and damaging 
one’s image.  Perhaps there is an incompatibility with ideology, as seen between the states 
that voluntarily aligned with the West or the Soviet Union during the Cold War.  These other 
international conditions could undermine credible commitment to strategic cooperation, and 
thereby degrade a relationship’s qualities of cooperation, in several ways or might preclude 
the willingness of states to even consider (let alone credibly commit to) a cooperative 
arrangement outright.  For instance, if State B from my model is ruled by someone whom 
many consider to be a ruthless dictator or a war criminal, State A has good cause to fear that 
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State B would renege in the future on critical cooperation promises (such as not using the 
proceeds from the cooperative relationship to harm its residents or others).  State B cannot 
credibly commit to being a non-pariah in the future and, therefore, cannot credibly commit to 
a strategic cooperation agreement with another state that is unwilling to closely cooperate 
with such types. 
Domestic sources of credible commitment problems 
I identify five sources of credible commitment problems at the domestic level that might 
undermine a relationship’s qualities of cooperation: disinterest, trust, reconciliation, state 
capacity, and political unification problems.  As with credible commitment problems from 
international sources, credible commitment problems from any one of these domestic sources 
could significantly undermine strategic cooperation results or preclude an attempt of strategic 
cooperation outright. 
A disinterest problem exists when at least one of the prospective participants is 
insufficiently interested in the gains that could be made from that specific strategic 
cooperation arrangement.  This creates a willingness problem for the state in question—even 
if it has the opportunity to engage in a particular cooperative relationship, it might decline to 
consider (let alone credibly commit to) the relationship or fail to enduringly cooperate 
towards cooperation goals because it deems the gains from the relationship to be unworthy of 
its effort.  To emphasize, a disinterest problem in this context means that there is a deficiency 
of interest in the available net gains that could be obtained from that specific cooperative 
relationship (say, one unit of utility)—a participant is not interested in that gain regardless of 
which cooperation opportunity it might come from.  Sometimes an apparent disinterest 
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problem actually has a different root cause.  For instance, if a prospective participant is 
interested in the same net gain (the one unit of utility) from strategic cooperation with a 
different state, just not from strategic cooperation with the original state, this indicates a 
different root cause (source) for the credible commitment problems such as a trust problem or 
a reconciliation problem.  If disinterest is because there is more to gain from another 
cooperative agreement and that other agreement is exclusive (one cannot have both), this also 
indicates a different root cause for the credible commitment problem such as a competitor 
problem.  
Disinterest in the strategic cooperation gains on behalf of one or both of the prospective 
participants could be caused by complacency or pride—a prospective participant might feel 
that it can forego the benefits from any strategic cooperation and either live with its existing 
circumstances or achieve its goals unilaterally.  In a wartime scenario, for instance, the 
damage that a nation incurs during a war may not create sufficient security challenges or 
economic strife as to warrant the complications of external commitments for states that 
traditionally prefer to avoid such entanglements.   
Disinterest could also be a problem if the gains that a state could achieve from the 
cooperative agreement were too minimal to warrant serious consideration.  This addresses 
the question of joint economy from cooperation for each of the prospective participants —
clearly there must be something to gain from strategic cooperation or there would be no 
reason for actors to want strategic cooperation at the micro level or for states to obligate 
themselves to strategic cooperation at the macro level.  Reflecting back on Ikenberry’s 
postwar scenarios, perhaps the cost of occupation and governance is low (e.g., no occupation 
is required and abandonment is a viable option) or perhaps the capacity for the more 
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powerful adversary to help with postwar reconstitution of the weaker adversary is insufficient 
and this leads to limited cooperative gains for both sides of a prospective relationship.  
Where there is less to gain from a strategic cooperation relationship, there will be less 
interest.  Note, however, that when multiple cooperative relationships are possible, it would 
be rational to capture any available gains, even if those gains are very modest.   
In some cases, there may actually be a net loss to a potential strategic cooperation 
relationship, and this may cause strong disinterest.  At the macro level, for instance, the 
security gains from a cooperative relationship may be far outweighed by the domestic 
political losses or extralegal (e.g., terrorist) losses of a specific joint-security endeavor (e.g., 
host-basing for participant military forces).  At the micro level, some actors might fear that a 
given cooperative relationship (say, with Japan) might precipitate unwanted competition to 
the domestic industry that supports their livelihood (say, auto manufacturing).
47
  Or perhaps 
the strategic cooperation arrangement would interfere with an actor’s ongoing rent-seeking 
(e.g., corruption).  In such situations, affected actors might very well view the relationship as 
a threat.  However, for these concerns to be causal in undermining the relationship, there 
must be insufficient means to mitigate them or alter the relationship to accommodate them 
(e.g., considering my examples, states could not exclude “auto imports” or “basing” from the 
strategic cooperation agreement for some reason).   
Reflecting back on my model, if State B has a disinterest problem that State A cannot 
remedy (e.g., by increasing State B’s share of cooperation gains), State A has cause to fear 
that State B would voluntarily backslide in the future on its strategic cooperation promises 
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(provided that State B agrees to strategic cooperation in the first place) to forgo the cost of 
cooperation and forfeit the cooperative gains (or losses) that State B is insufficiently 
interested in to begin with.  This serves to degrade a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.   
A trust problem exists when at least one of the prospective participants fears that the 
other will not honor its strategic cooperation promises in the future.  This creates a 
willingness problem for the state in question—even if it has the opportunity to engage in a 
particular strategic cooperation arrangement and is otherwise willing to do so, it might 
decline to consider (let alone credibly commit to) the arrangement or fail to enduringly 
cooperate towards arrangement goals because it does not trust that the other participant will 
reciprocate.  This variable captures past behavior (reputation), the perceived strength of the 
institutional arrangement, and anticipated future behavior.  For instance, referring back to my 
model, State A’s reputation for honoring institutional arrangements (e.g., treaties, bargains, 
and so forth), its current resources that are devoted to the cooperative relationship (e.g., the 
current number of personnel and materials actually participating in the arrangement), and its 
public rhetoric (e.g., statements from political elites that would influence future strategic 
cooperation activities) could influence State B’s belief that State A will honor its strategic 
cooperation promises in the future.  As a practical example, reflect back on my car leasing 
analogy.  A dealer would have good reason to trust a lessee who had a robust and spotless 
credit history (i.e., had honored several other institutional agreements), had ample resources 
devoted to the lease (e.g., a reasonable down payment and automatic payments set up from a 
well-funded bank account), and had not volunteered any information that would hint at future 
problems (e.g., an impending layoff).  However, the dealer would have ample reason not to 
trust a lessee who had an awful credit history (e.g., had defaulted on several previous 
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institutional agreements), was in debt (i.e., could not afford a down payment), and disclosed 
a probable layoff in the future.  This would make the dealer reluctant to credibly commit to 
the lease.   
The analysis of trust problems is complicated in that trust problems are, by definition, 
part of every credible commitment story in some way.  For example, recalling my 
explanation of disinterest problems, State A cannot trust that State B will honor future 
cooperation promises because State B is insufficiently interested in the strategic cooperation 
gains.  State B has a disinterest problem, and this causes State A to have a trust problem—the 
root cause of this predicament is disinterest problems within State B, not trust problems 
within State A.  But trust problems can have an independent effect as well.  If every other 
variable is favorable for strategic cooperation—all international sources of credible 
commitment problems are favorable for strategic cooperation and the other domestic sources 
(disinterest, reconciliation, state capacity, and political unity) are all favorable as well—a 
trust problem alone could still undermine a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.  Back to 
my disinterest example, if State B remedied the disinterest problem, strategic cooperation 
outcomes could still suffer because State A simply does not trust State B from the outset and 
forevermore.   
Importantly, for trust problems to be the root cause of a breakdown in a relationship’s 
qualities of cooperation, the many tools available to mitigate trust problems, such as tit-for-
tat and cost-sharing strategies, must be insufficient to alleviate those problems.  Also, trust 
depends heavily on the perception of whether the other participant will follow through with 
strategic cooperation promises, not necessarily the reality of whether the other participant 
will follow through with those promises.  
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Reflecting back on my model, if State B has a trust problem that cannot be remedied by 
State A’s demonstrations of commitment or trust-building strategies like tit-for-tat or cost 
sharing, then State B would be dubious that State A would honor its strategic cooperation 
promises in the future and this, in turn, undermines State B’s commitment to and cooperation 
in the strategic cooperation relationship—regardless of State A’s actions and intent, State B’s 
ill perceptions of State A’s trustworthiness continue to undermine the relationship. 
A reconciliation problem exists when at least one of the prospective participants harbors 
resentment against the other for perceived past injustices.  This creates a willingness problem 
for the participant in question—even if it has the opportunity to engage in a particular 
strategic cooperation arrangement and is otherwise willing to do so, it might decline to 
consider (let alone credibly commit to) the arrangement or fail to enduringly cooperate 
towards arrangement goals because it finds association with the other participant to be 
offensive.  A reconciliation problem might arise because, at some point, there was conflict 
(e.g., a trade dispute or a war) between the two entities such that at least one of the 
prospective participants identifies the other as a non-friend.  Perhaps the identification is that 
of rival, or worse, enemy, and reconciliation is required before any cooperation is possible, 
let alone the deep and enduring cooperation associated with strategic cooperation.   
The dynamics of reconciliation at the macro and micro levels are important to this study 
so that we might recognize causal reconciliation problems and understand how they influence 
various actors.  At the macro level, a state’s government plays a crucial role in facilitating 
reconciliation between participant populations.  As Thomas Berger notes,  
“The ways in which most people remember the past is powerfully conditioned 
by the narratives generated by the state, which are, in turn, driven primarily by 
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practical considerations of security and economic gain. States are not only 
capable of overriding the powerful feelings of anger, guilt, and resentment 
generated by memories that its people may have of the injustices that have 
been inflicted on them, but to a surprising—and perhaps saddening—degree 
they are able to ignore, defuse, and even redirect them.”48 
Recalling Kupchan’s contributions on state rapprochement, we find a framework for how 
states go about promoting such narratives to change an identity from enemy to friend: one 
state makes a unilateral offer for rapprochement to a rival through diplomatic engagement 
(e.g., a strategic cooperation offer); the other state reciprocates; concessions and cooperation 
follow and cause the rivalry to abate; and, finally, “top decision-makers” change the identity 
of the former adversary from rival to friend and “bring around bureaucracies, legislative 
bodies, private interest groups, and ordinary citizens through lobbying and public 
outreach.”49  While I have noted the limits of Kupchan’s framework for this study, it shows 
that when top decision makers have reconciled enough to reciprocate, they play a key role in 
convincing the remainder of the population to reconcile.  This also highlights the inherent 
problem of when states lack political unification (and thus the allegiance of large segments of 
their residents), in which case a deficiency in reconciliation of actors who ignore their 
government can increasingly undermine credible commitment. 
While this provides a macro-understanding of state preferences and how states go about 
reorienting the identity of a prospective strategic cooperation participant, we must look to the 
micro level to understand the dynamics of reconciliation for individual actors.  How do top 
decision makers and others go about the sometimes arduous internal task of reorienting their 
identity of a former adversary from enemy to partner?  First, we must understand what 
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reconciliation is.  Ervin Staub defines reconciliation as “mutual acceptance by groups of each 
other,” where former adversaries change their psychological orientation toward each other, 
“do not see the past as defining the future,” and “see the possibility of a constructive 
relationship.”50 
Next, we must understand the mechanics of what promotes and undermines reconciliation 
in the individual psyche.  There are several relevant dimensions of reconciliation to consider, 
including the roles of shame (I’m bad), guilt (I did something bad), shared responsibility (it’s 
my fault too), injustice (someone did something bad to me that I didn’t deserve), and 
forgiveness (I no longer harbor resentment for the injustice done to me).
51
   
Shame and guilt come not just from (perhaps) losing a conflict, but also from the 
“internal acknowledgement that what one did was blameworthy.”52  Importantly, literature 
warns of problems with reconciliation when actors do not acknowledge their own group's 
contribution to a conflict.
53
  Shame and guilt can play a constructive role in promoting 
reconciliation, but they can also undermine reconciliation.  Catherine Lu argues that 
“experiences of shame and guilt may be pivotal for creating conditions of possibility for 
reconciliation marked by political and moral transformation.”54  However, unhealthy 
applications of shame or guilt can lead to a sense of injustice and, in turn, further conflict.  
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For instance, one could argue that the Treaty of Versailles did not foster feelings of shame 
and guilt amongst the Germans about their role in World War I, but instead left the Germans 
feeling victimized and preoccupied with expressing their rejection of the peace.
55
   
Thus, shame and guilt are important predictors of reconciliation, yet one must examine 
the effects that shame and guilt have on a specific actor to understand whether that shame or 
guilt is promoting a sense of shared responsibility that fosters reconciliation or a sense of 
injustice that fosters resentment.  A sense of injustice can severely damage the prospects for 
strategic cooperation.  Some would go as far as to say that a stable and lasting peace is 
impossible without justice.
56
  Importantly, some may not identify with their government’s 
actions or feel in any way responsible for its transgressions.  Those actors may feel unjustly 
treated if they were at all adversely affected by any reprisals against their government. 
Finally, forgiveness is critical to moving past injustices.  A key consideration of 
forgiveness in strategic cooperation scenarios is that “forgiving the other group seems more 
important for advancing reconciliation than forgiving the actual perpetrators” of injustices.57  
This offers hope to move past isolated accidents (perhaps even past atrocities) in cooperation 
efforts.  Also, acts of contrition from one state to its former adversary are not required for 
reconciliation and, in certain circumstances, may be counterproductive.
58
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When these many dimensions of reconciliation are resolved to individual needs, 
individuals can reorient their identity of prospective strategic cooperation participants and 
achieve true reconciliation.   
This discussion of the dynamics of the macro and micro levels of reconciliation puts 
much authority and responsibility on the state to reshape the collective memory of their 
society and impose reconciliation—to create a healthy sense of shame or guilt and a sense of 
shared responsibility for past conflict, to eradicate perceptions of injustice, and to promote 
forgiveness.  However, as previously discussed, strategic cooperation arrangements can 
become politicized.  In a democratic society, in particular, unresolved resentment may very 
well have a voice at some point.  As Berger notes:  
“We also must be realistic about the limits of political power to reshape 
historical memory.  This holds true not only for democratic societies but for 
authoritarian ones as well, albeit to a lesser degree.  Although states can 
suppress the memories social groups and individuals may have, insurgent 
historical narratives can spring up that challenge the existing official 
narratives.  These insurgent narratives evolve in response to forces that are 
only partly related to considerations of the material interests of the state or of 
the groups that promote them.  They are rooted in the actual experiences of 
the people, and they evolve according to a dynamic that cannot be explained 
by material considerations alone.   Even though narratives can be ignored or 
suppressed by the state, over time they have real political effects that political 
leaders can ignore only at their own peril.  Time and again, groups 
representing the victims of historical injustice, as well as groups who for their 
own reasons promote a historical narrative different from the existing official 
one, have been able to place their own concerns on the political agenda in 
ways that greatly complicate the efforts of political leaders to promote what 
they see as national interest.  The impact of such groups is particularly large in 
democratic countries.”59  
Thus, state efforts to reorient a prospective participant’s identity, if required for strategic 
cooperation, are important to promote reconciliation between the states’ actors.  But state 
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efforts alone may not be enough.  The official narrative may not necessarily match the 
collective memory of society, and while they can influence each other, “we cannot assume a 
priori dominance of one over the other.”60  Further, state efforts to promote reconciliation 
that trivialize the injustices of some groups can lead to problems.  “The official narrative of 
the state can thus promote reconciliation efforts between groups by exposing their members 
to the basic facts as well as the viewpoint of the other side. Conversely, the failure of the 
official historical narrative to recognize the perspective of a group or nation will hinder the 
recovery of traumatized individuals, breed resentment and discord between groups, and sow 
the seeds for future conflict.”61  So while material factors may dominate the state’s 
preferences and short-term decisions, ideational factors may eventually take precedence 
amongst a society.  Unresolved reconciliation issues, especially in democratic societies, may 
be immune to state reshaping efforts and might undermine qualities of cooperation at some 
point in an enduring relationship. 
Additionally, there are several other mechanisms besides a state’s reshaping efforts that 
might help cause or resolve reconciliation issues between societies and thereby affect 
credible commitment to strategic cooperation arrangements.  For instance, a harsh postwar 
military occupation may breed a strong sense of injustice and therefore much resentment 
within the occupied population.  The occupied population may very well enduringly resent 
the occupier and withdraw cooperation or cut ties as soon as the circumstances are favorable 
(e.g., as seen with several Eastern Bloc states and Russia after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union).  However, while occupations are typically resented, David Edelstein finds that 
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military occupations are more palatable when the occupier and the occupied share a common 
threat.
62
  This would mitigate the buildup of resentment and perhaps help solidify a 
cooperative relationship.  The passage of time might help as well.  Then again, some 
resentment is timeless (as seen in present day sectarian battles that have spanned centuries).  
What is most important, however, is whether reorientation from enemy to partner takes place, 
regardless of the mechanism that causes the reorientation, and this can be a long or short, 
easy or difficult process depending on the circumstances and the population involved.   
The microfoundations of reconciliation, coupled with the macro level insights on the role 
of the state and the framework for state rapprochement, highlight the importance and 
challenges of reconciliation.  While we see great hope for reconciliation when considering, 
for instance, the monumental transformation of relationships between the United States, 
Germany, and Japan after World War II, we should be leery of reconciliation problems in 
cases where a potential strategic cooperation participant does not feel shame or guilt for its 
part in a conflict or has an unhealthy sense of shame or guilt, lacks a sense of shared 
responsibility for a conflict, or feels unjustly treated.  We should also be leery when state 
efforts to help reorient the identity of a potential strategic cooperation participant from 
enemy to partner are absent, protested, or ineffectual.  Ultimately, these problems can 
undermine true reconciliation and, in turn, credible commitment to strategic cooperation.  
Reflecting back on my model, if State B has a reconciliation problem (e.g., a sense of 
resentment towards the prospective participant amongst important actors and ineffectual 
government efforts to reorient the correspondingly unfavorable identity), then State A has 
good cause to fear that State B would voluntarily (if the reconciliation problem lies within 
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the leadership or its winning coalition) or involuntarily (if the reconciliation problem lies 
within other influential domestic actors) backslide in the future on any strategic cooperation 
promises (provided that State B agrees to strategic cooperation in the first place), perhaps in a 
manner that reignites the original conflict and maximizes State B’s advantage over State A.     
The final two sources of credible commitment problems that I identify are linked.  State 
Capacity problems are material in nature.  Political Unification problems are ideological in 
nature.  Either type of problem can degrade qualities of cooperation by reducing a state’s 
opportunity to credibly commit to strategic cooperation.   
When a prospective participant has a state capacity problem, it lacks sufficient resources 
to meet strategic cooperation obligations.  For instance, the cooperation obligations may 
require a state to provide ten units of manpower, ten units of financial resources, and ten 
units of territory while the state has only five units of each resource type in its entire store of 
wealth.  The state is therefore materially unable to meet the requirements of the cooperative 
arrangement, and this reduces that state’s opportunity to credibly commit to the arrangement.  
For states to have the capacity to meet their strategic cooperation obligations, they must be 
able to prioritize efforts, direct the activities of their agents, and allocate resources as related 
to the cooperative arrangement.  State capacity refers, then, to a state’s ability to govern and 
manage, at a minimum, the spaces, organizations, and personnel that are relevant to the 
cooperative arrangement.  This is not to say that states always require a lot of capacity for a 
given cooperative arrangement.  Rather, they require enough capacity to meet the 
requirements of the specific cooperative arrangement.  For instance, the stronger participant 
may simply require access to a weaker participant’s territory (e.g., permission to help) for the 
weaker participant’s contribution to the cooperative relationship.  Reflecting back on my 
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model, if State B has state capacity as a source of credible commitment problems, State A 
has good cause to fear that State B would simply lack the resources to fulfill its strategic 
cooperation promises in the future. 
State capacity has linkages to, but is distinct from, another source of credible 
commitment problems—political unification.  When a state has a political unification 
problem, its residents do not identify with the state government.
63
  If the residents identify 
with another powerful actor (e.g., a powerful religious leader or a warlord) who resists 
strategic cooperation, this could create an opportunity problem for that government to 
credibly commit to strategic cooperation—that powerful actor might direct masses of 
followers to resist the relationship, perhaps violently, which could undermine credible 
commitment, deep and enduring cooperation and, thereby, strategic cooperation outcomes.  
In this scenario, the state’s political unification problem becomes a source of credible 
commitment problems for strategic cooperation.   
Political unification is distinct from state capacity in that it focuses on identity rather than 
resource and management capacity.  It is about allegiance to a government, not just capacity 
of a government.  Amati Etzioni describes three considerations that we can use as indicators 
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that a government has achieved political unification: “it has a monopoly over the legitimate 
use of means of violence…it has a center of decision-making that is able to affect the 
allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community… and it is the superior focus 
of political identification for the large majority of the politically aware citizens.”64  Thus, 
there may be violence.  However, a politically-unified government’s violence is seen as 
legitimate, while other violence (e.g., from local warlords or tribal leaders) is not.  There may 
be many sources of resources and rewards (note that both state capacity and political 
unification have a resource-allocation component).  However, a politically-unified 
government can affect the whole of its territorial responsibility, while non-governmental 
sources may lack such far-reaching capability.  Lastly, there may be many rivals contesting 
for political voice, but this is done within the boundaries of a politically-unified 
government’s political system rather than within a competing shadow political system (e.g., a 
tribal governance structure that is the “real” government).  To emphasize, a state may possess 
the capacity to manage sufficient strategic cooperation resources (i.e., no problem with state 
capacity), but this does not guarantee that its citizens accept the state government and look to 
it for leadership and support.   
As I have conceptualized state capacity and political unification, a state can have one 
without the other—they are distinct.  A state could lack the capacity to fulfill its required 
strategic cooperation obligations but have no problems with political unification.  As an 
example, consider Costa Rica.  Costa Rica is a consolidated democracy that abolished its 
army in 1949.  Costa Rica could not credibly commit to a strategic cooperation arrangement 
that had a collective-security component, for instance, that required Costa Rica to contribute 
                                                 
64
 Etzioni 1962, 45. 
54 
 
a few highly-trained and modernly-equipped infantry brigades for joint defense efforts.  This 
is not a political unification problem, but a state capacity problem.  Conversely, a state could 
have ample capacity to meet strategic cooperation obligations but lack the collective will to 
do so due to a political unification problem.  Consider, as an example, events in Somalia over 
recent decades.  A prospective strategic cooperation participant might only require water, 
desert space for basing, and a handful of translators as the Somali contribution to a strategic 
cooperation arrangement—contributions within the material capacity of the Somali 
government.  Yet Somalia has a political unification problem that might undermine this 
relationship.  There are vast numbers of Somalis who do not identify with their government, 
but identify with and follow the directives of other influential domestic actors.  These 
influential domestic actors, who are seen as legitimate by and hold the loyalty of large 
portions of the population, may well resort to violence or other means to mount a credible 
resistance to strategic cooperation.  They might credibly threaten water access or participant 
assets.  Somalia might have the capacity to defend these assets, but might not be able to 
credibly guarantee that their security agents would not “turn a blind eye” at a critical moment 
out of loyalty to other influential domestic actors.  In a more benign scenario, the Somali 
translators might be dissuaded from cooperating (e.g., conveniently “mis-translate”) because 
of their loyalty to the other influential domestic actors.  In this case, a prospective co-
participant with the Somalis would receive mixed signals of Somali commitment—the 
Somali government may well profess commitment to strategic cooperation, but other Somali 
influential domestic actors may countermand that signal.  This is a political unification 
problem, not a state capacity problem, and its effects combine to undermine credible 
commitment to the strategic cooperation arrangement and degrade qualities of cooperation.   
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That said, there is a relationship between state capacity and political unification—they 
are not perfectly distinct.  Political unification requires a minimum level of state capacity to 
meet Etzioni’s criteria (i.e., a state must have enough state capacity to affect the allocation of 
resources and rewards throughout the community) which may be more or less than the state 
capacity required to meet the obligations of a strategic cooperation agreement.  Regardless, 
most importantly for this study, political unification as I have defined it is centered on 
identity of the population and the credibility of state promises in light of those circumstances, 
not just a state’s material capacity to meet its strategic cooperation obligations.  Just because 
a state has the capacity to meet its obligations doesn’t mean it can credibly commit to do so.  
A political unification problem is one of the reasons it might not be able to do so.  
This has important implications for policymakers.  One might examine a prospective 
participant’s limited internal security capacity, for instance, and believe that bestowing that 
participant with enough equipment and training—Humvees, rifles, radios, and command and 
control centers—will solve the problems seen in my Somali example.  However, painful U.S. 
lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that having capacity and choosing to use that 
that capacity for its intended purposes are different things.  If identity problems are not 
remedied, that equipment and training may well become tools of other influential domestic 
actors and be used for purposes that are inimical to strategic cooperation.   
A state’s political unification problem may not always result in credible commitment 
problems for strategic cooperation.  Circumstances are important.  A political unification 
problem can provide an incentive for the affected state to seek external support that might 
help it consolidate and vie for the loyalty of its population.  If that state is otherwise 
disinterested in strategic cooperation, the political unification problem, especially if it were 
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associated with an internal threat that could jeopardize regime survival, may help mitigate 
that disinterest problem, at least while that political unification problem exists.  Regardless, if 
that political unification problem is associated with influential domestic actors who resist 
strategic cooperation, a credible commitment problem exists—if a prospective participant 
has a political unification problem and influential domestic actors resist strategic 
cooperation, this alone would likely undermine the prospective participant’s opportunity to 
credibly commit to the strategic cooperation agreement and would thereby degrade the 
relationship’s qualities of cooperation.  This, I would argue, is more likely than a scenario 
where a state has a political unification problem but no influential actors resist strategic 
cooperation.  It would be an unusually permissive environment if no one profited from 
resisting strategic cooperation.   
Influential domestic actors might resist a given strategic cooperation arrangement for 
myriad reasons.  Perhaps they have disinterest problems in that the arrangement would 
interfere with their rent seeking (e.g., corruption), or perhaps they have reconciliation or trust 
issues with the other participant.  In line with this thought, Cooley finds in his study on 
oversees U.S. basing that “Certain political environments, especially periods of volatile 
democratic transition, afford considerable political benefits to elites who contest basing 
agreements.  Conversely, the consolidation of a base host’s democratic institutions tends to 
lead to the depoliticization of the issue, regardless of prevailing public opinion or anti-U.S. 
sentiment.”65  Adopting Cooley’s insight to my study’s context, I would argue that certain 
political environments, especially the sometimes tumultuous postwar environments that are 
the focus of my study, offer incentives for elites to contest strategic cooperation agreements.  
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However, when democratic institutions consolidate, which is commensurate with an increase 
in political unification, those incentives are reduced.  In the former situation, a state with 
political unification problems may send mixed signals to the prospective participant about the 
credibility of its commitment to the strategic cooperation agreement.  The government might 
signal that it is committed, while elites signal credible resistance.  This would undermine a 
prospective participant’s confidence that the other will have the opportunity to abide by 
strategic cooperation promises in the future, especially if large segments of the population 
identify with the resisting elites instead of the government.   
Reflecting back on my model, if State B has a political unification problem as a source of 
credible commitment problems, State A has good cause to fear that State B will lack the 
opportunity to fulfill its strategic cooperation promises in the future because other influential 
domestic actors might effectively resist strategic cooperation. 
The Roles of External and Internal Threats 
I pause here to reflect on an important nuance that I intersected occasionally in my 
theorization: the roles of external and internal threats.  One of the stronger alternate theories I 
will discuss in my upcoming case studies is that external threats are necessary for strategic 
cooperation between former adversaries.  This is one explanation for why the United States 
and Germany and the United States and Japan were able to mend fences so spectacularly 
after World War II—they united against a common Soviet threat.  Of course, that common 
threat subsided after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, yet the deeply-
cooperative U.S. partnerships from World War II continue to endure and are in some ways 
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growing stronger.
66
  However, more recent U.S. postwar strategic cooperation efforts (i.e., 
with Iraq and Afghanistan) have lacked a similarly powerful common threat and are clearly 
not enjoying the same success as the World War II cooperative relationships. 
Relatedly, Edelstein finds that a common external threat makes lengthy occupations more 
acceptable to the host population and more palatable to the states that provide the occupation 
forces.  Other threat scenarios (no threat or internal threat) have a somewhat negative effect 
on occupations.
67
  This could clearly have an effect on the prospects for strategic cooperation 
in postwar cases that involve occupations—without a common external threat, those 
occupations may foment resentment and cause reconciliation problems between prospective 
strategic cooperation participants.    
My response to this potential confounder is that I find no theoretical reason why an 
external threat (or internal threat for that matter) is necessary for higher qualities of 
cooperation, even amongst former adversaries.  This is not to say that a threat cannot 
promote the prospects for strategic cooperation—certainly the Soviet threat had a positive 
influence on the growing partnership between the United States and Germany after World 
War II.  However, as will be evident in my case studies, a threat is one means, not the only 
means, to help reduce credible commitment problems and promote cooperation.  What is 
most important is how threats, in conjunction with the many other conditions that might 
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affect those credible commitment problems, aggregately affect the eight sources of credible 
commitment problems that I have described. 
An external threat can influence several of the credible commitment variables that I 
identified.  For instance, it could increase state interest in collective security arrangements for 
the duration of the threat—any means of increasing power and security may look more 
attractive when threatened.  But this interest would be in external assistance (e.g., military 
aid, protectorate status, alliance, and so forth) from perhaps several entities, not necessarily 
deep and enduring strategic cooperation with a particular state.  An external threat could also 
help with reconciliation by providing opportunities to make one look “just” and good (e.g., 
the U.S. occupiers as compared to the Russian occupiers in World War II) or by providing 
opportunities to be seen as a hero (i.e., to demonstrate commitment, such as with the Berlin 
Airlift), thereby assisting in a reorientation from foe to friend.  Lastly, an external threat 
could help with political unification by spurring disparate domestic factions to unite against a 
common threat.   
But several other mechanisms could influence these variables too.  An increase in interest 
could come from a substantial joint economy (e.g., creative technical expertise married with 
robust manufacturing capability) or amplified need (e.g., devastating damage from war or 
natural disaster).  Reconciliation problems could be mitigated by a strong sense of 
responsibility and remorse (e.g., the so-called German “guilt” from World War II68), 
restitution, apologies, or the passage of time.  Political unification may not be a problem to 
begin with, or could be achieved when a previously hierarchical society simply falls back 
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into old habits after regime collapse.  In the case of war and occupation, political unification 
could be retained by not completely dismantling the previous government of a hierarchical 
society (e.g., by leaving the Japanese Emperor in place after WWII). 
An internal threat can similarly promote cooperation for the time it exists, particularly 
when government survival is in jeopardy.
69
  Interest may increase and reconciliation 
problems may subside, at least temporarily.  However, as previously highlighted, internal 
threat scenarios may be associated with political unification problems that could undermine 
cooperation. 
Additionally, it is the enduring effects that the external or internal threats have on my 
credible commitment variables that are most important.  If those threats do not have a lasting 
effect, then this bodes ill for the qualities of cooperation of an enduring strategic cooperation 
relationship in the long run.  If an external or internal threat is the only thing holding a 
strategic cooperation relationship together and the underlying credible commitment problems 
are not resolved, my theory predicts that the relationship’s qualities of cooperation will 
suffer.  A threat does not guarantee, for instance, that reconciliation will take place, although 
that threat will perhaps subdue reconciliation problems for a while.  What I am most 
interested in, then, is assessing whether my independent variables (e.g., disinterest, 
reconciliation, and political unification) are favorable for strategic cooperation.  Secondary to 
that is assessing the specific mechanism (e.g., threat, restitution, or remorse) that happened to 
cure these potential sources of credible commitment problems. 
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General Hypotheses 
My theoretical analysis generates eight possible sources of credible commitment 
problems (independent variables) that could influence a relationship’s qualities of 
cooperation (my dependent variable).  These eight international and domestic sources of 
credible commitment problems encapsulate the incentives to do and the incentives not to do 
strategic cooperation and, in turn, affect a state’s opportunity and willingness to credibly 
commit to strategic cooperation.  As a general proposition, with limited exceptions, an 
increase in the presence of any of these sources of credible commitment problems will likely 
decrease a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.70  Conditions should be favorable where 
qualities of cooperation are higher.  Conversely, at least one condition should not be 
favorable where qualities of cooperation are lower.   
One should think of these variables as having a “product” effect and not a “sum” effect 
on a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.  To formally illustrate, let C represent the 
predicted level of the qualities of cooperation and v1, v2, …v8 represent the eight sources of 
credible commitment problems which serve as my independent variables.  Say that all but 
one of these independent variables are highly favorable for strategic cooperation (say, 0.95 
on a continuous scale from 0 to 1) and the outlying variable is highly unfavorable for 
strategic cooperation (say, 0.15 on a continuous scale from 0 to 1) at time (t).  If one thinks of 
the relationship of these variables as a sum, one would get the following result: 
Ct = ∑v1t, v2t, …v8t = (0.95 x 7) + (0.15) = 6.8 
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This sum of 6.8 equals the sum that one would get in the case that all independent 
variables were favorable (say, 0.85 on a continuous scale from 0 to 1) and falls relatively 
close to the sum 7.6 that one would get if every variable were highly favorable (again, 0.95 
on a continuous scale of 0 to 1).  One might therefore reasonably predict that the 
corresponding relationship would have high qualities of cooperation, and this is precisely 
contrary to my theory.  To avoid this fallacy, think of the relationship of the variables as a 
product, in which case my example yields the following result: 
Ct = Πv1t, v2t, …v8t = (0.95)
7
 x (0.15) = 0.10 
This product of 0.10 is well shy (2.7 times) of the product 0.27 that one would get in the 
case that all independent variables were favorable (say, 0.85 on a continuous scale from 0 to 
1) and even further off (6.6 times) the product of 0.66 that one would get if every variable 
were highly favorable (again, 0.95 on a continuous scale of 0 to 1).  One might therefore 
predict that the corresponding relationship would have low qualities of cooperation, and this 
is precisely congruent with my theory—one unfavorable variable can greatly reduce the 
likelihood of higher qualities of cooperation.  In my example, the one unfavorable variable 
(0.15 instead of 0.95) dropped the product for an otherwise highly favorable scenario from 
0.66 to 0.10—a substantial effect.  This perspective suggests that, as I go about generating 
hypotheses and conducting my case analyses, I can expect relatively low qualities of 
cooperation whether credible commitment problems stem from just one or multiple sources.    
Considering all that has been theorized, I garner four general, condensed, testable, and 
falsifiable hypotheses regarding qualities of cooperation and, in turn, strategic cooperation 
outcomes.   Hypothesis 1 recognizes that international barriers to strategic cooperation may 
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be so strong as to preclude cooperation or, should cooperation be attempted, severely 
undermine it.  International conditions must support strategic cooperation for it to prosper.  
This is the first (outer) layer of the onion for policymakers to analyze when predicting the 
costs, benefits, and risks of a particular strategic cooperation arrangement.   
H1: An increase in credible commitment problems at the international level 
(from spoilers, competitors, or otherwise) decreases the opportunity for 
and/or willingness of governments to credibly commit to strategic cooperation 
and, in turn, causes a decrease in the qualities of cooperation of such 
relationships or prevents them outright. 
The next three hypotheses focus at the domestic level.  Domestic conditions must also 
support strategic cooperation for it to prosper.  The domestic level is the second (inner) layer 
of the onion for policymakers to analyze when predicting the costs, benefits, and risks of a 
particular strategic cooperation arrangement. 
Hypothesis 2 recognizes that both the leadership and its winning coalition must be 
willing to engage in strategic cooperation for it to prosper over the course of an enduring 
relationship.  Leaders may be able to influence their winning coalition’s willingness for 
strategic cooperation and vice versa, but leaders must ultimately appease their winning 
coalition or they jeopardize their own political survival.   
H2: At the domestic level, an increase in disinterest problems, trust problems, 
or reconciliation problems within a state’s leadership or its winning coalition 
reduces a government’s willingness to credibly commit to strategic 
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cooperation and, in turn, causes a decrease in the qualities of cooperation of 
such relationships or prevents them outright. 
Hypothesis 3 recognizes that even if leaders and their winning coalitions are otherwise 
willing to credibly commit to strategic cooperation, they must have the opportunity to do so.  
Opportunity, in part, is dependent upon a state’s capacity to meet its strategic cooperation 
obligations—if a state lacks the resources to meet those obligations, qualities of cooperation 
suffer.   
H3: At the domestic level, an increase in state capacity problems reduces the 
respective government’s opportunity to credibly commit to strategic 
cooperation and, in turn, causes a decrease in the qualities of cooperation of 
such relationships or prevents them outright.   
Hypothesis 4 is the second to focus on the opportunity for strategic cooperation from a 
domestic perspective.  It recognizes that even if leaders and their winning coalitions are 
otherwise willing to credibly commit to strategic cooperation, and even if the state has the 
resources required to meet its strategic cooperation obligations, a problem with political 
unification could still undermine the relationship’s qualities of cooperation.  Under such 
conditions, influential domestic actors might mount effective resistance to strategic 
cooperation.   
H4: At the domestic level, an increase in political unification problems 
reduces the respective government’s opportunity to credibly commit to 
strategic cooperation when influential domestic actor(s) resist such 
agreements (for myriad reasons, including reconciliation problems or outside 
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options).  This, in turn, causes a decrease in the qualities of cooperation of 
such relationships or prevents them outright. 
Strategic Cooperation between the United States and its Former Adversaries 
In this section, I tailor my general strategic cooperation theory to specific contexts of 
strategic cooperation between the United States and its recent war adversaries.
71
  It is not my 
intent to assume away any of the eight commitment problems that I have identified on either 
side of a relationship (i.e., on the U.S. side or the former adversary side).  However, I have a 
research challenge—too many independent variables (eight) in my general hypotheses for the 
amount of available cases in general, let alone the cases within the scope of this project—an 
“N” deficiency.  My methodological choice is to narrow the focus to what should be the most 
important variables in U.S. cases—the primary levers that should influence a relationship’s 
qualities of cooperation in these contexts.  This will help me select the best cases for study 
from my small universe.  This will also, in the end, help U.S. policymakers focus on the “big 
rocks”—the primary levers—while still allowing examination of all other variables within 
these cases, albeit perhaps not evaluation.    
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Reviewing the Context 
A review of the context of this study helps to narrow my focus.  The context is U.S. wars 
from World War II to present.  Two things differentiate this context from the generic 
strategic cooperation context: first, war; and second, the United States is specified as one of 
the prospective participants.  How do these qualities help us focus? 
The wartime environment brings much baggage to a prospective strategic cooperation 
relationship—commitment and cooperation (let alone deep and enduring cooperation) 
between former adversaries can be particularly challenging.  Commitment problems can 
inhibit a state’s ability, in certain circumstances, to commit to a bargain short of war, let 
alone to a highly amicable conflict resolution outcome as envisioned in strategic 
cooperation.
72
  Such a commitment problem would contribute to a deficiency in cooperation, 
which is a requirement just to maintain peace (i.e., a simple ceasefire) in the aftermath of 
war.
73
  In that sense, cooperation is ever more crucial for the success of a strategic 
cooperation arrangement in the postwar environment.  Consider also that strategic 
cooperation is enduring in nature and, as a result, recurrent acts of cooperation are required to 
credibly signal continued commitment to the relationship.  It is understandable that strategic 
cooperation arrangements between former adversaries are rare—the level of commitment and 
cooperation required from the former adversaries is ambitious, to say the least.   Further, the 
wartime dynamic implies increased salience of certain variables that would be particularly 
troublesome for commitment and cooperation in the postwar environment.  Focusing on 
domestic variables, reconciliation problems stand out as one probable source of credible 
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commitment problems in postwar strategic cooperation scenarios.  Lu calls war “the ultimate 
act of estrangement between states.”74  One must consider that states choose war for a reason, 
and are willing to kill and die for that reason.  Trust problems stand out as another probable 
source of credible commitment problems in postwar strategic cooperation scenarios.  As Dan 
Reiter notes, 
“Belligerents consumed by the heat of war are especially unlikely to trust each 
other.  Two states cannot build much trust while fighting.  Making matters 
worse, there is likely a history of broken trust between two belligerents, as an 
attacker often breaks a neutrality or border agreement when it decides to 
launch a war.”75 
The salience of the other variables in in the postwar context depends more on the specific 
circumstances of the conflict.  State capacity may be more or less of a problem based on its 
status before a war, its erosion during the war, and the demands of the specific cooperative 
arrangement.  Disinterest might depend more on the damage sustained during the war and the 
capacity of the stronger state to offer support after a conflict.  Political unification problems 
might depend more on the qualities of a given state—whether it had a history of political 
unification before the war or whether there was an imposed regime change, and therefore 
political transitions to consolidate, as a result of the war.    
Next, the United States is specified as one of the prospective participants in this study.  
How does this help us focus?  First, in these contexts, the United States is a preeminent (if 
not hegemonic) global power.  Second, in these contexts, the United States has immense 
economic capacity as the world’s largest consumer.  Third, in these contexts, the United 
States, which has a long history of fighting its wars on foreign soil, has enviable military 
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capacity with which to offer security to a former adversary.  In effect, in these contexts, the 
United States has the capability, should it choose, to offer its former adversary the “keys to 
the kingdom.” 
Considering this, in these contexts, the United States should emerge from war as the 
“stronger” state (not necessarily the “victor”) with excess resources to offer towards strategic 
cooperation—the United States should have the capacity to help a needy former adversary 
when many others cannot.  Consequently, in these contexts, the former U.S. adversary should 
emerge from war as the “weaker” state, be more likely in need of external support, and have 
fewer resources to offer towards strategic cooperation.  For instance, it is quite possible that 
the former U.S. adversary would need assistance restarting its economy, regaining security, 
and establishing a new regime.  As I noted at the beginning of this chapter in my discussion 
of the incentives for strategic cooperation, a strategic cooperation arrangement can be very 
useful towards those ends.
76
  Importantly, the United States, perhaps more so than many 
other states and probably any previous superpower, has been historically interested in such 
cooperative arrangements and institutions.
77
  Typically, it has been willing to credibly bind 
itself to an institutional arrangement even when it is the more powerful state—to exercise 
“strategic restraint” as Ikenberry terms it—in order to achieve a mutually acceptable, 
voluntary, cooperative postwar resolution.  Further, for all the reasons previously noted in my 
discussion of the incentives for strategic cooperation—plus the likelihood that the United 
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States does not want to have a recurrence of war, wants allies, and wants stability for the 
global economy—the United States would also have incentives for strategic cooperation.   
Therefore, in these contexts, there should be a substantial joint economy to be gained by 
both sides.  However, there may also be a substantial legacy of baggage from the war (i.e., 
perhaps something in line with the bully example from my opener).  All of this combines to 
suggest that the salience of some sources of credible commitment problems is greater than 
others in these contexts.  Disinterest and trust variables may be less salient because of 
potential gains to both participants and the historical willingness of the United States (the 
stronger state) to mitigate trust issues through credible institutional arrangements.  As a 
wealthy and powerful state, the United States may be wholly unconcerned with former 
adversary state capacity problems and may be willing to accept an institutional agreement 
with little resource contributions from the former adversary.  There are no reasons to believe, 
however, that reconciliation and political unification problems would be less salient.   
Necking it down 
In light of these insights, I narrow the focus of my study on those sources of credible 
commitment problems that are most difficult for states to mitigate or control in these contexts 
by first considering the international variables, then the domestic variables from the U.S. 
side, and finally the domestic variables from the former U.S. adversary side.   
All strategic cooperation arrangements are subject to the international environment.  
Which international sources of credible commitment problems should most affect a 
relationship’s qualities of cooperation, and thereby the outcome of strategic cooperation 
arrangements between the United States and its former adversaries, during the timeframe of 
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this study?  This category is hard to narrow—all are possible—but some of these problems 
are more likely than others in these contexts.  Spoiler problems could be a factor, but 
considering U.S. power in these contexts, a spoiler would have to be extremely strong (e.g., 
Russia during World War II, having already occupied Eastern Bloc states) to have both the 
opportunity and the willingness to create a credible barrier between the United States and its 
former adversary, especially if the United States were resolute on strategic cooperation.  
Competitor problems are less likely considering the immense resources at the disposal of the 
United States in these contexts.  Consider that the United States controls how many resources 
it is willing to offer towards strategic cooperation and has the capacity to outbid just about 
any conceivable competitor in these contexts.  If the United States chooses not to outbid a 
competitor, this indicates a different root cause to the credible commitment problems (e.g., 
other international conditions).  Further, it is unlikely that a former U.S. adversary has to 
“compete” for strategic cooperation with the United States since the United States has 
demonstrated a preference for such relationships, has the capacity for many, and may 
consider the relationship itself worth more than any material cooperative gains.  Problems 
from other international conditions are a more likely international source of credible 
commitment problems in these contexts.  Cold War-like considerations, complications to 
existing alliance patterns (e.g., when existing allies identify the prospective U.S. partner as an 
enemy), and U.S. concerns over its image (e.g., wanting to be seen as supporting democratic 
ideals) may very well undermine strategic cooperation prospects. 
Turning now to domestic sources of credible commitment problems on the U.S. side, this 
category is easier to narrow in these contexts.  Disinterest problems on the U.S. side, for all 
the reasons previously discussed, are unlikely.  Additionally, in these contexts, something 
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compels the United States to expend resources and risk forces in war.  If U.S. interests in the 
former adversary state or region are important enough for war, they are important enough for 
strategic cooperation—the United States would likely want to secure any gains from this 
expensive endeavor for as long as possible.  Recall that a disinterest problem would apply to 
the applicable strategic cooperation gains in general—if one is disinterested in those gains 
from just a specific entity, the root cause of the problem lies with a different source (e.g., a 
trust problem or reconciliation problem).   
Trust problems are likely to exist in these contexts, but not likely, on their own, to 
prevent a U.S. attempt at strategic cooperation due to the historical U.S. affinity for trust-
building institutions and strategies like tit-for-tat and cost sharing.  Recall that trust problems 
are part of every credible commitment breakdown at some level, but in these contexts, trust 
problems on the U.S. side are more likely to be in response to former adversary credible 
commitment problems (e.g. former adversary political unification problems) than the 
independent cause of credible commitment problems.   
Reconciliation problems are possible but, overall, unlikely from the U.S side in these 
contexts.  Aggregately, the United States, typically, is pragmatic and has a short memory.  
This was demonstrated in World War II where the United States vilified entire populations 
(specifically the Germans and Japanese) with slurs and propaganda during the war and then 
followed with active and publicly-accepted state reorientation efforts shortly thereafter to 
shore up support for the Marshall Plan.
78
  The United States has been more selective about 
attributing evil to an enemy in more recent conflicts (e.g., Manuel Noriega was bad, not all 
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Panamanians; Slobodan Milosevic was bad, not all Serbs; the Taliban were bad, not all 
Afghans; Saddam Hussein and the Baathists were bad, not all Iraqis), making national 
reconciliation easier from the U.S. side once the “evil element” has been removed.  The 
exceptions to this would be the wars with Vietnam and perhaps North Korea, conflicts in 
which the United States did not win.
79
  Perhaps this is because it is easier for a clear victor to 
reconcile—it got its way.   
Finally, state capacity and political unification problems are unambiguously not sources 
of credible commitment problems on the U.S. side in these contexts.  Consider that, in these 
contexts, the United States has international state capacity (the resources to meet its strategic 
cooperation requirements globally and, in all likelihood, the resources to ensure that a 
prospective participant could meet its strategic cooperation requirements too), not just state 
capacity.  Further, since the end of the U.S. Civil War, the United States has maintained its 
democratic consolidation.   
I turn now to the domestic sources of credible commitment problems on the former U.S. 
adversary side.   Disinterest problems at the macro (state interest) level are unlikely in these 
contexts for all the reasons previously discussed.  A former U.S. adversary is by nature 
weaker and more vulnerable than preferred, having expended critical resources in conflict.  
Its economy is likely in shambles, and it may be going through a perilous regime transition.  
It is unlikely that a former adversary government would pass on the opportunity to remedy 
these critical deficits out of disinterest.  Further, the United States has some control over this 
variable—it can, for instance, increase the war damage to an adversary (to increase the 
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former adversary’s need for external help) or increase U.S. contributions to the strategic 
cooperation arrangement (i.e., sweeten the deal).  Also, the United States, as a preeminent 
world power in these contexts, has capacity, more so than many others, to remedy these 
economic and security deficits and, through strategic cooperation, would likely take active 
measures to underwrite former adversary success.  At the micro level, however, certain actors 
may have more tendencies towards disinterest, perhaps fearing a personal loss from strategic 
cooperation (instead of gain) due to U.S. competition in their markets or meddling with their 
rent seeking (i.e., corruption).  However, one can mitigate this by avoiding those areas of 
strategic cooperation or by making provisions to compensate losers specifically for their 
strategic cooperation losses (i.e., with private goods).  Therefore, if the former adversary 
eschews U.S. strategic cooperation in these contexts, I would suspect that this is not because 
it is disinterested in any cooperative gains or that it believes that the United States could not 
help solve its problems.  I would suspect, rather, that the former adversary wants strategic 
cooperation (external support), just not (collectively) strategic cooperation with the United 
States.  This would suggest a different root cause for the problem (e.g., reconciliation or 
political unification problems).   
Trust problems on the former U.S. adversary side are also unlikely to be a source of 
credible commitment problems in these contexts.  A former U.S. adversary has little reason 
to doubt that the United States would honor its strategic cooperation commitments in these 
contexts.  The United States has remained a stable and consolidated democracy, which 
Cooley finds to be the most credible form of government for honoring contracts.
80
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strategic cooperation offers have been backed very publicly by its highest officials—
particularly credible and costly signals.  Further, despite its typical power advantage, the U.S. 
has historically shown great willingness to exercise strategic restraint and bind its power 
through institutions (e.g., the United Nations and World Trade Organization) and strategies 
(e.g., tit-for-tat and cost sharing) that are routinely used to mitigate typical multinational trust 
problems.   
Reconciliation problems on the former U.S. adversary side are much more likely in these 
contexts.  At the micro level, actors may very well identify with my opening story, feeling 
that a bully has just clobbered them, perhaps unjustly, and then audaciously extended a hand 
of friendship in expectation of reciprocation.  Individuals might identify the United States as 
an enemy, rival, or opportunist—far from partner or friend.  These reconciliation problems 
can manifest at many levels in the former adversary structure.  For instance, they could 
manifest with the leaders who decide to engage in strategic cooperation (Kupchan’s “top 
decision makers”), with their winning coalitions, with other influential domestic actors, or 
with the people (agents) in the field who actually cooperate to conduct the relationship’s 
activities.  This is not hard to conceptualize—having recently gone to war, it is not surprising 
that a lingering potential for ill will exists.  Turning to the macro level, former adversary 
governments may be resistant to or ineffectual at changing these identities through their 
official narrative.  Reconciliation, therefore, is a primary variable of interest.   
State capacity problems on the former U.S. adversary side are an unlikely source of 
credible commitment problems in these contexts, at least in the short term.  A high U.S. 
interest in strategic cooperation, coupled with comparatively vast U.S. resources, combines 
to decrease the expected material contributions from former adversaries in these contexts.  
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Further, the United States would likely solve former adversary capacity problems until such 
time as the former adversary could manage on its own.  The United States, for instance, has 
often devoted substantial resources (the pinnacle being the Marshall Plan) and imbedded 
advisors with local civil and military entities up through the most senior leadership (e.g., the 
prime minister) to routinely exercise state capacity functions in parallel until their former 
adversary had the capacity to manage on its own.  There are, perhaps, limits to how long the 
United States would “carry” a co-participant, but there would likely be other problems 
(specifically, reconciliation and/or political unification problems) underlying an enduring 
state capacity problem.  For instance, the former adversary government may have the 
capacity to direct its agents to cooperate with U.S. advisors in an effort improve overall state 
capacity but opt not to because of a leadership or winning coalition reconciliation problem. 
Political unification problems on the former U.S. adversary side, like reconciliation 
problems, are a more likely source of credible commitment problems in these contexts.  
Regime change has often been a byproduct of war with the United States and, depending on 
the conditions, political transitions may be easier or harder to consolidate—that is if they 
ever consolidate.  There may be little that the stronger state (the United States) could do to 
mitigate this.  While it is relatively straight-forward to increase one’s material offer to 
increase a former adversary’s interest in strategic cooperation or fend off a competitor, 
encouraging former adversary residents to identify with their new government instead of 
powerful non-governmental actors is not so clear cut.  This is especially the case when the 
former adversary lacked political unification even before the war, as seen in more recent U.S. 
conflicts.  This could very conceivably create a situation where former adversary 
policymakers might decide that the best future for their nation lay in strategic cooperation 
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with the United States, but other influential domestic actors may not desire such a 
relationship.  These influential actors may feel this way for many reasons—reconciliation 
problems themselves, or perhaps unsanctioned outside options in which they profit from no 
strategic cooperation (this could be the case for government officials as well, acting outside 
their official capacity).
81
  If these power players have sufficient influence, their effects could 
aggregate to a level that precludes “collective” former adversary willingness, prevents 
credible commitment, and undermines the relationship’s qualities of cooperation.  The 
question, then, is whether governmental influence (when the government desires the strategic 
cooperation arrangement) is sufficient to overcome the influence of dissenting groups—
whether power is consolidated to the point that the political authorities can credibly commit 
to strategic cooperation despite domestic pressure to the contrary.  Political unification, 
therefore, is another primary variable of interest.   
The Finalists 
Factoring all of this, neither international nor domestic sources of credible commitment 
problems can be “ruled out” for consideration in these contexts, which include U.S. wars 
from World War II to present.  However, there is room to focus the domestic variables to 
optimize this project’s explanatory power with the limited cases at hand and within the scope 
of this study.  In these contexts, the most likely sources of domestic credible commitment 
problems on the U.S. side are trust problems and reconciliation problems.  However, the 
United States has demonstrated a strong capability to mitigate such problems.  In these 
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contexts, the most likely sources of domestic credible commitment problems on the former 
U.S. adversary side are reconciliation problems and political unification problems, and these 
are much more challenging problems to mitigate.  As a result, the most likely domestic 
sources of credible commitment problems overall in these contexts are reconciliation 
problems and political unification problems on the former U.S. adversary side.  This puts a 
lot of explanatory weight on the former U.S. adversary side of the strategic cooperation 
equation.  Therefore, in my case analyses, I focus my research to address these variables and, 
accordingly, put more brief attention on the U.S. side of the equation while focusing a bulk 
of my attention on the former U.S. adversary side of the equation, where most of the 
potential problems (and learning) should exist. 
Conclusion 
In closing my theory chapter, I highlight that this line of reasoning, if supported, creates 
an interesting implication for foreseeable (i.e., while the United States is still a democratic 
superpower) U.S. strategic cooperation arrangements with its former adversaries: barring 
some international force that would preclude the possibility of cooperation between the 
United States and its former adversary, former adversary collective willingness for deep and 
enduring cooperation with the United States is the primary driver of variation in the 
relationship’s qualities of cooperation and, in turn, strategic cooperation outcomes.  This 
means that the former adversary must be politically unified and have a reconciled 
government and winning coalition to support higher qualities of cooperation or the former 
adversary must have a completely willing (i.e., no resistance from influential domestic 
actors) resident population to support higher qualities of cooperation.  This is important for 
policymakers and has predictive power.  While U.S. policymakers may have some control 
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over a former adversary’s disinterest (e.g., by adjusting the “sweetness” of its strategic 
cooperation offer), trust (e.g., by the institutional guarantees it commits to), and state 
capacity (e.g., by the state capacity it will provide the former adversary), U.S. policymakers 
must evaluate the prospects of resolving sources of credible commitment problems that are 
much harder for them to control—former adversary reconciliation problems and political 
unification problems—to adequately assess the costs, benefits, and risks of a given strategic-
cooperation policy choice.  This is the key. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
In this chapter, I first discuss my method to empirically test my hypotheses.  I then 
discuss my case selection process and identify the cases on which I utilize this methodology.  
Next, I discuss how I operationalize and measure my variables that I test in those cases and 
close with a preview of my case study format and flow.   
As a review, my first hypothesis suggests that the qualities of cooperation in the 
relationships between the United States and its former adversaries will suffer in the presence 
of credible commitment problems at the international level.  Sources of these credible 
commitment problems include spoilers, competitors, and other international conditions.  My 
second hypothesis suggests that the qualities of cooperation in the relationships between the 
United States and its former adversaries will suffer in the presence of credible commitment 
problems at the domestic level that would undermine the willingness of a state’s leadership 
or its winning coalition to credibly commit to strategic cooperation.  Sources of these 
credible commitment problems include disinterest, trust, and reconciliation problems; of 
these, the most likely source of credible commitment problems in these contexts is 
reconciliation problems within the former U.S. adversary.  My third and fourth hypotheses 
suggest that the qualities of cooperation in the relationships between the United States and its 
former adversaries will suffer in the presence of credible commitment problems at the 
domestic level that would undermine the opportunity of a state’s leadership to credibly 
commit to strategic cooperation.  Sources of these credible commitment problems include 
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state capacity and political unification problems; of these, the most likely source of credible 
commitment problems in these contexts is political unification problems within the former 
U.S. adversary.  
Method for Conducting Empirical Tests: A Qualitative Approach 
My theory identifies several sources of credible commitment problems at the 
international and domestic levels that could influence a relationship’s qualities of 
cooperation.  My theory recognizes that there is a great deal of complexity and texture in the 
circumstances that could influence a relationship’s qualities of cooperation over the course of 
an enduring relationship.  All of this complexity and texture must be accounted for in my 
research design and conduct.  In the remainder of this section, I identify my methodological 
approach, justify this choice, and explain my process for data collection.   
The approach 
My central empirical approach is qualitative—an in-depth examination of strategic 
cooperation behavior in a small number of cases involving the United States and war.  The 
strategy I use is best characterized as Comparative Historical Analysis (CHA).  It includes 
“structured and focused” controlled comparisons to guide data collection and enable 
systematic comparisons of the cases to gain leverage over my puzzle.
82
  Although I do not 
employ “process tracing” in the conventional sense,83 I do trace the evolution of variables 
over time to show how variations in sources of credible commitment problems cause 
variations in qualities of cooperation and how the prospective participants do or do not 
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become gradually enmeshed in a relationship with higher qualities of cooperation.  Taken as 
a whole, the cases I study demonstrate how variations in sources of credible commitment 
problems at both the international and domestic levels cause variations in qualities of 
cooperation. 
The Justification 
The obvious rationale for choosing this approach is that there are relatively few cases in 
my universe (less than 20) which makes a large-N study impractical.  But beyond that, the 
evolutions of the variables in these cases are big, contextual, textured, transpire over long 
periods of time, and are driven in part by strategic behavior at the highest levels of a state.  It 
is important to capture the nuances of these evolutions to better understand the dynamics of 
strategic cooperation outcomes, and the qualitative CHA method accommodates this aim 
nicely.   
To be more specific, strategic cooperation decisions are made by state leaders and the 
best way to assess my hypotheses with high confidence and within the scope of this study is 
to assess each variable and how those variables influence policymaker decisions regarding 
cooperation with their former adversary.
84
   We need a deep understanding of decision 
making processes to do this. 
Temporal effects are also important. If one was to ask if there was a commitment 
problem based on disinterest in the cooperative arrangement between the United States and 
Germany after World War II, the answer could be either yes or no depending on where one 
looks in that variable’s evolution process.  Immediately after World War II, the United States 
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wanted to abandon Europe—it was disinterested in an intense form of strategic cooperation 
that we might now call an ideal strategic partnership.  But as events unfolded, the U.S. 
position changed—disinterest ceased to be a problem within a few years of the war’s end.  
Further, interest is not irreversible, and had it changed, that would have suggested that the 
qualities of cooperation would have suffered.  It is important to understand how a variable 
unfolds in relation to the others across time and how this dynamic influences strategic 
cooperation choices.   
Equifinality, or “many alternative causal paths to the same outcome,” is a key 
consideration for this study.
85
  There are numerous ways that prospective participants could 
resolve credible commitment problems to improve their relationship’s qualities of 
cooperation.  For example, there are many ways to promote reconciliation.  This could be a 
byproduct of unquestionably just action, such as when a prospective participant removes a 
vile, coup-born government and restores a country‘s legitimate government with the 
overwhelming consent of the domestic community (e.g., perhaps U.S. action in Grenada, 
1983).  Reconciliation could also be promoted by a prospective participant’s “hero 
moments,” such as the Berlin Airlift or natural disaster relief.   This might also be done 
through prolonged confidence-building measures in conjunction with a cooperative 
government that promotes a new official narrative to reorient the public’s identity of a 
prospective participant from foe to non-foe or friend.   Similarly, there are numerous paths on 
which a credible commitment problem might originate, surface, and, in turn, undermine a 
relationship’s qualities of cooperation.  A reconciliation problem might develop when a 
prospective participant initiates what many believe is an unjust war.  Even if the war is 
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perceived to be just, the postwar treatment of the defeated population might be perceived as 
unjust and create a reconciliation problem.  A reconciliation problem could also preexist 
from centuries past and change little as a result of a more current conflict.   
Finally, endogeneity, covariance, and interaction of the variables are important 
considerations for this study as well.  Regarding endogeneity, not only do credible 
commitment problems cause variation in strategic cooperation results, but strategic 
cooperation results might cause variation in credible commitment problems, for better or 
worse.  For instance, a pattern of successful cooperative ventures may help resolve trust 
issues, thereby rectifying that existing source of credible commitment problems.  Conversely, 
a pattern of unsuccessful strategic cooperation ventures may spawn disinterest towards the 
relationship, thereby creating a credible commitment problem where none previously existed.  
Further, the actors in this story are not completely independent of each other.  For instance, 
the winning coalition can influence a leader’s behavior towards strategic cooperation, but a 
leader can influence its winning coalition’s behavior towards strategic cooperation as well.  
Regarding covariance and interaction, the variables in this story may not always be 
independent of each other.  In a case of extreme political unification problems, for example, 
we might also see an associated internal threat to regime survival (e.g., an insurgency).  This 
could influence other variables such as disinterest.  For instance, a regime might be otherwise 
unwilling to engage in strategic cooperation because of disinterest but, facing survival 
challenges caused by an insurgency, may suspend its disinterest problem at least until the 
threat to the regime' survival subsides. 
The small-N, CHA approach allows me to thoroughly address all of these complexities 
and conduct controlled comparisons across cases to observe the various causal paths and 
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independent causal effects of my independent variables.  This approach also allows me to 
intensely examine the unfolding of each case over time and in sequence.  In addition, it 
allows me to assess a wide variety of causal paths that may be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to adequately model quantitatively.  It allows me to assess the myriad 
interdependent effects of the variables and assess the directions of their influence and 
causality.  Plus, frankly, in my humble opinion, we learn more and could have a larger policy 
impact from a thicker study of this puzzle.  A thicker study allows one to tease out the other 
unobservable implications of my theory in a way that is not possible in a large-N study, and a 
thicker study is more accessible to policymakers who might be encouraged to act upon its 
findings.   
Data 
I use a variety of evidence, from both primary and secondary data sources, to assess the 
evolution of each variable over time and how these variables affect the key decisions of 
policymakers who are responsible for strategic cooperation choices.  Primary sources include 
public and private information from diaries, official government documents (e.g., actual 
strategic cooperation agreements), official government statements and press releases (e.g., 
White House and U.S. State Department communications), raw transcripts of speeches and 
conversations (e.g., transcripts from recordings of Saddam Hussein’s private 
conversations),
86
 survey data, interview data, and so forth.  Secondary sources favor 
recognized subject matter experts (e.g., seasoned historiographers) as much as possible. 
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While this technique helps to build a thick and comprehensive story of the preferences 
and intent behind observed actions, it is not without its challenges.  For instance, primary 
sources include public and private statements of key actors for a given story.  It can be good 
to “get it from the horse’s mouth,” so to speak.  However, sometimes individuals misstate 
their preferences and intentions, intentionally (strategically) or otherwise.
87
  Some primary 
sources are widely available, and some are still classified.  This can create an incomplete 
picture or an alternate reality.  Secondary sources, particularly those from seasoned 
historiographers, can provide great insight into thoroughly debated topics.  Secondary 
sources from the World War II era are abundant, thorough, and fairly stable after years of 
peer review.  However, secondary sources are much less advanced for more recent conflicts 
such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan.  This can create skepticism with regards to newer 
secondary information.   
Where primary and secondary sources fall short, I turn towards the historical record, 
interpreting and assessing key decisions, actions, and consequences.  Actions speak louder 
than words, as they say.   
Case Selection 
In this section, I clearly identify and justify my universe of cases, then present my case 
selections, selection criteria, and rationale.   
My Universe 
My universe of cases includes U.S. wars from World War II to present.  I am primarily 
trying to explain strategic cooperation outcomes for this specific subcomponent of all 
                                                 
87
 See Reiter 2009, 57-58.   
86 
 
possible strategic cooperation contexts.  The U.S. wars in my universe are coincident with 
the Correlates of War Project’s inter-state war list, with the exception of Grenada and 
Panama, which I add because of their nature (a U.S. invasion followed by a regime change) 
and Libya, which has transpired since the last Correlates of War update.  This universe of 
war dyads for possible postwar strategic cooperation relationships is comprised of the United 
States and:  
From World War II (1941-1945)
88—Germany, Japan, Italy, and to some extent, 
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, all of whom 
sided with the Axis. 
From the Korean War (1950-1953)—North Korea, and to some extent, China and 
Russia. 
From the Vietnam War (1965-1975)—Vietnam. 
From Operation Urgent Fury (1983)—Grenada. 
From Operation Just Cause (1989)—Panama. 
From the Persian Gulf War (1991)—Iraq (1991). 
From the War for Kosovo (1999)—Serbia. 
From Operation Enduring Freedom (2001)—Afghanistan. 
From Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003)—Iraq (2003). 
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From Operations Odyssey Dawn/Unified Protector (2011)—Libya. 
I focus on U.S. wars for several reasons.  First, in the context of this study, the United 
States has the opportunity to engage in strategic cooperation more so than many other states 
due to its ample resources and global reach.  Second, in the context of this study, the United 
States has an affinity for democratic institutions and cooperative relationships.  The United 
States, more than any other nation I can think of, has engaged globally to pursue this strategic 
cooperation option, postwar or otherwise.  In that sense, the United States has the 
willingness, more so than many other states, to engage in strategic cooperation.  Lastly, by 
focusing on U.S.-only wars, I control better for some of the variation in circumstances 
between cases.   
I focus on the time period of World War II to present for several reasons as well.  First, 
the world was fundamentally different during this period than it was previously.  Second, the 
United States was fundamentally different in this period than it was previously.   
The world was fundamentally different in the more recent period due to the rise of the 
nuclear age, and new existential threats may well have changed the calculus for the benefits 
of cooperative relationships (and the dangers of going it alone) for many states.  Further, as 
Thomas Berger notes for some of the states involved in World War II and in this study, 
“World War II was a seminal experience as well as an apparent rupture in the development of 
each country’s [Japan’s, Germany’s, and Austria’s] national identity and political system.”89   
The United States was fundamentally different in the more recent time period for several 
reasons.  First, the United States fundamentally changed its foreign policy.  Previous U.S. 
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foreign policy was more aligned with the philosophies of President George Washington who 
“warned his fellow citizens against permanent alliances in the conduct of foreign affairs”90 
and President Thomas Jefferson who declared “peace, commerce, and honest friendship with 
all nations, entangling alliances with none.”91  Emerging from World War II, we saw quite a 
different U.S. foreign policy—the United States began to embrace entangling alliances and 
other relationships that we might call strategic partnerships today.  Second, by this time the 
United States had accepted its role of global hegemon.  While the United States avoided its 
role as a hegemon in the interwar periods, by World War II it had accepted its role as a world 
leader and continued to engage globally.  Third, and partially as a byproduct of the capacity it 
had built up during World War II, the United States could credibly offer protectorate status 
and enviable strategic cooperation benefits to nations around the globe in this timeframe.   
My Case Selections, Selection Criteria, and Rationale 
From my universe of cases, I do full case studies on Germany (East and West), Iraq 1991, 
and Iraq 2003.  I do abbreviated case studies on Serbia and a counterfactual of Iraq 2003.  
The following explains my rationale for these choices. 
I followed the case-selection philosophy of George and Bennett who argue that case 
selection should be guided by a well-defined research objective and an appropriate research 
strategy—cases should not be chosen just because they are interesting or because a lot of data 
exists.
92
  Rather, as professed by George and Bennett, I chose my cases because they are 
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relevant to my research project, provide the best mix of control and variation for my research 
problem, and demonstrate the explanatory power of my primary variables of interest.
93
    
In light of this philosophy, I necked down my universe of cases to a shortlist of 
candidates using a series of elimination criteria.  I then selected the most suitable cases from 
that shortlist.   For the first criteria, I chose to avoid cases with intractably powerful forces 
that overwhelm and confound other variables.  For this reason, I eliminated the cases of 
Grenada and Panama.  Although the United States invaded these states, forced regime 
change, and occupied these states briefly, these states are solidly in the U.S. “sphere of 
influence.”  While the favorable variables and very cooperative relationships of these cases 
would support my theory, I cannot distinguish between voluntary strategic cooperation and 
domination—the power differentials between the United States, Grenada, and Panama, 
coupled with their extremely close geographic proximity, are too confounding. 
Second, I eliminated the cases of wars that the United States didn’t “win.”  This includes 
the cases of the Korean War and the Vietnam War.  It is not surprising or overly informative 
that some of the credible commitment variables were unfavorable and that the corresponding 
qualities of cooperation were low or absent in these cases.  By not winning, the United States 
was not able to resolve the issues it had with these states—they remained adversaries.  
Further, while the United States did not win, it was nonetheless a very strong state and not in 
need of support—and it had little incentive to offer a helping hand to those who refused its 
will.  Also, the U.S. adversaries in these conflicts found themselves on the communist side of 
the Cold War—an international condition that made strategic cooperation untenable and 
                                                 
93
 The first two case-selection criteria are from George and Bennett 2005, 83-84; the last is from Reiter 2009, 
52-56.   
90 
 
overwhelmed the effects of all other variables.  Counterfactually, I may not have eliminated 
this category of cases if there had been an example in which, for instance, the United States 
warred against a near-peer, did not win, suffered catastrophic losses, was left in great need, 
and its former adversary had spare resources with which to offer the United States a valuable 
strategic cooperation relationship (a “shoe on the other foot” scenario).  However, there are 
no examples of this in my universe.  In my universe, the United States, win or otherwise, 
emerged from conflict as a powerful, resource-rich, and self-sufficient state. 
Third, I eliminated the newest cases which are not yet ready for analysis.  This includes 
the cases of war in Afghanistan and Libya. 
Lastly, for the remaining cases, I favored the crucial cases.  For World War II, I consider 
Germany and Japan to be crucial cases.  Italy joined the Allies in 1943—it is not surprising 
that the corresponding qualities of cooperation would be high.  U.S. action with Romania, 
Hungary, and Bulgaria paled in comparison to U.S. action in Germany and Japan, and the 
low qualities of cooperation of the corresponding relationships is not surprising considering 
that they fell behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War.  While those effects are useful to 
demonstrate how international sources of credible commitment problems can degrade 
qualities of cooperation, those effects are already evident in my case study of (East) 
Germany.   
This resulted in the following shortlist of cases for possible inclusion in my study: the 
World War II cases of Germany and Japan, Iraq 1991, Serbia, and Iraq 2003.  From this 
shortlist, I used the following criteria to select the specific cases for my study.  First, I 
endeavored to address each possible permutation of international and domestic sources of 
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credible commitment problems to demonstrate what happens when credible commitment 
problems exist in none, one, or both levels of analysis.  Second, I endeavored to maximize 
the variation in my dependent variable (qualities of cooperation) and my key domestic 
independent variables (reconciliation and political unification problems on the former U.S. 
adversary side).   
Figure 3 below shows how my shortlist of cases fits into the possible permutations of the 
basic favorability (based on a simplified, dichotomous, preliminary assessment) of 
international and domestic sources of credible commitment problems towards strategic 
cooperation.  The cases that I chose for this study are emphasized in bold italic.  Note that all 
possible permutations are covered by my case selection.   
 Domestic Conditions 
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 Favorable Unfavorable 
Favorable 
Quadrant I 
West Germany, Japan 
Quadrant II 
Iraq 2003 
Unfavorable 
Quadrant IV 
East Germany 
Quadrant III 
Iraq 1991, Serbia 
Figure 3: Case Selection Based on Permutations of International and Domestic Conditions 
My theory of strategic cooperation suggests that Quadrant I cases will exhibit higher 
qualities of cooperation.  Quadrant III and IV cases may not be attempted because of 
international barriers to strategic cooperation.  If attempted, they will likely experience lower 
qualities of cooperation.  Quadrant II cases are more likely to be attempted because 
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international conditions are permissive, but since domestic conditions are unfavorable, 
qualities of cooperation will likely suffer. 
To select cases in a way that maximizes variation in my key domestic independent 
variables (reconciliation and political unification problems on the former U.S. adversary 
side) for my study’s context (U.S. wars from World War II to present), I adjust my original 
hypotheses from Chapter 2 to reflect just these primary variables of interest.  These key 
domestic independent variables are components of Hypotheses 2 and 4, and adjusting these 
hypotheses results in the following “tailored” hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 2 becomes “Hypothesis 2-tailored” (H2t) and is specifically focused on 
reconciliation within the former adversary state.   
H2t: At the domestic level, an increase in reconciliation problems within a 
former adversary’s leadership or its winning coalition reduces a former 
adversary government’s willingness to credibly commit to strategic 
cooperation and, in turn, causes a decrease in the qualities of cooperation of 
such relationships or prevents them outright. 
Hypothesis 4 becomes “Hypothesis 4-tailored” (H4t) and is specifically focused on 
political unification problems within the former adversary state.   
H4t: At the domestic level, an increase in a former adversary’s political 
unification problems reduces the respective government’s opportunity to 
credibly commit to strategic cooperation when influential domestic actor(s) 
resist such agreements (for myriad reasons, including reconciliation problems 
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or outside options).  This, in turn, causes a decrease in the qualities of 
cooperation of such relationships or prevents them outright. 
Figure 4 below depicts all possible permutations (eight) that result from variations in my 
primary domestic variables of interest (former adversary political unification and 
reconciliation problems) within my theory’s hypotheses.  This disregards any effects at the 
international level (e.g., spoiling, competition, and so forth).  The second column is extracted 
from Hypothesis 2-tailored (H2t) and accounts for the favorability of a former adversary’s 
willingness to engage in strategic cooperation based on the status of reconciliation within its 
state leadership and the respective winning coalition.  The third and fourth columns are 
extracted from Hypothesis 4-tailored (H4t) and account for the favorability of a former 
adversary’s opportunity to engage in strategic cooperation based on the status of political 
unification and resistance of influential domestic actors.  Within the matrix, a “+” symbol 
means that the condition is favorable for strategic cooperation and a “-” symbol means that 
the condition is unfavorable for strategic cooperation—again, a simplified, dichotomous 
construct.    
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Case 
Type 
H2t 
Reconciliation of the former 
U.S. adversary’s leadership 
and its winning coalition 
H4t Component 1 
Political unification of the 
former U.S. adversary 
H4t Component 2 
Willingness of former 
U.S. adversary’s 
influential domestic actors 
Theory’s 
prediction 
for 
qualities of 
cooperation 
1 + + + Higher 
2 + + - Higher 
3 + - + Higher 
4 + - - Lower 
5 - + + Lower 
6 - + - Lower 
7 - - + Lower 
8 - - - Lower 
Figure 4:  Possible Case Permutations Based on Former Adversary Reconciliation and 
Political Unification 
Note that, with the exception of Case Type 3, both former adversary reconciliation and 
political unification (i.e., the second and third columns) must be favorable for my theory to 
predict higher qualities of cooperation.  Conversely, with the exception of Case Type 3, my 
theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation whenever either reconciliation or political 
unification (i.e., the second and third columns) is unfavorable.  Accordingly, H4t Component 
2, the willingness of the former U.S. adversary’s influential domestic actors, only changes 
the otherwise-predicted outcome in Case Type 3.   
Case Type 3 represents a permissive environment where the former adversary leadership, 
winning coalition, and all influential domestic actors are willing to engage in strategic 
cooperation with the United States, but for some reason the state lacks political unification.  
Importantly, there are no known real-world examples of this case type in my universe of 
cases.  Perhaps this is because Case Type 3 is theoretically possible but not likely in postwar 
95 
 
scenarios—we can almost be assured that a powerful actor will resist strategic cooperation 
with the United States, and political unification will determine if a willing government has 
the opportunity to make a credible commitment to strategic cooperation in spite of that 
resistance.   In light of this, I set aside H4t Component 2 and focus my case selection on 
those conditions that matter most in practice.   
This results in a useful simplification to Figure 4, as depicted in Figure 5 below.  This 
matrix has four (instead of eight) case types.  To further simplify, these four case types are 
broken down into two categories: the “all is well” category (Category 1) in which both 
reconciliation and political unification variables are favorable for strategic cooperation and 
my theory predicts higher qualities of cooperation; and the “something is awry” category 
(Category 2) in which one or both of the reconciliation and political unification variables are 
unfavorable for strategic cooperation and my theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation.   
Figure 5 shows how my shortlist of cases fits into the possible permutations of the basic 
favorability (based on a simplified, dichotomous, preliminary assessment) of my key 
domestic independent variables towards strategic cooperation.  The cases that I chose for this 
study are emphasized in bold italic.  Note that all possible permutations are covered by my 
case selection. 
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H2t 
Reconciliation of the 
former U.S. adversary’s 
leadership and winning 
coalition 
H4t component 1 
Political unification of 
the former U.S. 
adversary 
Theory’s 
prediction 
for 
qualities of 
cooperation 
Cases that demonstrate this 
1 + + Higher Germany, Japan 
2 
- 
+ 
- 
- 
- 
+ 
Lower 
Lower 
Lower 
Iraq 1991 and Iraq 2003 
Iraq 2003 Counterfactual 
Serbia 
Figure 5: Case Selection Based on Permutations of Former Adversary Reconciliation and 
Political Unification 
Of note, the Serbia and Iraq 1991 cases are confounded by credible commitment 
problems at the international level, making these suboptimal to isolate strictly domestic-level 
effects.  Unfortunately, it is quite challenging to find cases in my universe where 
international forces are not a big part of the explanation.  The counterfactual case of Iraq 
2003 demonstrates how qualities of cooperation respond when international conditions are 
favorable, the reconciliation of the former U.S. adversary leadership and its winning coalition 
is favorable, yet the political unification of the former adversary is low and influential 
domestic actors resist strategic cooperation.   
My case selections from my shortlist (Germany, Iraq 1991, Serbia, and Iraq 2003) 
maximize my available variation in the permutations of problems at the international and 
domestic levels and in permutations of my key domestic variables of interest (former 
adversary reconciliation and political unification problems).  The cases of Germany and 
Japan show the same variation in my permutations.  I elected to do the German case because 
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of the utility of its East German component, which helps me address the conditions 
represented in Quadrant IV of Figure 3.    
Consequently, I do not complete case studies of all 17 cases in my universe.  Nor are my 
case selections random.  However, they meet my selection criteria, provide substantial 
variation in my independent variables and dependent variable, and span the timeframe of my 
study.  Further, they occur in a wide range of contexts yet control for many contextual 
variations to improve focus on the independent effects of variables.  As George and 
McKeown stress, “If exogenous (i.e. contextual) differences between cases can be ruled out 
as a source of variations in outcome (admittedly not a simple manner…), then differences in 
outcomes in the two cases could be attributed to differences on the one dimension of the 
typology.”94  By choosing the German case and comparing the experiences of West and East 
Germany, I avoid many contextual confounders and better isolate the effects of my variables 
of interest than if I were to choose, for instance, Japan for my Quadrant I case and East 
Germany for my Quadrant IV case.  The same benefit exists by studying Iraq 1991 and 
comparing it to Iraq 2003.  Finally, the constant U.S. side of the cooperative relationship 
helps control some of the contextual variation as well.   
In the subsequent chapters, I do full case studies of Germany, Iraq 1991, and Iraq 2003, 
each of which are key to explaining variation in the sources of credible commitment 
problems at the international and domestic levels and within the domestic level (see Figures 3 
and 5).  I do brief case studies on Serbia and a counterfactual of Iraq 2003 to further 
demonstrate the nuances of the domestic “something is awry” category (see Figure 5).   
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 George and McKeown 1985, 28. 
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Operationalization and Measurement of Variables 
In this section, I describe how I operationalize and measure each variable.  I begin with 
the operationalization and measurement of the dependent variable.  I then proceed with the 
operationalization and measurement of the independent variables, beginning with the 
international sources of credible commitment problems and concluding with the domestic 
sources of credible commitment problems.   
The Dependent Variable: Qualities of Cooperation 
Recall from my introduction that I define strategic cooperation as voluntary, deep, and 
enduring cooperation.  The depth and endurance of cooperation have a level of ambition and 
a level of realization, both of which are important in the evaluation of a relationship’s 
qualities of cooperation.  This continuous relationship is graphically depicted in a 
simplified
95
 manner in Figure 6 below.   
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 The model in Figure 6 is further simplified in that the possibility that realization exceeds ambition is not 
represented.  For instance, the lower right quadrant represents a relationship that successfully meets its lowly 
cooperative ambitions.  As I have constructed this model, a relationship that exceeds its lowly cooperative 
ambitions would fall somewhere to the right of this quadrant.  Alternately, one could draw a vector from the 
lower left corner of the quadrants to the upper right corner of the quadrants and consider the levels of ambition 
and realization in a pure mathematical sense.  Every point on that vector would represent a relationship where 
realization perfectly meets ambition.  Every point to the left of the vector (upper left triangle of the split matrix) 
would represent a relationship where realization falls short of ambition.  Every point to the right of that vector 
(lower right triangle of the split matrix) would represent a relationship where realization exceeds ambition.  To 
model the relationships in this way would complicate the model and the explanation while providing limited 
analytical benefit within the confines of this study where ambition, measured by explicit agreements, is not 
static (i.e., can increase or decrease over time) and in all likelihood precedes and exceeds realization.  Further, 
the focus of this study is on the upper right quadrant.  The best strategic cooperation sets high goals and 
achieves them rather than only reaching agreement on low goals and unexpectedly exceeding them.   
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Figure 6: Assessing Qualities of Cooperation 
I evaluate and code the qualities of cooperation for postwar relationships as highly 
cooperative, cooperative, semi-cooperative, uncooperative, or absent based on a qualitative 
assessment of the levels of ambition and realization associated with their postwar 
cooperation.  Although my dependent variable is continuous in nature, this simplified 5-point 
coding scheme is sufficient for the purposes of this study.  
To assess a relationship’s ambition of cooperation, I evaluate the depth and endurance of 
cooperation as described in explicit agreements (if any) between states.
96
  In strategic-
cooperation agreements, cooperative ambitions vary widely.  For example, the Strategic 
Framework Agreement (SFA) between the United States and Iraq includes comprehensive 
provisions for political, diplomatic, defense, security, cultural, economic, energy, health, 
environmental, information technology, communications, law enforcement, and judicial 
cooperation and is designed to enable the achievement of broader mutual interests with 
                                                 
96
 While I acknowledge that tacit agreements for cooperation may exist, I set them aside for this initial study 
and focus on the more tractable explicit agreements.  This technique is sufficient for the purposes of this study.   
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respect to regional security and prosperity.
97
  To assess the realization of cooperation, I 
evaluate the achieved depth and endurance of cooperation as reflected in the historical 
record.   
Endurance of cooperation is fairly straightforward to stratify.  A low endurance of 
cooperation might be reflected by the persistence of cooperation for only a few years to a 
couple of decades.  A higher endurance of cooperation might be reflected by the persistence 
of cooperation beyond a couple of decades (beyond a generation).  The highest depth of 
cooperation might be reflected by persistent and indefinite cooperation that survives jostling 
(i.e., recovers from “accidents” or conflicts and survives substantial changes to the status 
quo). 
Evaluating the depth of cooperation is more complex.  In line with Downs et al., who 
conceptualize a “treaty's depth of cooperation as the extent to which it requires states to 
depart from what they would have done in its absence,” I conceptualize the depth of 
cooperation for a strategic cooperation arrangement as the extent to which it requires states 
to depart from what they would have done in its absence.
98
  There are numerable dimensions 
with which to evaluate a postwar relationship’s depth of cooperation, including security, 
foreign policy, domestic policy, and economic dimensions, amongst others.  Perhaps the 
most readily apparent and easiest to stratify is the security dimension.  With the presumption 
that former adversaries have a recent history of highly uncooperative behavior (war) towards 
each other in the security dimension, joint cooperation in this dimension can be readily 
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 See the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the 
United States of America and the Republic of Iraq in Appendix A.   
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 Downs et al. 1996, 383.   
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evaluated using the perspective given by Downs et al.   A low depth of cooperation in the 
security dimension might be reflected by a mutual non-aggression pact or limited joint 
security efforts.  A higher depth of cooperation might be reflected with a defensive alliance.  
The highest depth of cooperation might be reflected in the voluntary hosting of substantial 
numbers of former adversary troops on the other’s soil—certainly something states would not 
do in the absence of very deep cooperation.  Likewise, one can look towards foreign and 
domestic policy choices or economics, given an understanding of state preferences, and 
assess the depth of cooperation based on how much a state deviated from their preferences to 
accommodate their former adversary.   
The following typology shows how these qualities of cooperation overlay into my coding 
scheme.  
Highly cooperative: high; relationship has high cooperative ambition and a highly 
realized depth and endurance of cooperation (upper right quadrant of Figure 6); deep 
cooperation endures (or, for newer cases, is on track to endure) at least four decades 
(two generations)—it is long-term and survives jostling.   
Cooperative: middling; relationship has moderate to high cooperative ambition and a 
moderately realized depth of cooperation; moderately deep cooperation endures (or, 
for newer cases, is on track to endure) at least four decades—it is long-term and 
survives jostling.    
Semi-cooperative: low; relationship has low cooperative ambition, which it realizes 
(sets and achieves low goals) or has higher cooperative ambition with a low level of 
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cooperative realization (upper left or lower right quadrants of Figure 6); cooperation 
endures at least two decades (one generation).     
Uncooperative: troubled; relationship has varied levels of cooperative ambition but 
relationship fails to realize even low cooperative ambitions (e.g., lower left quadrant 
of Figure 6); relationship is often uncooperative— participants often counter each 
other’s important interests; cooperation does not endure at least two decades—it is 
not long-term (by design or it fails/does not survive jostling) or (for the newer cases) 
is failing.     
Absent: no appreciable ambition or realization of cooperation (i.e., no attempt at 
strategic cooperation or other forms of cooperative relationships). 
The Independent Variables 
I evaluate and code all international and domestic sources of credible commitment 
problems as favorable, ambiguous, or unfavorable for a relationship’s qualities of 
cooperation based on a qualitative assessment of their status.  Additionally, in my assessment 
of disinterest, trust, and reconciliation problems, I pay particular attention to the segments of 
the population from which the problem emanates (e.g., within the leadership, its winning 
coalition, or other influential domestic actors). Although my independent variables are 
continuous in nature, this simplified 3-point coding scheme is sufficient for the purposes of 
this study.  
 Recall that I define a spoiler as a rival state that has both the opportunity and the 
willingness to preclude the possibility of strategic cooperation by localized force or coercion.  
This does not necessarily require the spoiler to be a peer U.S. rival, but, in the context of this 
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study, it must be powerful enough to deny strategic cooperation activities such as 
negotiations and ongoing cooperation between a superpower (the United States) and its 
prospective co-participant.   
Evidence of spoilers includes, for example, a rival’s military occupations of a prospective 
participant, installation of puppet regimes, credible threats of reprisal for engaging in 
strategic cooperation, or assassinations or kidnappings of key persons to, in part, discourage 
strategic cooperation.  Counterevidence of sufficient capacity to spoil includes, for example, 
a prospective participant’s military occupation of the other’s prospective participant’s state or 
a laughable power differential between the supposed spoiler and the strongest of the 
prospective participants.   
The following typology shows my coding scheme for the status of spoiler problems 
towards a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.   
Favorable: No spoiler exists that demonstrates both the opportunity and the 
willingness to preclude the possibility of a cooperative relationship between the 
United States and its former adversary.  
Ambiguous: Powerful rivals have the opportunity to preclude the possibility of a 
cooperative relationship, but their intentions (willingness) are unclear (e.g., 
referencing the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008, Russia demonstrates the 
opportunity to quickly occupy and potentially deny strategic cooperation for nearby 
states, but Russia’s willingness to enduringly do so is unclear).  
Unfavorable: A spoiler clearly demonstrates both the opportunity and the willingness 
to deny the possibility of a cooperative relationship between the United States and its 
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former adversary (e.g., the Soviets in Eastern Europe in the aftermath of World War 
II and throughout the Cold War).   
Recall that I define a competitor as a state that has both the opportunity and the 
willingness to provide one of the prospective strategic cooperation participants a better 
strategic cooperation offer and that there must be an element of exclusivity to that offer such 
that the prospective participant cannot participate in both prospective strategic cooperation 
arrangements.  A more attractive offer could come in the form of more reliable and 
affordable security or economic benefits.   
Evidence of competitor problems includes, for example, exclusive and comparatively 
better competitor offers to engage in treaties or other forms of strategic cooperation, provide 
or sell military equipment, contribute forces to enhance security, provide economic aid, 
improve infrastructure, or engage in joint economic ventures.  A prospective participant need 
not accept these offers for a credible commitment problem to exist (i.e., these exclusive 
offers alone can cause fears of future voluntary defection from a strategic cooperation 
agreement).  Counterevidence includes, for example, clear disadvantage in the prospective 
gains of a competitor’s offer or evidence that a competitor’s offer is non-exclusive.   
The following typology shows my coding scheme for the status of competitor problems 
towards a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.   
Favorable: No competitor exists that demonstrates both the opportunity and the 
willingness to provide a better strategic cooperation offer on an exclusive basis.    
Ambiguous: Competitors have the opportunity to provide a better strategic 
cooperation offer but their willingness to do so is unclear. 
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Unfavorable: A competitor clearly demonstrates both the opportunity and the 
willingness to provide a better strategic cooperation offer on an exclusive basis.    
Recall that other international conditions could vary in nature and may create an 
opportunity or a willingness problem for one or both of the prospective participants that 
would undermine credible commitment to strategic cooperation.  Such conditions could come 
in the form of competing alliances (e.g., if a prospective participant is an enemy of the 
other’s existing allies), untenable political situations (e.g., if pariahs or war criminals remain 
in political control of a prospective participant state), incompatibility of ideology (e.g., 
incompatibilities with Cold War alignment), and so forth.  
 Evidence of this includes, for example, State Department and Foreign Ministry policy 
analyses that identify such problems, identification of incompatible treaty structures, or 
policymaker statements linking strategic cooperation refusal to such a condition. 
The following typology shows my coding scheme for the status of other international 
conditions towards a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.   
Favorable: No adverse international conditions exist that are likely to preclude or 
undermine credible commitment to strategic cooperation.    
Ambiguous: The effects of other international conditions are not assessable. 
Unfavorable: Adverse international conditions exist that are likely to preclude or 
undermine credible commitment to strategic cooperation.    
Turning to the domestic independent variables, recall that I define a disinterest problem 
as when at least one of the prospective participants is insufficiently interested in the gains 
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that could be made from that specific strategic cooperation arrangement and that the 
participant must not be interested in that gain regardless of which strategic cooperation 
opportunity it might come from (else a different problem is indicated, such as a trust or 
reconciliation problem).  Disinterest problems could stem from a prospective participant’s 
perceptions that gains from the arrangement are trivial, that the arrangement might cause a 
net loss, or that one is self-sufficient and better off without potentially entangling relations.   
Evidence of disinterest problems includes, for example, a rejected strategic cooperation 
offer without seeking or accepting other strategic cooperation offers of equal or lesser gain, 
complacency and contentment in rhetoric about one’s state of being, or avoidable neglect of 
the strategic cooperation arrangement and one’s required cooperative contributions.  
Counterevidence includes, for instance, public rhetoric, diplomatic inquiries and policy 
decisions seeking external strategic cooperation arrangements and support, or eager and 
faithful participation in strategic cooperation.   
The following typology shows my coding scheme for the status of disinterest problems 
towards a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.   
Favorable: A preponderance of evidence suggests that disinterest problems do not 
exist within a participant’s leadership or its winning coalition. 
Ambiguous: The effects of disinterest problems are not assessable.   
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Unfavorable: A preponderance of evidence suggests that disinterest problems exist 
within a participant’s leadership or its winning coalition.99 
Recall that I define a trust problem as when at least one of the prospective participants 
fears that the other will not honor its strategic cooperation promises in the future.  Trust 
problems are part of every credible commitment breakdown in some way, so it is important 
to note whether trust problems are the independent cause of a breakdown in credible 
commitment, or in response to other credible commitment problems (e.g., in response to 
disinterest problems on the other prospective participant’s side).  Further, for trust problems 
to be the root cause of a breakdown in a relationship’s qualities of cooperation, the many 
tools that are available to mitigate trust problems must be insufficient to alleviate those 
problems.  Trust problems could stem from a prospective participant’s poor reputation for 
honoring agreements, a prospective participant’s hostile public rhetoric towards the 
cooperative relationship, or in response to other credible commitment problems at the 
international and domestic levels, and so forth.   
Evidence of trust problems includes, for example, unfavorable policy analyses regarding 
the trustworthiness of a prospective participant.  Other evidence includes a participant’s 
request for, and subsequent other participant’s rejection of, trust-problem mitigation 
measures such as up-front contributions, cost sharing or tit-for-tat agreements, or asset 
protection agreements (e.g., a status of forces agreement, also known as a SOFA, designed to 
prevent participant forces from being subject to host-nation laws).  Counterevidence 
includes, for example, favorable policy analyses regarding the trustworthiness of a 
                                                 
99
 If disinterest problems exist with other domestic influential actors who resist strategic cooperation and there 
is low political unification, this will be reflected by an unfavorable political unification problem status.   
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prospective participant or acceptance of and compliance with trust-problem mitigation 
measures.   
The following typology shows my coding scheme for the status of trust problems towards 
a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.   
Favorable: A preponderance of evidence suggests that immitigable trust problems do 
not exist within a participant’s leadership or its winning coalition. 
Ambiguous: the effects of trust problems are not assessable.   
Unfavorable: A preponderance of evidence suggests that immitigable trust problems 
exist within a participant’s leadership or its winning coalition.100 
Recall that I define a reconciliation problem as when at least one of the prospective 
participants harbors resentment against the other for perceived past injustices and identifies 
the other as a non-friend, or perhaps even a rival or an enemy.  Reconciliation problems 
could stem from a previous conflict between the participants (e.g., a trade dispute, a 
diplomatic slight, or a war) from which there are lingering feelings of injustice, a lack of a 
sense of shared responsibility, an unhealthy sense of shame or guilt, or an absence of 
forgiveness.  Importantly, I assess the sense of reconciliation based on a qualitative 
assessment of the evidence of reconciliation, not whether a former adversary should feel 
reconciled.     
Evidence of reconciliation problems includes, for example, rhetoric from government 
officials or other influential actors that condemns or vilifies a prospective participant, 
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 If trust problems exist with other domestic influential actors who resist strategic cooperation and there is low 
political unification, this will be reflected by an unfavorable political unification problem status. 
109 
 
politicization of strategic cooperation issues to take advantage of cleavages caused by 
reconciliation problems in certain segments of a society, protests against the participant or 
the strategic cooperation arrangement, or violence against participant resources.  
Counterevidence includes, for example, government narratives to reorient the identity of a 
participant that are generally accepted by the population, displays of forgiveness, positive 
public opinion regarding a prospective participant, and evidence of friendly identification 
(e.g., fraternization and intermarriages between prospective participant residents). 
The following typology shows my coding scheme for the status of reconciliation 
problems towards a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.   
Favorable: A preponderance of evidence suggests that reconciliation problems do not 
exist within a participant’s leadership or its winning coalition. 
Ambiguous: The effects of reconciliation problems are not assessable.  
Unfavorable: A preponderance of evidence suggests that reconciliation problems 
exist within a participant’s leadership or its winning coalition.101 
Recall that I define a state capacity problem as when at least one of the prospective 
participants lacks sufficient resources to meet strategic cooperation obligations.  State 
capacity problems could stem from an inability to generate resources, exhaustion of existing 
resources during a conflict, or from unrealistic strategic cooperation requirements.   
Evidence of this includes, for example, policy analyses that reference a prospective 
participant’s lack of state capacity as an immitigable concern, observed resource deficiencies 
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 If reconciliation problems exist with other domestic influential actors who resist strategic cooperation and 
there is low political unification, this will be reflected by an unfavorable political unification problem status. 
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with respect to strategic cooperation requirements, or observed failures in strategic 
cooperation responsibilities that can be attributed to a lack of sufficient state capacity (i.e., 
the participant lacks the resources to prioritize efforts, direct the activities of their agents, and 
allocate assets as required to meet its obligations under the strategic cooperation 
arrangement).  Counterevidence includes, for example, favorable analyses of a prospective 
participant’s state capacity, amenable adjustment to strategic cooperation requirements to 
mitigate state capacity deficiencies, observed resource surpluses with respect to strategic 
cooperation requirements, and recurring successful strategic cooperation activities with the 
state capacity at hand.     
The following typology shows my coding scheme for the status of state capacity 
problems towards a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.   
Favorable:  A preponderance of evidence suggests that immitigable state capacity 
problems do not exist from the other participant’s perspective. 
Ambiguous:  The effects of state capacity problems are not assessable.   
Unfavorable:  A preponderance of evidence suggests that immitigable state capacity 
problems exist from the other participant’s perspective.  
Recall that I define a political unification problem as when a prospective participant’s 
residents do not identify with their state’s government.  When residents identify with other 
influential domestic actors who resist strategic cooperation, those influential actors can 
mount a credible resistance to strategic cooperation and thereby undermine a state’s 
opportunity to credibly commit to strategic cooperation.  Such a combination of conditions is 
unfavorable for cooperation.  Political unification problems could stem from a historical lack 
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of political consolidation, domestic or foreign imposed regime transition (e.g., from a coup or 
war), or a rising challenge to government control (e.g., an insurgency).  The resistance of 
influential domestic actors to strategic cooperation could stem from disinterest, trust, or 
reconciliation problems.  They may profit when strategic cooperation is rejected.   
Evidence of political unification problems includes, for example, patterns of non-
governmentally-sanctioned violence that are tolerated or seen as legitimate by large portions 
of the population, widespread public disregard for the rule of law, poor resident perception of 
government legitimacy, the existence of shadow governments (e.g., tribal organizations) that 
challenge the officially-sanctioned political process, and organizations or cults of personality 
that command the loyalty of large segments of the population at the expense of the official 
government.  Counterevidence includes, for example, well-ordered political behavior that is 
subordinate to state laws and favorable public perception of government legitimacy.   
The following typology shows my coding scheme for the status of political unification 
problems towards a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.   
Favorable:  No substantial evidence of political unification problems exists—
political unification is high or a preponderance of residents (including influential 
domestic actors) favors strategic cooperation.   
Ambiguous: The effects of political unification problems are not assessable.   
Unfavorable:  Substantial evidence of political unification problems exists—political 
unification is low and influential domestic actors resist strategic cooperation. 
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Case Analyses Preview 
In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, I present full case studies.  In Chapter 7 (the Conclusion), I 
briefly apply my theoretical framework to two additional cases.  Each case is presented in the 
same basic flow.  After I introduce a case, I conduct a historical review to provide a common 
baseline for author and reader of the basic evolution of relations between the United States 
and its adversary as well as additional information that is important in the context of strategic 
cooperation.  Next, I measure my variables, beginning with the independent variables 
(international first, then domestic on the U.S. side, then domestic on the former U.S. 
adversary side) and then the dependent variable.  I then conduct a holistic analysis of the 
case.  For the full case studies, I next address alternate theories as applicable.  I conclude 
each case with a summary of my findings with respect to the case’s support (or lack thereof) 
of my hypotheses and, in turn, my theory. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE GERMAN CASE 
The Relationship between the United States and Germany after World War II 
 
In this chapter, I present my case study of the postwar relationship between the United 
States and Germany after World War II.  This case provides two distinct sets of 
circumstances—two distinct treatments on the German population by either Western or 
Soviet occupiers—upon which to test my theory.  First, in “West” Germany (a term that 
refers to the zones
102
 of Western-occupied Germany and, once established in 1949, the 
Federal Republic of Germany), international and domestic conditions were favorable towards 
higher postwar qualities of cooperation shortly after the end of World War II.  My theory 
predicts higher qualities of cooperation in this situation.  Second, in “East” Germany (a term 
that refers to the “Russian” or “eastern” zone of occupied Germany and, once established in 
1949, the German Democratic Republic), international conditions were unfavorable and 
domestic conditions were otherwise favorable (when controlling for the influence of the 
unfavorable international conditions) for higher qualities of cooperation from the end of 
World War II until the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.  My theory predicts lower 
qualities of cooperation in this situation. 
The United States and the Western-occupied zones of postwar Germany resolved their 
credible commitment problems fairly expeditiously after World War II.  In short order, there 
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were no conditions at the international or domestic levels that were sufficient to trigger lower 
qualities of cooperation as reflected in my four hypotheses.  This side of the German case 
provides a baseline with which to compare the favorability of variables in other cases.  In 
what would become East Germany, however, international conditions were markedly 
different.  Unlike their countrymen in the Western-occupied zones of postwar Germany, this 
portion of the German population was under Soviet occupation.  The Soviets served as a 
credible spoiler, and as such, presented a condition that was unfavorable for strategic 
cooperation (and as a byproduct, a condition that undermined the favorability of several 
variables at the domestic level).  In this situation, my theory predicts lower qualities of 
cooperation as reflected in my Hypothesis 1.   
My theory’s predictions hold up in this case.  The postwar relationship between the 
United States and West Germany (and, much later, unified Germany after the fall of the 
Soviet Union) had a high ambition and realization of cooperative depth and endurance 
throughout the many decades after the war.  The postwar relationship between the United 
States and East Germany (before the fall of the Soviet Union) had little, if any, ambition or 
realization of cooperative depth and endurance.   
After my historical review, which is focused mainly on the 1941-1955 timeframe, I 
proceed with my variable measurement and analysis, writing mainly in reference to West 
Germany except where noted.  After this, I discuss the East German experience specifically, 
explaining what was different for this segment of the German population and why its 
outcome was different.   
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Pertinent Historical Record 
When World War II ended in May 1945, Germany lay utterly devastated and was 
completely occupied by Allied forces.  Hitler was dead, and the Nazi regime was decisively 
defeated.  The Americans and British eventually colluded to form a separate West 
Germany.
103
  These actions set the path to permanently orient western Germany towards the 
West.  By 1955, a separate West Germany enjoyed a rebuilt economy, was rearming, was a 
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and was emerging as a model of 
Western liberal democracy.
104
  Deep cooperation between the United States and Germany 
(West Germany initially, and then unified Germany after the fall of the Soviet Union) 
endures to this day.   
Prewar-1945: U.S. Pursuit of Unconditional Surrender and Abandonment, not 
Strategic Cooperation 
 
After World War I, Germany was initially led by the peaceful and liberal democratic 
Weimar government.  By 1932, the Nazi’s, capitalizing on the ill effects of hyperinflation, 
world depression, and public resentment towards the conditions of the Versailles Treaty that 
ended World War I, won a third of the vote on a platform that stressed nationalist and racist 
themes.  By 1934, Adolf Hitler was both Reich Chancellor and President.  Under Hitler’s 
direction, the Nazis implemented a program of genocide and set upon a plan for world 
domination by co-opting, attacking, or invading their European neighbors and others.  In 
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1941, the United States joined the ongoing war against Germany, having provided material 
and other support to allies prior to declaring war.
105
 
The Lead-up to V-E Day 
The aggression between the Allies and Germany during the war is well known.  This was 
a war in which all sides purposely targeted civilian population centers via area bombing and 
rockets to weaken civilian morale.
106
  Germany was left physically and psychologically 
devastated at the war’s end.107  “Major cities were almost entirely destroyed—93 percent of 
the houses in Düsseldorf, 75 percent in Frankfurt, and 66 percent in Cologne” were in 
ruins.
108
   A U.S. Army observer reported that “more than 20 million Germans [were] 
homeless or without adequate shelter.  The average basic ration [was] less than 1,000 
calories.  The ability to wage war in this generation has been destroyed.”109  The devastation 
of this war permeated the German society, and there was great potential for lasting animosity 
and fear on all sides after the war.    
This was also a war with clear and decisive U.S. military objectives—unconditional 
surrender, complete occupation, and Allied governance—and no American prewar plan for 
deep and enduring cooperation with the Germans.   At Casablanca in 1943, Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt (FDR) proclaimed his goal of unconditional surrender, “affirming his antipathy 
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toward all things German and also a blithe disregard for the complications of planning and 
implementing a military occupation.”110  If it were up to him, there would likely have been a 
short U.S. occupation of defeated Germany followed by an abandonment of Europe.  Many 
others also considered the “permanent occupation of Germany by the Allies, and particularly 
by the United States, [as] inconceivable.”111  As a result, initial U.S. planning was for an 
occupation of no more than two years.
112
  Europeans hoped otherwise.  “Throughout the 
postwar period, European leaders were more concerned with American abandonment than 
with domination, and they consistently pressed for a formal and permanent American 
security commitment.”113 
Far from strategic cooperation, FDR wanted Germans to feel the pain of the war they 
started, stating in August 1944 that “every person in Germany should realize that this time 
Germany is a defeated nation…The German people as a whole must have it driven home to 
them that the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of 
modern civilization.”114  Further, FDR “placed no importance on what the German people 
would or would not accept as a reasonable settlement after the war,” and although he 
affirmed that the German people would be treated fairly by the Allies, FDR clearly retained 
the prerogative to break up the German nation.
115
  FDR was “convinced that Germany was 
incorrigibly militaristic, [and] he thought the country must be substantially weakened in 
                                                 
110
 Wilson in Moten, ed., 2011, 202. 
111
 McAllister 2002, 17. 
112
 Wilson in Moten, ed., 2011, 202. 
113
 Ikenberry 2001, 165. 
114
 McAllister 2002, 52.   
115
 Ibid, 50.   
118 
 
order to prevent future aggression. For this purpose, FDR's preferred method was to carve it 
into several parts.”116  These ideas were embodied in the harsh and punitive Morgenthau 
Plan, which was designed to eliminate German industry by stripping the German industrial 
heartland of all existing industries and by preventing that heartland from reemerging as an 
industrial area for the foreseeable future.
117
  
Importantly, these draconian views were not shared by all U.S. policymakers.  As early as 
1943, the U.S. State Department, which believed that a postwar order would have to respect 
the needs and desires of the German people, supported a policy to “integrate a disarmed but 
united Germany into the World economy.”118  Reinforcing this attitude, fear about the 
Soviets and their communist influence had already mounted prior to the war’s conclusion on 
May 8, 1945, with U.S. officials expressing concern that communists “would capitalize on 
the unrest.”119  Notably, Admiral Karl Donitz, Commander and Chief of the German armed 
forces upon Hitler’s suicide, proposed to surrender to the Allies in the West while continuing 
the resistance to the Red Army in the East, to which General Eisenhower, the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, subsequently refused.
120
  The Allies seem to 
have compared favorably to the Soviets from a German perspective very early on.   
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1945-1955: Building a Foundation for Deep and Enduring Cooperation in the West 
At the end of the war, as FDR envisioned, Germany was divided into four zones to be 
governed by the United States, England, France, and Russia.  Berlin, 110 miles inside the 
Russian zone in the East, was itself carved into four zones of responsibility (see map, 
Appendix C).  The postwar occupation was intended to be harsh.  “While FDR backed away 
from the punitive Morgenthau Plan in late 1944, its spirit lingered in the occupation directive 
for American forces, JCS 1067,”121 which had the following stated goals:   
“Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated 
nation. The clear fact of German military defeat and the inevitable 
consequences of aggression must be appreciated by all levels of the German 
population. The German population must be made to understand that all 
necessary steps will be taken to guarantee against a third attempt by them to 
conquer the world.”122 
U.S. occupational forces were to do just enough with the German economy to “prevent 
disease and unrest.”123  They were strictly forbidden from fraternizing with the German 
population.  However, the U.S. military governor for Germany, General Lucius Clay, and his 
American troops found prohibitions against fraternization with the Germans to be ridiculous 
and quickly devised ways to circumvent them, going so far as to transplant democracy into 
the parts of Germany that they controlled.
124
 
The Allies proceeded to exploit Germany’s resources while doing just enough to prevent 
disease and unrest.  Coal extraction to feed the needs of the European continent was 
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imperative from the outset of the occupation.  In June 1945, U.S. President Harry Truman 
wrote to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, “Without immediate concentration on the 
production of German coal we will have turmoil and unrest” that could threaten the stability 
of the whole continent.
125
  Truman accepted that this policy might cause great suffering and 
provoke violence inside Germany.
126
  Meanwhile, the Soviets were focused on extracting war 
reparations.  Soviet officials gave German territory to Poland and dismantled “German 
factories for transshipment to the Soviet Union,” which antagonized German opinion.127   
Soon, however, it was clear that such massive extraction operations (by which the victors 
extracted “reparations”) were not just irritating the Germans, but exacerbating the whole 
economic debacle in Europe.  Further, “the economy in the U.S. zone was in shambles…Clay 
feared mass starvation, runaway inflation, and total economic paralysis,” and other officials 
feared that “millions of Germans might die from famine in the forthcoming winter.”128  By 
April 1946, food shortages in western Germany had forced the American military 
government to slash the already low 1,275 calorie ration (a 1,500 calorie ration was 
originally promised) and to cut the bread provision by a third.  Rickets, malnutrition, and 
anemia were imminent concerns.
129
  
In response, contrary to the mandate of JCS 1067 and the previous Allied agreements, the 
United States set about reviving the German economy and pressured the Kremlin to reduce 
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its demands for German war reparations.
130
  Notably, it was the Americans and the British 
who stood up against the Soviets on behalf of Germany.  While the Soviets felt betrayed that 
the wartime promises of reparations were being broken, it was the “Americans and British 
delegates [who] privately denounced them as looters.”131  Around this time, U.S. diplomat 
George Kennan’s influential “long telegram” made its way to Washington, signaling the 
recognition of the Soviet threat and setting the stage for the imminent four-decade U.S. grand 
strategy of Soviet containment.
132
  “Identification of the Soviet Union as the enemy eased 
U.S. policymaking” and also galvanized support for the forthcoming Marshall Plan.133   
1946-1947:  The Seeds of Strategic Cooperation Emerge 
With the dire conditions in Germany and the recognition of the Soviet threat, U.S. 
objectives were modified.  The primary U.S. fear was that these conditions might spark a 
communist revolution and drive the Germans to the Soviet camp (not necessarily that JCS 
1067 was too harsh on the Germans).
134
  Coal production was still only about 30 percent of 
1938 levels, and this was stalling recovery everywhere.  “The people of the western zones 
were hungry, demoralized, and defeated.”135  By the fall of 1946, an acknowledged American 
priority had become priming the German economy for self-sustainment of an average 
European standard of living in addition to “promot[ing] the recovery of Western Europe, 
check[ing] Soviet influence, thwart[ing] Communist gains, and lower[ing] occupation 
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costs.”136  As noted by Arthur Burns, former U.S. Ambassador to West Germany, 
“Americans were the first to extend once again the hand of friendship to the Germans.”137  
Further, by September 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes “had made it clear that he was now 
willing to openly compete with the Soviets for the allegiance of the German people” and that 
“American policy was now directed toward winning the struggle for Germany.”138 
“The first real American bid for the loyalty of the German people came in a September 
1946 speech at Stuttgart by Secretary Byrnes.”  This important speech “went a long way 
toward distancing the Truman administration from the legacy of the Morgenthau Plan and the 
popular perception that America would quickly withdraw from Europe.”139  Byrnes “openly 
appealed to German nationalism and promised that American troops would stay in Germany 
as long as the other occupying powers did,” thereby marking “the unofficial end of 
Roosevelt’s grand design and exit strategy for postwar Europe.”140  “Byrnes’s speech was 
warmly approved by the American occupational authorities and by the German people.”141  It 
was the first joint public meeting between German and American officials since the end of 
World War II, and the speech received a standing ovation from the German audience—
without doubt, Byrnes vision of a restored Germany under the protection of American power 
provided great relief to many.
142
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As U.S. policy continued to evolve towards a divided-Germany solution, policymakers 
increasingly acknowledged the importance of German cooperation and partnership.  Kennan 
saw only two choices for U.S. policy: “to unify Germany with the high probability that it 
would pass into the Soviet sphere, or to divide the country and integrate the western zones 
with Western Europe.”  Of course, the latter was preferred.143  However, the plan to divide 
Germany and fashion a West European orbit that was amenable to American leadership 
required reassurances to the Germans and the other allies.
144
  Regarding German cooperation 
for American policy in general, Clay “realized that he would not enlist German backing for 
his policies if he did not promise to improve their economic lot, restore their political 
autonomy, and revive their national dignity.”145  The United States was compelled to 
represent German interests with the French on a frequent basis.  Consistently, from before the 
war’s end (and until the West German admittance to NATO), the French were cautious of 
any measure that might increase German power.  The French resisted a unified 
administration of the German economy, feeling that “their security depended on German 
dismemberment…and the containment of Soviet influence.”146  Eisenhower noted that the 
French “continued to be terrified at the thought of a unified Germany, no matter how much it 
[was] weakened” nor how long the occupation.147  Despite French concerns, the U.S. and 
British zones united economically in January 1947, “symbolizing a widening gulf between 
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the Western allies and the Soviet Union” and mitigating the previous Soviet monopoly on 
printing money.
148
 
1947 and the Marshall Plan: A Tangible U.S. Commitment to Strategic Cooperation 
When Truman came to power after FDR’s death in 1945, he was still a bit naïve about 
Russian leader Joseph Stalin’s nature.149  However, he soon recognized the need to reverse 
FDR’s course of minimizing Europe’s significance in world affairs and, in short order, “the 
focus shifted to the containment of Soviet aggression.”150  Further, “the situation in the 
western zones of Germany was worsening every day.  Major food riots erupted, and even the 
1,550-calories ration was imperiled by growing shortages.”151  By late spring 1947, rations 
were down to 1,200 calories a day and officials feared that, without additional food, they 
would lose the struggle to prevent Germany from going communist.
152
 
Still, there was fear from Republican spokesman (and future Secretary of State) John 
Dulles and others that a recovered Germany would seek revenge, would attempt to return to 
great power status, and would be tempted to align with the Soviets.
153
  Communists were 
improving in elections throughout Europe and, alarmingly, had achieved victories in Italian 
municipal elections.
154
  There was fear at that time that “no one could predict the orientation 
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of a future German government,” particularly once the occupation was over.155  Despite this 
debate, “there was no more important priority than reviving the production of western 
Germany and using it to win the loyalty of the German people.”156 
The U.S. answer to these woes was the Marshall Plan, launched in June 1947.  Secretary 
of State George Marshall took office in January 1947 and soon after championed his 
namesake plan to integrate Germany into Europe and restore an indigenous balance of power 
in Europe.
157
  The Marshall Plan included $13 billion
158
 in assistance for Europe, and its 
major objectives were numerous.  First, American officials wanted to “spawn economic 
recovery in Western and Southern Europe, undermine the appeal of communist parties, and 
thereby circumscribe the latent influence and power of the Kremlin.”  Second, American 
officials wanted to “revive the western zones of Germany and to integrate them into a 
Western economic and political orbit.”  Finally, “American Marshall Planners hoped to drive 
a wedge into the emerging Soviet bloc of satellite states in Eastern Europe.”159 
The Marshall Plan was hatched not only to address the economic strife in Europe, but 
also to stave off the threat of communist political victories, often by placing anti-communism 
conditions on its aid.
160
  It was the chief instrument of containment against the Soviet Union 
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at that time.
161
  The Marshall Plan was carefully crafted to bolster American influence and 
power, “bind European economies to the American economy,” and ultimately, it signified 
“that the economic recovery of Europe, including western Germany, had become the 
number-one priority of the Truman administration.”162  The Soviets recognized that the 
Marshall Plan would not only revive Germany’s strength, but also undermine communist 
strength in Western Europe, and they expectedly opposed the plan.
163
  The Soviets were not 
alone in their opposition; the French also strongly opposed the plan for typical reasons.
164
  
Yet, in the end, the United States represented German interests as well as its own. 
1948-1949: Consolidating Westward Orientation—the Berlin Blockade and a West German 
State 
 
The call for a West German government became more widespread, setting the path 
towards a long-divided Germany.  Kennan was keenly interested in separating Germany and 
Russia, warning that if there were ever “a happy marriage between Germany and Russia…we 
might as well fold up.”165  In early 1948, “both American occupational authorities and the 
State Department were already pushing for the creation of a separate West German state.”166  
Furthermore, the Americans and British had resolved to have two Germanies for the 
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foreseeable future—the Russians would get the East and the western zones would form a 
separate state.
167
 
German participation in their governance increased, and U.S. officials began to worry 
more that Allied demands might incite German nationalism, undermine pro-democratic 
Germans, and create opportunities for the Kremlin to steal Germany.
168
  Kennan reported a 
sense of German resentment over Allied demands, especially the “prospective of long-term 
division of their countries,” and that the old defiant German nationalism was resurfacing.169  
He worried that “a united Germany would be strongly nationalistic, authoritarian, and 
susceptible to offers from the Soviet Union.”170  While he thought a West German 
government would just make things worse, he realized that democratic forces in Germany 
were faltering and that the United States had to minimize occupation controls and allow the 
Germans to govern themselves or they would turn away from the West.
171
  The French, 
predictably, voiced concerns, and American policymakers pressured the French to “stop 
obstructing the formation of a West German government…and accept reductions in 
reparations.”172  However, U.S. policymakers also voiced assurances that it was “very 
unlikely that American forces would be withdrawn from Germany for a long time—until the 
threat from the East had disappeared.”173 
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In the midst of the migration towards a West German state, a great opportunity arose for 
the Americans to demonstrate their commitment to strategic cooperation with the German 
people.  On June 24, 1948, “Russian military authorities cut off the electricity, and stopped 
all railroads, barges, cars, trucks, and pedestrians going into and out of the western sectors of 
Berlin.”174  This was the start of the infamous Berlin Blockade.  Importantly, it presented the 
United States a choice to either abandon Berlin or stand up with the Germans to resist 
Russian aggression.  The United States chose the latter, and this proved pivotal for the U.S.-
German partnership.  Eisenberg sums up the events and consequences, explaining that:      
“By October, the airlift had surpassed all expectation as a dramatic and 
effective means of supplying the city.  Furthermore, rather than undermining 
the London Accords, Soviet militancy was facilitating their realization.  
Against the backdrop of the blockade, the Americans were enjoying 
unprecedented success in disciplining West European allies and enlisting the 
enthusiastic cooperation of west German inhabitants.”  U.S. policymakers 
“increasingly perceived the Soviet blockade of Berlin as a diplomatic 
windfall.  By trying to cut off the city the Russians had discredited the 
German Communists, demeaned Marxist ideology, sowed fear across Western 
Europe, and provided the Americans with the chance to display their 
humanitarianism and military might.”  “On May 12, 1949—one minute past 
midnight—the lights went on in the western sectors of Berlin as cars, trucks, 
and trains resumed their travel into and out of the city.  Clumps of citizens 
stood along the autobahn, where they cheered and placed flowers on the 
passing vehicles.  Over the next two days, there were ceremonies and 
demonstrations honoring the bravery of the Allied airmen and the sacrifice of 
the local populace.  At the city assembly, members unanimously voted to 
name the square in front of Tempelhof Airport ‘Platz der Luftbrüche’ (Airlift 
Square).”175   
The triumph of the Allies in maintaining this foothold in Berlin, 110 miles inside the 
future German Democratic Republic, was a key partnership moment.  The Berlin Airlift 
showed the “resolve of the United States to share in the protection of the young democracy 
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that had risen from the ashes of World War II.”176  Berlin “became the primary channel 
through which East Germans could flee their own state and settle in the West.  The Western 
allies, together with the West Germans, actively encouraged this process, with the result that 
between 1945 and 1961, approximately one sixth of all East Germans departed for the West, 
most of them through Berlin.  There was no corresponding flow of people in the opposite 
direction.”177   
Another key strategic development during this timeframe was the groundwork to create 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  In February 1949, the new U.S. Secretary 
of State, Dean Acheson, had a first draft of the North Atlantic Treaty.  NATO was to be more 
than just a security alliance—European and American officials saw it as a way to “reinforce 
wider realms of postwar cooperation.”178  The looming issue for policymakers was whether 
West Germany would be allowed to join this alliance.   
Although Americans and Russians still feared that a united Germany would side with an 
adversary or reemerge as a threat in its own right, plans to establish “West Germany” were 
completed.
179
  In a May 1949 meeting of French, British, U.S., and Soviet foreign ministers, 
Acheson successfully executed a negotiation plan that paved the way for a West German 
government and the end of the military “occupation,” although U.S. troops would explicitly 
remain in Germany.
180
  By September, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was 
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established, the occupational military government was terminated, and the FRG had 
democratically-elected leadership.  Konrad Adenauer, a member of the Christian Democratic 
Party and a particularly U.S.-friendly political figure, was surprisingly elected by the 
Bundestag parliament as the first chancellor of the FRG, a position he would hold until 
1963.
181
  
Adenauer believed that “the quickest way to end the occupation regime was by increasing 
the level of trust the Western powers had in Germany,” while his main political opponent, 
Kurt Schumacher of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), thought that “the occupying powers 
would only make concessions in response to concerted pressure” and sought to tarnish 
Adenauer as the “Chancellor of the Allies.”182  Throughout the future interactions between 
the United States and Germany, Schumacher proved “eager to capitalize on allegations that 
Adenauer was kowtowing to the allies” and helped pressure Adenauer to seek increased 
sovereignty for West Germany.
183
  U.S. policymakers respected Adenauer’s delicate position 
and avoided undermining him.  In return, the U.S.-friendly policies of Adenauer solved 
problems that were generated by the Schumacher-types who wanted to unify Germany at the 
expense of cooperation with the West.   
In response to the creation of West Germany, the Soviets created the German Democratic 
Republic in eastern Germany, putting the nail in the coffin of near-term German reunification 
and any chances of aligning eastern Germany with the West.  Schumacher “assailed 
Adenauer for compromising too much and for indifference to the fate of 18 million east 
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Germans.”184  Despite this pressure, the Adenauer-U.S. partnership held, the United States 
achieved its divided-Germany solution, and Adenauer, democratically, held power for more 
than a decade to follow. 
1949-1955: Deepening Strategic Cooperation with West Germany—Rearmament, Returning 
Sovereignty, and NATO Membership 
 
Adenauer was a proponent of German rearmament and let “American officials know on 
several occasions throughout 1949 that he was in favor of a German defense contribution.”185  
From the U.S. perspective, “the realities pointed inexorably to a greater use of German 
resources for the defense of Europe,” although Acheson and others worried that the Germans 
had not yet proven themselves as reliable partners and were not so strongly aligned with the 
West that they would not cut a deal with the East.
186
  Aside from resistance in the United 
States, there was resistance in Western Europe, even among many West Germans, with 
respect to rearming West Germany.
187
  Schumacher and the SPD, for instance, wanted to 
hold off on rearmament to get more concessions from the occupying powers, and based on 
their recent gains in local elections, it seemed that the population, particularly pacifists and 
those demanding greater equality, were receptive to this strategy.
188
  The French pitched the 
Pleven Plan, designed to postpone any form of German rearmament, and Acheson rebutted 
that the Germans would not accept an organization where they were openly and blatantly 
labeled as inferiors.  Once again, U.S. policymakers advocated for Adenauer and his fellow 
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Germans.
189
  Providing impetus and reaffirming the Soviet threat, NSC-68 was completed in 
April 1950 with an overall recommendation for a “rapid and sustained build-up of political, 
economic, and military strength of the free world.”190  The Korean War helped the United 
States with this rearmament dilemma.  In light of the recent Berlin Blockade, the successful 
Soviet detonation of a nuclear bomb, and the new Soviet-backed war in Korea, the Truman 
government proposed the rearmament of West Germany in the summer of 1950.
191
  In April 
1951, Adenauer was vindicated, and the plan that established the preconditions for German 
rearmament was signed, against the objections of Schumacher and his like.
192
 
Negotiations for German reunification and West German sovereignty kept policymakers 
busy over the next year.  “Adenauer himself remained strongly committed to integration with 
Western Europe and the Atlantic community,” but not all Germans felt this way.  Some 
resented Allied efforts to control their foreign policy and intervene in their internal affairs.
193
  
Schumacher’s party constrained Adenauer in this respect, but such domestic pressure also 
helped Adenauer bargain for German equality in the European Defense Community (EDC), 
full membership in NATO, and authority over foreign troop levels on West German soil.
194
  
The French were initially resistant to the idea of West German admittance to NATO.  U.S. 
policymakers allayed these fears, promising that U.S. troops would remain on German soil, 
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although not as occupiers, and assuring that Germany’s admittance to NATO would wait.195  
While the FRG was still not a member of NATO, FRG’s rearmed forces were to be bound to 
the EDC, which was subordinated to NATO and was “a supranational security regime 
designed to make West German rearmament more acceptable to the French.”196  Such 
“complex arrangements, made possible by the willingness of the United States to extend its 
aid and incur military obligations, satisfied Adenauer’s ambitions for German renewal, 
comforted Schuman’s [the French foreign minister] quest for French security, and established 
a configuration of power in the Old World that comported well with U.S. national security 
interests”—a co-option of German power and a concession for the Germans short of 
unification.
197
 
The Soviets still had not abandoned the idea of unification.  In March 1952, the Soviets 
proposed a unified, unaligned Germany, though Acheson was not interested.  Acheson 
wanted to co-opt German power, not create a unified Germany that could align with Moscow 
or grow into a future threat in its own right.
198
  Most Germans, however, “still preferred 
unification over integration” and, fortunately for U.S. policymakers, Adenauer shared 
Acheson’s perspective. 
In May 1952, a new agreement was signed in Bonn that ceased the “occupation,” while 
prohibiting West Germany from expelling Western troops, and gave the FRG “full control 
over domestic affairs, except in times of emergency.”  It also granted the FRG “increased 
                                                 
195
 Ibid, 453-456.   
196
 McAllister 2002, 171.   
197
 Leffler 1992, 460. 
198
 Ibid, 458.  
134 
 
autonomy over its foreign policy, except that it could not…alter its territorial boundaries, 
conclude a peace treaty with the Kremlin, or jeopardize Western access to Berlin.”199  This 
was a step towards full sovereignty, and again, U.S. policymakers advocated for Adenauer’s 
position and Adenauer delivered West German cooperation.  Adenauer’s political standing 
held strong and he was “triumphantly” reelected in 1953.   “The West Germans had chosen 
and, on the whole, were satisfied with their government,” despite Schumacher’s harsh 
criticisms.
200
   
1954 and 1955 saw the final steps to full partnership with the return of West German 
sovereignty, rearmament, and West German admittance to NATO.  When the FRG 
negotiated its return to sovereignty in 1954, “it had an incentive to embrace its new 
democratic institutions—recognizing that the western allies could only be relied upon to 
defend Germany if it embraced democratic values.”201  Despite all the actions taken to secure 
West German admission into the EDC, the French National Assembly refused to ratify the 
EDC treaty in 1954.  The British, however, suggested making West Germany a member of 
NATO, and surprisingly, the French accepted this idea.  The FRG joined the NATO alliance 
in May 1955.
202
 
In this period, “U.S. officials intelligently decided to rebuild Western Europe and to co-
opt German…strength”—actions that were “prudently conceived and skillfully implemented 
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in cooperation with indigenous elites.”203  Adenauer, who used these last few years to gain 
the confidence of his West European neighbors, was crucial in making this American-
partner-backed security solution palatable to Western European decision authorities when it 
had previously been rejected.  Further, Adenauer led the effort of postponing reunification 
and joining NATO as the path to rearmament and, as historian Marc Trachtenberg notes, 
“Adenauer was viewed by western statesman…as almost too good to be true [and] as much 
more committed to the West than they logically had any right to expect from a German 
statesman.”204 
1955 to Present: An Enviable Cooperative Relationship between the United States and 
West/Unified Germany 
 
For the world powers, the division of Germany was institutionalized, convenient, and 
preferable to other alternatives by 1955.
205
  Although the original U.S. postwar plan was to 
withdraw forces from Europe as soon as possible, U.S. military presence has been constant in 
Germany and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future.   In fact, more than 90,000 
U.S. military personnel still remained in Germany in 2003, more than a decade after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, and there were approximately 40,000 U.S. troops in Germany 
at the time of this writing, more than two decades after the Soviet collapse.
206
  “Ensuring the 
maintenance of a permanent military presence in Europe after the Cold War was one of the 
most important” U.S. policy goals when negotiating German reunification.  Even after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Secretary of State Warren Christopher pledged to keep U.S. 
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military presence on European soil to “help preserve peace and prosperity for the next fifty 
years and beyond.” 207 
This is not to say that the U.S-German partnership has not been tested along the way or 
experienced its ups and downs.  The 1960’s brought concerns over U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam.  The 1970s brought concerns over American proposals to deploy the neutron bomb 
on West German soil.  While this concern caused massive anxiety in segments of German 
society, Carter’s ultimate decision not to proceed with the deployment of the “bomb” 
disappointed the West German government and left hard feelings.
208
  The relationship was 
tested strongly in the 1980’s.  There was great controversy over U.S. deployments of 
intermediate-range nuclear forces (i.e., Pershing II missiles) to Germany, which caused 
widespread protests and demonstrations in Germany.
209
  There was controversy when West 
Germany went ahead with a project to finance the Siberian natural gas pipeline.  The United 
States opposed this project, fearing that it would render NATO Allies vulnerable to Soviet 
manipulation (as has been witnessed in practice during the time of this writing).  While this 
almost led to a crisis in the NATO Alliance, European interests were accommodated in the 
end.
210
  Further, the 1985 visit by President Reagan to West Germany during the 40
th
 
anniversary of V-E Day, which became known as the “Bitburg Affair,” caused diplomatic 
turmoil.  SS members were buried near the visit site, which sparked pressure from some 
American Jews for the U.S. president not to attend.  Reagan stuck with the trip, deferring to 
the German position, but this demonstrated that “the reconciliation between the German 
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public and other peoples of the world [was] less complete than was generally supposed.  
Unhealed wounds remain[ed] a painful legacy of the Nazi era.”211  When the Berlin Wall fell 
and the Soviet Union collapsed, Germany reunified and had a prime opportunity to leave 
NATO.  Yet, “East and West Germans overwhelmingly favored joining NATO” and, with 
the support of the U.S. Government to pressure Gorbachev and a German “aid” package to 
buy Soviet concurrence, Germany reunited and remained in the alliance.
212
  More recently, 
the German government was a staunch opponent of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.  Yet, 
German soldiers lined the roads, shoulder to shoulder, to salute the U.S. wounded as they 
made their way to the major U.S. medical facility at Landstuhl, Germany, and German 
soldiers and civilians alike left gifts for the wounded.
213
  After the war, the German 
government rushed to pursue rapprochement.
214
  
Measurement of the Variables 
International Independent Variables (with respect to the United States and West 
Germany) 
 
Spoiler Problems 
There was one possible spoiler at the end of the war that was strong enough to preclude a 
cooperative relationship between the United States and Germany through force or coercion—
the Soviet Union.  The Soviets had the willingness to spoil until perhaps the late 1980s when 
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev courted support from the West to ease the Soviet fall.  
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The Soviet opportunity to spoil was limited to the eastern zone of Germany that was under 
Russian postwar occupation, and this opportunity lasted until the fall of the Soviet Union. 
The Soviets acted as a spoiler in Germany’s eastern zone and could have spoiled a 
unified Germany.  The United States precluded the latter with the divided-Germany solution 
and, conversely, served as a spoiler for cooperation between the Soviets and the Germans in 
the western zones that were under American-led occupation.  While the Soviets took 
measures to keep Germany neutral or on its side, they could not exercise the level of force 
and coercion required to spoil U.S. cooperation with West Germany without risking open 
war against an American adversary that had proven its ability to use nuclear weapons.  U.S. 
policymakers considered and rejected the notion that the Soviets were looking for a fight and 
willing to take those measures.   
The Soviets did, however, use force and coercion when and where they were able, as seen 
during the Berlin crisis.  They were successful at spoiling cooperation between the United 
States and East Germans/East Berliners through brute force military strength until the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  The exceptions to this were the millions of East Germans who 
escaped through Berlin’s western zones and subsequently participated in West Germany’s 
deep and enduring cooperation with the United States.  While the Soviets tried to spoil U.S. 
efforts to strategically cooperate with West Berliners outright, this was ultimately ineffective 
as seen in the aftermath of the Berlin Airlift.  Upon the collapse of Soviet power in 1989 and 
the subsequent German reunification in 1990, the Soviets no longer had sufficient power to 
spoil cooperation between the United States and East Germany.  This change in dynamic was 
recognized and capitalized upon by the West as seen by the subsequent German reunification 
and the continued orientation of unified Germany towards the West.   
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Status of spoiler problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation between the 
United States and West Germany for the duration of this case’s timeframe (and, as will be 
explored more fully later, UNFAVORABLE vis-à-vis East Germany until the collapse of 
Soviet power circa 1989).   
Competitor Problems 
There was one potential competitor that might have had both the opportunity and 
willingness to undermine cooperation between the United States and Germany by means of 
an exclusive and better strategic cooperation offer, including competitive security and 
economic benefits—the Soviets.  The Soviets, however, squandered any opportunity to do so 
from the beginning of their harsh occupations in Eastern Europe.  Conversely, the 
Americans, having recognized the Soviet threat shortly after the war’s end, came to see the 
need to compete for German allegiance and made this sentiment clear with the Marshall Plan 
in 1947.   
As a result of Soviet unwillingness or ineptness to compete, the Soviet opportunity to 
credibly do so in the eyes of its target population was materially undermined.  While the 
Russians clearly demonstrated the military capacity and conviction to secure the territory 
under their occupational responsibility, their brutality on the local population
215
 made the 
Germans want to be “secured from” the Russians, not “secured by” the Russians.  The 
Kremlin’s opportunity to provide competitive economic benefits was suspect in light of its 
heavy war damage and expenditures, and its willingness was likewise suspect in light of its 
aggressive program to extract “reparations” and dismantle German factories to ship home to 
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the Soviet Union, while the Americans and the British, recognizing the worsening economic 
disaster in 1946, chided those Soviets as looters.  The difference between eastern and western 
economic capacities was made even starker after the inception of the Marshall Plan in 1947.  
Berliners could see the difference in the economic wellbeing between the eastern and western 
zones first hand and often voted with their feet. 
In contrast to the Soviets, the United States also demonstrated the ability to secure the 
territory under its responsibility, but without the pervasive brutality.  Also, while the western 
zones experienced great economic strife early in the occupation that certainly could have 
opened up opportunity for a competitor, the United States took aggressive economic 
measures through the Marshall Plan to gain advantage over any competition.  This 
competitive economic advantage never faltered, extending beyond the point where deep 
U.S.-German cooperation was institutionalized via the NATO alliance and beyond.   
Status of competitor problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation from 
1947 throughout the remainder of this case’s timeframe—no competitor existed with both the 
opportunity and willingness to provide a better strategic cooperation offer on an exclusive 
basis.   
Other International Conditions 
There are two international conditions that stand out as potential sources of credible 
commitment problems in this case:  the Nazi problem and communism.   
The dynamics of the postwar Nazi problem were challenging to navigate for the 
Americans.  Clearly, Nazi leadership would not be tolerated—the United States could not be 
perceived as partnering with the war criminals responsible for Auschwitz and still maintain 
141 
 
any semblance of legitimacy with domestic or international audiences.  Yet, Nazism was 
pervasive throughout Germany.  Widespread denazification was challenged by U.S. 
occupational forces from the outset of their occupation.  General Patton, for instance, argued 
that 98 percent of the Nazis were just “camp followers” who were coerced into joining.  The 
United States had to decide the limits of their denazification program, and chose to purge 
“more than nominal” Nazis, which amassed to more than a million investigations and tens of 
thousands of trials and job vacancies—vacancies for which the occupiers had to compensate.  
At times, the military occupiers were seen as lax on the Nazis, and U.S. policymakers were 
compelled to protect the image of being tough on Nazis.  Ultimately, the tough image was 
sustained until the emphasis on denazification was overcome by other priorities and 
responsibility for denazification was passed to the Germans.
216
  In short, aggressive actions 
by the Soviets encouraged Europeans to reprioritize their desires—the desire to co-opt 
German power to maintain security trumped the desire for retribution against lower-level 
Nazis. 
The incompatible communist ideology had great potential to create a credible 
commitment problem that would undermine cooperation between the United States and 
Germany.  Communist parties were pervasive throughout Europe and communist political 
victories were mounting in neighboring countries (e.g., Italy) in the wake of V-E Day.  The 
Soviets were actively promoting communism in their spheres.  If German communists would 
have gained power, their incompatible ideology would have severely undermined 
cooperation with the democratic West.  Fortunately, communism had difficulty gaining 
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ground in Germany.  Even in the eastern (Russian-occupied) zone, communism had difficulty 
taking root.  During elections in October 1946, for example, the Russian-backed Socialist 
Unity Party (SED) barely held control in eastern Germany and Berliners stunned the 
Russians with their lack of support for the SED, which garnered only 19.8 percent of their 
vote.
217
  Ultimately, West Germany democratically elected Adenauer to power, and an 
ideology extremely friendly towards U.S. strategic cooperation was emplaced.   
Status of other international conditions: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation 
between the United States and West Germany for the duration of this case’s timeframe—
while problems with the Nazi image and communism had the potential to undermine 
cooperation, these conditions were effectively mitigated in the early postwar period and 
beyond.   
Domestic Independent Variables on the U.S. Side (towards West Germany) 
Disinterest Problems 
A case could be made that United States entered the postwar period with a disinterest 
problem.  However, any postwar U.S. disinterest problem was resolved in short order upon 
the broader recognition of the Soviet threat, no later than 1946.   
FDR’s disinterest in the gains to be made from a cooperative relationship with Germany 
was evident in his pre-victory vision of a harsh and brief occupation that was to be followed 
with abandonment of Europe.  Even before the war’s end, however, these sentiments were 
not universal amongst U.S. policymakers.  As U.S. policymakers increasingly perceived a 
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Soviet threat, they increasingly perceived the gains to be made from cooperation with a 
Germany that was oriented towards the West (which U.S. policymakers were able to secure 
with the divided-Germany solution).  These gains included, amongst others, hedges against 
both Soviet influence and the spread of communism.  When Truman replaced FDR before 
the war’s end, a new sentiment emerged and, by Kennan’s “long telegram” in 1946, the gains 
to be made by cooperating with Germany to counter the Soviets were widely coveted.  The 
generous Marshall Plan soon followed as a testament to U.S. interest in those gains.   
Status of U.S. disinterest problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation no 
later than 1946 and throughout the remainder of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of 
evidence suggests that disinterest problems did not exist within the U.S. leadership or its 
winning coalition during this period.   
Trust Problems 
There is little evidence of immitigable U.S. trust problems with the Germans in the 
western zone.  There, the United States initially ensured German compliance with 
cooperative agreements through unconditional surrender and occupational force.  As the 
United States began to compete for German allegiance and allow Germans more say in their 
governance, those Germans built U.S. confidence in German willingness to abide by strategic 
cooperation obligations through consistent affirmation of U.S. interests.  For instance, those 
Germans repeatedly elected the pro-U.S. Adenauer, delayed reunification, enabled an easy 
occupation (unlike the recent U.S. experience in Iraq), and permitted substantial U.S. troop 
presence and basing on their soil that has continued to the time of this writing.  West German 
adherence to institutional agreements, such as the Marshall Plan’s anti-communism 
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conditions, also helped reinforce U.S. trust.  In response, the United States encouraged and 
entered into more substantial agreements with the West Germans such as the NATO 
Alliance.   
Status of U.S. trust problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation between 
the United States and West Germany for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a 
preponderance of evidence suggests that immitigable trust problems did not exist within the 
U.S. leadership or its winning coalition.   
Reconciliation Problems 
Reconciliation problems on the U.S. side were remedied to some extent by the death of 
Hitler and the removal of the Nazi regime.  However, more work had to be done with some 
of the American people to reorient their identity towards the German population.  This was 
an important requirement to gain American support for the generous Marshall Plan.   
Unlike more recent conflicts in which U.S. policymakers were careful to villainize only 
regime leaders and their henchman (e.g., Hussein and the Baathists in Iraq or Milosevic and 
his officers in Serbia) and not the enemy population as a whole in the prelude to war, World 
War II was a conflict in which whole societies were villainized.
218
  FDR embodied this 
sentiment, wanting the whole of the German population to pay for Germany’s crimes.  
Truman was more pragmatic and eventually sought to co-opt Germany into the West to 
contain Soviet influence.  To do this, and to gain support for the generous Marshall Plan 
(which they did successfully by 1947), U.S. policymakers created an official narrative to 
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reorient American identities towards Germans.  This was also a necessary step to include 
Germany in the NATO alliance.  Of course, not all Americans struggled to reorient their 
identity of Germans, as evidenced by the rampant fraternization and the thousands of 
marriages between U.S. troops and German citizens shortly after the war.   
Status of U.S. reconciliation problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation 
between the United States and West Germany no later than 1947 and throughout the 
remainder of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that reconciliation 
problems did not exist within the U.S. leadership or its winning coalition in this period.    
Domestic Independent Variables on West Germany’s Side 
Disinterest Problems 
To suggest that Germans were not interested in the potential gains that could be made 
from cooperation with the United States is to suggest that they could either live with their 
existing circumstances or achieve their reconstitution goals without external assistance.  
Further, it is to suggest that they envisioned a postwar situation that avoided occupation and 
were ambivalent to the thought of being abandoned to the Soviet threat.   
Historical evidence does not bear out these claims.  Germany was devastated and starving 
at the end of the war—many Germans literally could not exist, let alone live with their 
current circumstances.  As history shows, conditions in occupied Germany were dire in 1945 
and 1946, even with Allied help.  Germany could not meet its reparation requirements, fuel 
Europe with its coal, and achieve domestic improvements without external cooperation.  
Further, Germans knew they would be occupied by some world power and were keenly 
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interested in who would be doing the occupying.
219
  While some Germans toyed with non-
alignment (e.g., Schumacher), those who were democratically elected and spoke for the 
majority of Germans (e.g., Adenauer) realized the utility of strategic cooperation to the long-
term health of Germany.  By 1949, when the Soviets exploded an atomic weapon and the 
United States lost its nuclear monopoly, the Germans were especially vulnerable and 
appeared, by the account of the leading American in Germany in 1950, “nervous, hysterical, 
and uncertain.”220  Thus, harkening back to Ikenberry’s theory on postwar order, Germans 
were not interested just in the handouts associated with a friendly occupation.  They had an 
interest in establishing a long-term cooperative relationship with a power of their choice to 
prevent abandonment into Soviet hands.    
Status of West Germany’s disinterest problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of 
cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests 
that disinterest problems did not exist within the West German leadership or its winning 
coalition.  
Trust Problems 
There is little evidence of immitigable West German trust problems after the United 
States firmly committed to co-opting Germany as an ally against the Soviet threat and began 
competing for German allegiance circa 1947. 
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Before the war’s end, there was little commitment to Europe from FDR in general—he 
wanted to keep the occupation short and reduce European influence in world affairs.  In 
1946, the reassessment of the Soviet threat changed the U.S. perspective and set the United 
States down a path of true commitment to strategic cooperation in Europe.  The Americans 
subsequently increased German confidence in U.S. willingness to abide by strategic 
cooperation obligations in several ways.  For instance, Byrnes’ crucial Stuttgart speech 
signaled a commitment to an enduring U.S. presence in Europe and was well-received by the 
German population.  The Marshall Plan, made available in 1947, was an explicit and very 
credible demonstration of commitment to strategic cooperation.  West Germany was a 
notable recipient of the benefits of that plan and Germany’s citizens regularly observed the 
United States honoring its aid promises.  The United States further quelled trust concerns 
during the Berlin Airlift, where it was clear that trust grew as Germans observed the United 
States honoring its security commitments.  However, despite these explicit displays of 
commitment, the West Germans maintained a watchful eye, and in the 1950s, they worried 
whether the United States would stand against a new Soviet nuclear power if West Germany 
were threatened.  Many of these fears were allayed with West German admittance into the 
formal NATO Alliance, made possible by the collaboration and cooperation between 
Adenauer and U.S. policymakers.
221
  In the mid-1960s, West Germans supported U.S. action 
in Vietnam and viewed it as a testing ground of how the United States honored its 
commitments.
222
  While the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam was a matter of concern and seen 
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by some as abandonment, some of these concerns have been mitigated by the persistent 
presence of U.S. troops and substantial military might on German soil, operating side by side 
with German forces, even until today.   
In summary, the West Germans consistently and understandably sought reassurances of 
U.S. commitment, and the United States consistently took measures to demonstrate 
commitment, both institutionally (e.g., NATO) and materially (e.g., by establishing the 
Marshall Plan and by stationing tens of thousands of U.S. forces and their families on the 
Cold War front alongside their German partners).  Further, the Soviets were useful catalysts 
to mitigate trust concerns by creating “incentive to trust” and by giving the United States 
ample opportunity to demonstrate its credible commitment to strategic cooperation.  Also, 
without a credible Soviet alternative, the West Germans, in some ways, had no alternative 
but to trust the Americans despite their anxiety.  While trust has been an ever present 
consideration for U.S.-German affairs, it has never been a consideration that was left 
unmitigated to fester into a trust problem that would undermine strategic cooperation.   
Status of West Germany’s trust problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of 
cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests 
that immitigable trust problems did not exist within the West German leadership or its 
winning coalition.   
Reconciliation Problems 
A preponderance of evidence suggests that reconciliation problems on the West German 
side were not a substantial source of credible commitment problems. 
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Evidence to suggest that West Germany had a reconciliation problem is minimal.  First, 
there were understandable German complaints and riots over food shortages and general 
conditions during the early years of the occupation.  However, the Marshall Plan addressed 
these issues and, by the time of the Berlin Blockade in 1948, the superiority of the conditions 
in the western zones was more than evident to the German public on both sides.  Second, 
there was rumored activity of a Nazi insurgent group called the Werwolfs.  However, their 
efficacy is suspect.  According to Edelstein: 
“Little opposition to the occupation was evident, as Germans were desperate 
for the assistance that the Western allies were willing and able to offer.  The 
so-called ‘werewolves’—German military officers trained to disrupt any 
occupation activities—revealed themselves to have little capability or will to 
interfere with the occupation.”223 
Thomas Berger notes similarly that “there was virtually no organized opposition to the 
occupying forces.”224  This suggests that this supposed group of unreconciled insurgents, to 
the extent that it existed, lacked the support of a population that shared its reconciliation 
problem.  Last, there was evidence of reconciliation problems from Adenauer’s main 
political foes, most notably Schumacher.  Schumacher was a nationalist who continually 
attacked Adenauer for his cooperation with the West, favored reunification over cooperation 
with the United States, and fought German rearmament.  This suggests that Schumacher may 
have felt that U.S. actions were unjustified and that he may have had a correspondingly low 
sense of reconciliation.  This also suggests that if Schumacher were to have been elected to 
power in 1949 instead of Adenauer, there could have been a reconciliation problem within 
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the West German leadership and its winning coalition.  But, as history shows, this was not 
the case.     
Evidence to suggest a high German sense of reconciliation is abundant.  First, there was a 
general appreciation of the U.S. motive for strategic cooperation from the beginning (or, 
more accurately, an appreciation for what the U.S. motive was not—domination).  As 
Ikenberry notes, European willingness “to participate within the order was due in part to the 
reluctant posture of American foreign policy” which “allayed some European fears of 
American domination, but it raised worries about abandonment.  After 1945, the United 
States did find ways to allay these worries, as well.”225 
Second, as the occupation progressed, there was a pervasive sense that the U.S. treatment 
of Germans was just and fair, especially when compared to the Russians.  The Russian zone 
was rife with looting and physical assaults on a massive scale—Russian troops raped as 
many as two million German women in 1945 and 1946 alone.
226
  Worse yet, Soviet leaders 
sanctioned this behavior.
227
  According to General Clay, the first commander of U.S. 
occupation forces in Germany, the Soviet authorities, by their own actions, created enemies 
out of potential friends, and the Americans looked like “angels” in comparison.228  As Gaddis 
explains, despite large numbers of communist party members throughout Germany at the end 
of the war:  
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“The incidence of rape and other forms of brutality was so much greater on 
the Soviet than on the western side that it played a major role in determining 
which way the Germans would tilt in the Cold War that was to come.  It 
ensured a pro-western orientation from the very beginning of that conflict, 
which surely helps to account for why the West German regime was able to 
establish itself as a legitimate government while its East German counterpart 
never did.”229 
Third, there was rampant defection from East Germany to the U.S.-led occupation zones 
that continued despite the threat of capital punishment, and fourth, Adenauer’s U.S.-friendly 
government was democratically elected and reelected through 1963.     
Fifth, there is ample evidence of a strong affinity between the American occupiers and 
the German populace that began from the earliest days of their postwar relationship and 
continued to blossom.  This is also in stark contrast to the experience in the Russian zone.  
Whereas the Americans found that they had to reverse their JCS 1067 policy and allow 
fraternization, the Russians had the opposite experience, having initially encouraged such 
contacts and then being forced to prohibit them due to the hostility they generated.
230
  There 
were reports of “widespread fraternization between German women and allied soldiers in the 
Western zones” and a willingness of many women from “respectable backgrounds” to live in 
common-law marriages with GIs.
231
  This affinity continued to manifest such that, “of the 
1,865 marriages conducted in Baumholder between 1954 and 1962, 936 of them involved an 
American spouse.  The number of German-American marriages in other communities also 
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showed a steady increase throughout the decade, averaging about 20 percent of all 
marriages.”232  
Sixth, there is evidence from intelligence reports and public opinion polls that U.S. forces 
were held in relatively high regard by the Germans throughout the partnership-establishment 
process.  In October 1947, Germans were asked which occupying powers they trusted.  In 
response, 63 percent of Germans said they placed “much” trust in the United States to treat 
Germany fairly, while only 45 percent held the same regard for the British, 4 percent for the 
French, and none for the Russians.
233
  “In the same survey, 84 percent of Germans in the 
American zone of occupation said that they would choose the Americans again as their 
occupying power if they could turn back history.”234  In 1952, the U.S. Army raised concerns 
over persistent anti-Americanism in Germany, estimating that 10 percent of Germans were 
openly hostile towards Americans and another 15-25 percent of Germans were indifferent 
towards Americans.
235
  While the U.S. Army was concerned about these percentages, the 
remaining 65-75 percent of unambiguously U.S.-friendly Germans appears remarkably 
favorable considering the domestic approval ratings garnered by most U.S. presidents.  
Further, “in 1954, when Germans were asked if they preferred a good cooperation with either 
France or the United States, 69 percent chose the Americans as their preferred partner,” 
which is quite remarkable considering France’s geostrategic importance to Germany.236   
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Lastly, German cooperation in the postwar reparations and massive denazification 
processes shows that many Germans were at least aware of the Nazi atrocities, if not 
remorseful and willing to try and make amends.  Some history was initially not transmitted to 
the next generations.  In 1986, for instance, Ambassador Burns observed that relatively few 
young Germans “knew about the Marshall Plan…or how the freedom of Berlin had been 
preserved by a massive Western airlift.”237  However, he also noted that “most Germans 
[were] well aware of Nazi crimes against the Jewish people, and [were] truly remorseful.”238  
By 1997, German political leader Karsten Voigt explained the following rationale for 
Germany’s continued involvement in NATO and the EU: “we wanted to bind Germany into a 
structure that practically obliges Germany to take the interests of its neighbors into 
consideration.  We wanted to give our neighbors assurances that we won’t do what we don’t 
intend to do.”239  Germany’s past left lasting scars for which they were still atoning.  This 
suggests that Germans had a relatively healthy foundation of shame, guilt, and sense of 
responsibility that likely traces back to the beginnings of the postwar relationship, even 
though it is perhaps not explicitly acknowledged at times.   
Taken as a whole, it is hard to argue that the Germans, with the exception of 
Schumacher’s supporters and perhaps the Werwolfs, had a substantial reconciliation problem 
with the Americans.   
Status of West Germany’s reconciliation problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of 
cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests 
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that there was a high sense of reconciliation amongst the West German leadership and its 
winning coalition.   
State Capacity Problems 
Germany’s limited state capacity at the end of the war certainly could have become a 
source of credible commitment problems under different circumstances.  Instead, heavy U.S. 
assistance and reasonable U.S. state capacity requirements for West Germany’s strategic 
cooperation contributions, coupled with West German cooperation and progress towards a 
quick recovery of West German state capacity, mitigated these potential problems.   
Germany was a wholly devastated society upon the conclusion of the war.  Their leader 
had committed suicide, and the country was in ruins.  To exacerbate this, an aggressive 
Allied denazification program was, theoretically, underway and had the potential to further 
deteriorate state capacity—if all Nazis were purged down to the nominal level, then there 
would be a severe shortage in the local expertize required to manage German finances, water 
treatment plants, electricity plants, mines, and the like.   
Initially, state capacity was provided by a robustly-manned Allied occupation force (e.g., 
OMGUS, the Office of the Military Government, United States) and the aggressive Marshall 
Plan until such time as the West Germans could manage on their own.  Denazification was 
adjusted to accommodate the needs of capacity as well.  Eisenberg describes the situation in 
the late summer of 1945:  
“As of August 30 sixty thousand people had been stripped of their positions in 
the U.S. zone. Yet though these numbers signaled the seriousness of the 
American commitment to denazification, they obscured certain contradictory 
trends. Many of the individuals who had been removed were quickly 
reinstated. Others were bumped down to subordinate positions from which 
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they continued to exercise their previous authority. Then there were numerous 
instances where ‘more than nominal’ Nazis were simply replaced by different 
‘more than nominal’ Nazis.  And finally there were the thousands of culpable 
people who were never removed at all. Overall, there was great variation in 
how the public purge was carried out.”240 
The Americans required little German material capacity, but did require German 
cooperation to improve capacity, which the Germans delivered.  For their part and under the 
supervision of their occupiers, the Germans quickly organized politically—not surprising for 
a society that was highly orderly before the war.  This led to elections by 1946 in the eastern 
zone.  State capacity in the western zones improved quickly as well, to the point where 
Adenauer, despite a significant rivalry with Schumacher, could effectively manage his state 
and deliver on German commitments.  The Marshall Plan was instrumental in consolidating 
state capacity and, by 1955, West Germany was rearming as a full member of NATO.  Thus, 
as predicted by my theory, the resource-rich United States, once interested in a cooperative 
relationship, was willing to commit the required manpower and financial resources to 
manage West Germany’s state capacity until the West Germans were able to manage it for 
themselves.  The West Germans, in turn, cooperated with this assistance to increase their 
state capacity, thereby mitigating this potential source of credible commitment problems.   
Status of West Germany’s state capacity problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of 
cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests 
that West Germany did not have immitigable state capacity problems from a U.S. 
perspective.   
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Political Unification Problems 
There is little evidence of a political unification problem in West Germany during the 
postwar period.  West Germans seemed to identify with their (new) government and were 
relatively quick to organize elections.  When West Germany held democratic elections in 
1949, the main opposition to Adenauer came from other political parties seeking 
representation through the democratic process (i.e., Schumacher and the SPD), not via means 
of a competing political identity.  As John Gaddis attests, the West German regime was able 
to establish itself as a legitimate government despite Schumacher’s political attacks.241  The 
only potentially-substantial challengers to the West German government’s monopoly on 
legitimate violence were the Werwolfs, and they were shown to be lacking in public support 
and wholly ineffective.  Overall, in light of this high West German political unification, the 
resistance to strategic cooperation of influential domestic actors like Schumacher was 
ineffectual.   
Status of West Germany’s political unification problems: FAVORABLE towards 
qualities of cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe.   
Dependent Variable: The Postwar Qualities of Cooperation between the United States 
and West Germany 
 
The historical record shows a high postwar cooperative ambition between the United 
States and West Germany.  The states were able to reach agreements to cooperate deeply and 
enduringly in a number of important dimensions.  In the security dimension, the nations 
reached accord on a number of items including a robust formal alliance (NATO) and 
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substantial host basing that has endured to this day.   In the political dimension, both states 
reached accords that required them to deviate significantly from what they would have done 
in the absence of their cooperative relationship.  For instance, the United States agreed not to 
abandon Europe after the war and West Germany agreed to acquiesce to the divided-
Germany solution and delay reunification.  In the economic dimension, the two states 
reached agreements that were designed to be the backbone of the postwar recovery of 
Europe.  Many of these deep agreements were open-ended or have otherwise endured 
through the many decades since the war’s end.   
This high cooperative ambition has been highly realized.  In the security dimension, the 
states’ alliance was tested throughout the Cold War and after with both states, for instance, 
answering the call to arms in Afghanistan and elsewhere after the September 11 terrorist 
attacks in 2001.  In the political dimension, both states followed through with actions that 
were significant deviations from what they would have done in the absence of their 
cooperative relationship.  For instance, the United States has yet to abandon Europe, while 
Germany delayed reunification until 1990, after the fall of the Soviet Union, and did so in 
coordination with its U.S. allies to minimize the geostrategic fallout with Russia.  This is not 
to say that the states always cooperated politically, as evidenced by their discord over the 
Siberian natural gas pipeline and the Iraq War.  In the economic dimension, the states 
cooperated in a way that not only brought about European economic recovery, but resulted in 
Germany being a particularly strong economic powerhouse that could help manage economic 
problems elsewhere on the Continent (e.g., recently, Greece).  Lastly, the deeply cooperative 
relationship between the United States and Germany has endured almost seventy years and 
has survived much jostling in that time.  Most notably, the relationship survived the recovery 
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of Germany and the fall of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War—changes in relative 
power and threat conditions that may have signaled the end of such deep cooperation in other 
scenarios.   
Assessment of the qualities of cooperation:  HIGHLY COOPERATIVE—the relationship 
had high ambition for postwar cooperation, had a highly realized depth and endurance of 
cooperation, and survived substantial jostling.   
Analysis 
The case of the relationship between the United States and West Germany after World 
War II had favorable independent variables at both the international and domestic levels 
shortly after the war’s end and throughout the remainder of its timeframe.  My theory 
predicts higher postwar qualities of cooperation in this situation, and that is exactly what is 
seen in my dependent variable assessment.   
At the international level, there were no spoilers strong enough to preclude cooperation 
between the U.S. occupiers and the West Germans.  As the Soviets quickly and increasingly 
discredited themselves, there were no competitors with both the opportunity and willingness 
to undermine cooperation through a more competitive and exclusive offer.  Other 
international conditions were resolved by German cooperation with denazification and anti-
communism efforts.  Thus, conditions at the international level were largely supportive of 
cooperation.   
Domestically, on the U.S. side, disinterest problems were resolved shortly after the war.  
FDR’s death before the war’s end opened the door for voices—voices that already opposed 
the policy of abandoning Europe after the war—to have greater sway.  Thoughts of 
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abandonment were further sidelined by the fuller recognition of the Soviet threat circa 1946.  
Trust problems were initially mitigated through occupational force, then through carefully 
crafted agreements and substantial reinforcement of commitments by German policymakers 
(e.g., Adenauer).  Reconciliation seemed easy for many U.S. occupiers, who fraternized with 
the local population despite orders to the contrary, and policymakers created a new narrative 
to help re-identify their former adversary from an “enemy” worthy of abandonment to a 
“partner” worthy of generous Marshall Plan aid, a dangerous face-off against the Soviets 
during the Berlin Airlift, and full membership into NATO as allies.   
On the West German side, massive devastation ensured that disinterest problems would 
not be an issue for a long while after the war.  While West Germans feared U.S. 
abandonment after the war, they witnessed, over time, very visible signs of American 
commitment that permeated the fibers of their society (e.g., the Byrnes speech, the aid from 
the Marshall Plan, the Berlin Airlift, NATO advocacy, and so forth) and this, in turn, helped 
mitigate potential trust problems.  The West German government, it seems, did not have to 
exercise a large role in selling their new friendly identity of their former American 
adversaries to their population (as might have been expected in light of Kupchan’s 
rapprochement framework).  There is overwhelming evidence that the Germans, by and 
large, “liked” the Americans from the beginning.  Why?  German policymakers and other 
citizens alike had ample reason for resentment.  There was death and destruction all around 
them that was caused, intentionally, by a U.S. military machine that became their occupiers.  
Yet Germans could not escape the facts, as reminded throughout the denazification process, 
that they “elected” a government that shared responsibility for the war (by starting it), and 
bore shame and guilt for actions during the war (as the full extent of Nazi crimes became 
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clear).  Further, it was apparent to many that millions of Germans would have starved to 
death without U.S. aid in the aftermath of the war.  In light of these facts, and in light of the 
comparatively harsh practices of the Russian occupiers in the East, it was easy for Germans 
to feel “justly treated” by their U.S. occupiers.  All of this combined to make reconciliation 
relatively easy for the Germans and, as clearly demonstrated, facilitated widespread 
fraternization.  State capacity was provided initially by the Americans in cooperation with the 
Germans, and the Germans cooperated to quickly improve their indigenous capacity which 
mitigated state capacity problems for the long run.  Lastly, despite a regime change as a 
result of the war, the West Germans maintained their identity with their (new) government 
and did not legitimize non-governmental violence, thereby maintaining political unity 
throughout a highly precarious period.   
Thus, conditions at the domestic level on both the U.S. and West German sides were also 
largely supportive of cooperation and, as predicted, the relationship thrived and was typified 
with high qualities of cooperation.  As time passed, this highly cooperative relationship 
became institutionalized such that, by the time the Soviet Union fell and Germany had 
recovered and reunified, it endured despite substantial jostling.   
East Germany 
As I provide my brief analysis of the very different East German experience, I focus on 
the primary immediate postwar difference between West Germany and East Germany—the 
difference in their occupying powers.  The West Germans and Americans, under U.S. (and 
British and French) occupation, were able to establish conditions that were favorable for 
higher qualities of cooperation shortly after the war’s end.  Conversely, in East Germany, the 
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Soviet occupiers served as a credible spoiler to cooperation between the Americans and East 
Germans.  Aside from creating unfavorable conditions at the international level in its own 
right, the Soviet spoiler precipitated unfavorable conditions in other otherwise-favorable 
international and domestic variables as well.   
While this approach allows an abbreviated analysis that helps with parsimony, my 
primary reason for proceeding in this manner is to avoid confusing the important analytical 
point that it was a condition at the international level alone, the Soviet spoiler, which was the 
root cause of any problems with other sources of credible commitment problems and, in turn, 
the primary driver of the low (absent) qualities of cooperation between the United States and 
East Germany until German reunification  This more clearly demonstrates that problems at 
the international level alone can undermine strategic cooperation.  It also shows more clearly 
the power of a spoiler.   
The logic for this approach is that the German populations in the East and West were 
similar enough that the primary difference between them at the war’s end was their 
occupier.
242
   Had Germans in the Russian occupation zone been exposed to the same 
circumstances (i.e., the same treatment) as Germans in the other occupation zones, the 
outcomes in the case of the United States and East Germany would have resembled the 
outcomes in the case of the United States and West Germany.  The cases would have had 
similar favorability towards the qualities of cooperation for variables at the international and 
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domestic levels and, in turn, their postwar qualities of cooperation would have been similar.  
That is, had East Germans received the same treatment as the West Germans, international 
and domestic conditions in the case of the United States and East Germany would all have 
been “favorable” towards higher qualities of cooperation and the actual postwar qualities of 
cooperation would have been “highly cooperative.”  This logic is supported by the 
similarities in the West German and East German populations immediately after the war, 
which were most differentiated by lines on a map drawn by their occupiers.  This logic is also 
supported by history, which shows that the favorability of conditions and the qualities of 
cooperation in the West did not deteriorate over the years as millions of East Germans 
escaped to West Germany.  If one more East German had defected to the West, would the 
conditions have changed?  If a thousand, a million, or the whole of East Germany had 
defected, would the conditions have changed?  One might argue that this was basically what 
happened after German reunification, and the conditions and qualities of cooperation 
between the United States and Germany remained relatively stable despite this.     
Importantly for this tailored analysis, East Germans and West Germans were not exposed 
to the same treatment.  The Soviet occupiers in the East brutalized the Germans under their 
jurisdiction and served as a credible spoiler to cooperation between the Americans and East 
Germans.  Further, the Soviet spoiler precipitated unfavorable conditions in several 
otherwise-favorable international and domestic variables.  While the Soviet spoiler was 
discredited as a competitor, it created problems with other international conditions with its 
imposition of communism, effectively locking East Germany behind the Iron Curtain for the 
Cold War.  Domestically, on the U.S. side, the spoiler led to immitigable trust problems due 
to the threat that the spoiler might have caused East Germans to involuntarily defect from 
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agreements.  As the Cold War progressed, a U.S. reconciliation problem may have emerged 
due to the growing association of East Germany with their spoiler-imposed (initially, but 
later, perhaps, more deeply rooted) communism.  Similarly, reconciliation problems on the 
East German side may have developed over time as the Soviets pressed their “anti-capitalist” 
narrative, although these problems were largely remedied by the time of German 
reunification as communism was discredited.  Lastly, East German political unification may 
have been a problem as evident in the societal unrest and mass defections due to the 
illegitimacy of the East German government.
243
  As expected, the unfavorable condition at 
the international level (spoiler) caused low (absent) qualities of cooperation between the 
United States and East Germany until the Soviet spoiler was neutralized circa 1990, at which 
time international and domestic conditions and, in turn, qualities of cooperation, quickly 
improved.  
Assessing Alternate Theories 
Here I briefly acknowledge and assess an alternate theory about the role of external 
threats—that a common external threat is necessary for cooperation in these contexts.  In this 
case, the theory would suggest that the Soviet threat is what really mattered.   
If this were true, it would not explain why the U.S.-German partnership, instead of 
dissolving, expanded to include the East Germans after the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
continues today more than two decades after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.  Further, per 
Ikenberry:  
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“The emerging Cold War—and the perceived Soviet threat—did reinforce 
cooperation among the Western democracies, but it did not create it.  Even 
before the Europeans perceived a direct military threat from the Soviet Union, 
they actively cultivated a postwar American security commitment.  The open 
character of American hegemony, the extensive reciprocity between the 
United States and its partners, the absence of hegemonic coercion, and 
binding institutional relations all provided elements of reassurance and 
legitimacy despite the huge asymmetries of power.”244 
I do not argue, however, that the Soviet threat was unimportant.  As seen in my analysis, 
the Soviet threat served as a mechanism to promote U.S. interest (e.g., by creating an 
incentive for the United States to remain in Europe), German interest (e.g., by providing 
additional security incentives for strategic cooperation to accompany the clear economic 
incentives), German trust (e.g., by encouraging the Americans to take active measures to 
compete for German allegiance through demonstrations of commitment), and German 
reconciliation (e.g., by helping the Germans recognize the Americans as the “good guys”).  
That said, the Soviet external threat was not required to mitigate these potential obstacles 
toward strategic cooperation, nor was it the only mechanism mitigating those obstacles.  Per 
my theory, then, the importance of the Soviet threat was that it helped mitigate sources of 
credible commitment problems.  This could have been done by other mechanisms as well—
an external threat was but one possibility.  This is an important nuance for policymakers who 
are contemplating postwar strategic cooperation.  Those policymakers need to find a way to 
assuage disinterest, trust, reconciliation, and other problems (the ends), not necessarily 
identify or create an external threat (a means).  I will discuss this alternate theory further in 
my following cases. 
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Summary of Findings 
Overall, the case of the postwar relationship between the United States and Germany 
after World War II supports my theory.  The West German case had favorable conditions for 
cooperation at both the international and domestic levels.  My theory, in this situation, 
predicts higher qualities of cooperation for postwar relations and the “highly cooperative” 
postwar qualities of cooperation between the United States and West Germany is consistent 
with this prediction.  The East German case had unfavorable conditions for cooperation at the 
international level (a spoiler) that undermined the favorability of other conditions at the 
international and domestic levels.  My theory, in this situation, predicts lower qualities of 
cooperation for postwar relations and the “absent” postwar qualities of cooperation between 
the United States and East Germany (prior to the fall of the Soviet Union and commensurate 
elimination of the spoiler) is consistent with this prediction.     
More specifically, my finding in the West German case of the favorable international and 
domestic conditions causing higher qualities of cooperation supports my four hypotheses 
from their inverses (i.e., “decreased problems in all independent variables caused increased 
cooperation” instead of, as is specified in my hypotheses language, “increased problems in 
one or more independent variables caused lower cooperation”) .  My finding in the East 
German case of the unfavorable international conditions causing lower qualities of 
cooperation supports my Hypothesis 1. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE IRAQ 1991 CASE 
The Relationship between the United States and Iraq after the Gulf War of 1991 
 
In this chapter, I present my case study of the postwar relationship between the United 
States and Iraq after the Gulf War of 1991.  To limit the time period of this case study, I end 
it in 2002 at the lead up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq.  Chapter 6, the case of the United States 
and Iraq after their war in 2003, picks up at this point and moves forward to the time of this 
writing (2014).  As the Gulf War case is also foundational for my subsequent case, I provide 
amplified historical detail here where it fits within this case’s timeframe, particularly when it 
relates to a key actor in both stories—Saddam Hussein.  Further, some of the variable 
analyses apply to both cases but will not be recreated in whole in my subsequent case.  Thus, 
this case can be read independent of my subsequent case, but not vice versa.   
In contrast to the U.S.-Germany case where international and domestic conditions were 
favorable for higher qualities of cooperation in West Germany and where international 
conditions were unfavorable and domestic conditions were otherwise favorable for higher 
qualities of cooperation in East Germany (before the fall of the Soviet Union), the Iraq 1991 
case is one where both international and domestic conditions were unfavorable for higher 
postwar qualities of cooperation up through the subsequent war in 2003 between the United 
States and Iraq.  My theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation in this situation.   
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As I will show, at the international level, it was not spoilers or competitors that were 
unfavorable for strategic cooperation, but other international conditions—namely, Saddam 
Hussein’s pariah regime, its incompatible image, and the threat it continually posed to 
regional U.S. allies.  In this situation, my theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation as 
reflected in my Hypothesis 1.  At the domestic level there were several conditions that were 
unfavorable for strategic cooperation, including trust and reconciliation problems on the U.S. 
side (the root cause being Saddam and his regime) and trust, reconciliation, and political 
unification problems on the Iraqi side.  In this situation, my theory predicts lower qualities of 
cooperation as reflected in my Hypotheses 2 and 4.   
My theory’s prediction holds up in this case.  The postwar relationship between the 
United States and Iraq lacked any appreciable ambition or realization of cooperative depth 
and endurance in the years between the Gulf War (1991) and the Iraq War (2003).  Rather, it 
was typified by ongoing conflict and open hostility, culminating in another war just more 
than a decade later.   
Pertinent Historical Record 
Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 and the world responded with rare consensus to 
punish Iraq and eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait.  When Iraq accepted the terms for ceasefire 
in late February 1991, Saddam Hussein remained in power to menace again.  Saddam’s 
problems with the United States predated this case and were constant throughout.  The 
ceasefire, in a way, signaled a transition to an undeclared war that involved the frequent use 
of deadly force by both sides.  In 2003, the United States and Iraq were again, 
unambiguously, in open war.    
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Prewar: Building a Foundation of Resentment and Mistrust 
Because the postwar relationship between the United States and Iraq after 1991 was so 
greatly influenced by Saddam Hussein, I begin this historical overview with his rise to power 
and initial dealings with the United States.   
Saddam’s Rise, Soviet Alignment, Consequences, and Brutality 
In February 1963, Baath party militants from the Iraqi army, who had been working with 
the CIA, staged a coup.  They overthrew the Iraqi regime, an enemy of the United States, and 
executed the regime’s strongman, Abdel Karim Qassim.  In the Baathist’s words, they “came 
to power on the CIA train.”  Notably, an earlier assassination attempt had been made on 
Qassim—by a young Saddam Hussein.  However, although “the U.S. secretly supplied the 
Baath regime with military equipment,” that regime fell to another coup within a year and 
Iraq, consequently, returned to enemy status in U.S. eyes.  The Baathists reclaimed power 
through another coup in 1968, but subsequently aligned with the Soviets.
245
   
Following this, the United States implemented a policy of routinely hostile activities 
toward Iraq with tactical exceptions during the Iran-Iraq war.  For example, the United States 
aided a guerrilla war by the Kurds against the Baath regime in the early 1970s, to include 
arms shipments.
246
  The United States also provided equipment to the U.S.-friendly Shah of 
Iran during this timeframe “to offset the massive Soviet aid going to the [Baath] regime.”247 
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Saddam became president of Iraq in 1979 and proceeded to purge the Baath leadership, 
establishing firm dominance over political rivals as a strongman.  One of his early actions 
was to try and take advantage of the turmoil in neighboring Iran, a historical enemy of Iraq.  
Iran was in the midst of the 1979 Iranian revolution and overthrow of its Shah.  Saddam 
perceived vulnerability.  In 1980, Saddam invaded Iran and this provided an opportunity for 
the United States and Iraq to cooperate towards their common Iranian enemy.  The United 
States offered tactical support to Iraq to thwart Iran.  While the United States had a 
longstanding antipathy towards Iraq’s Baathist regime, the Reagan administration supported 
Baghdad just enough to prevent an Iraqi defeat.
248
  For example, “the Reagan administration 
shared intelligence on Iranian troop dispositions.”249  Regional U.S. allies offered support to 
Iraq as well.  The Saudis, for instance, “supported the Iraqi war effort financially and 
permitted Iraqi combat planes to launch surprise attacks against Iranian targets from Saudi 
airspace.”250  Importantly, the primary U.S. interest in the Iran-Iraq conflict was to prevent 
disruption of the flow of Gulf oil, not to bolster its 20-year enemy in Iraq.
251
  This became 
painfully evident to Saddam when the revelations of “Irangate,” in which the United States 
facilitated arms sales to Iran during the conflict, became public.   
Towards the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam turned his attention from menacing his 
neighbor Iran to menacing a domestic enemy.  In 1988, Saddam launched the Anfal (meaning 
“booty” or spoils of war) campaign against his own Kurds in northern Iraq.  His attacks 
“depopulated large areas of Iraqi Kurdistan, along the Iranian border, by razing 
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approximately two thousand villages and expelling an estimated 150,000 people from their 
homes.”  Estimates of the dead or “disappeared” Kurds as a result of this campaign range 
from 50,000 to 150,000.
252
  One of the most notorious attacks occurred in March 1988 when 
Saddam hit the Kurdish town of Halabja with mustard gas and nerve gases (specifically, 
sarin, tabun, and VX) killing an estimated 5,000 Kurds.
253
  
Failed Rapprochement 
Despite the demonstrable threat that Saddam was to his neighbors and domestic 
population, the United States contemplated rapprochement.   In September 1989, President 
George H. W. Bush affirmed his desire for close ties with Baghdad.
254
  His administration 
considered whether Saddam could change.  Perhaps not—Saddam was a brutal dictator—but 
some saw no harm in trying.  The consensus of the administration and its regional partners 
was that “engagement, not containment, represented the best course for U.S. policy towards 
Iraq.”255  This was reflected in National Security Directive 26 which accommodated Hussein 
and stated that “normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve [longer-
term U.S.] interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East.”  Rather than 
force or coercion, it suggested that the U.S. Government propose economic and political 
incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior.
256
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Saddam, meanwhile, viewed the American presence in the Gulf during and after the Iran-
Iraq War as threatening.  While the United States took measures to protect its friends in the 
Gulf (e.g., by escorting Kuwaiti oil tankers), Iraq complained repeatedly in 1989 and 1990 
that “the United States sought to establish an anti-Iraq coalition in the Gulf.”257  By early 
1990, U.S. ideas of rapprochement seemed even less plausible.  Iraq demanded that the U.S. 
Navy leave the Gulf and accused the Americans of spying.  In March, U.S. intelligence 
confirmed that Iraq had deployed its Scud missile launchers within range of Israel—“Bagdad 
subsequently threatened to burn half of Israel with chemical weapons.”258  Relations between 
the United States and Iraq commensurately deteriorated and, after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, 
the former U.S. reliance on Iraq as a counterbalance to Iran and a stabilizing presence in the 
Gulf ceased—the two were now unambiguous enemies.259 
The Gulf War of 1991: an Unresolved Conflict 
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded, quickly defeated, and occupied neighboring 
Kuwait.  Threatening the world’s oil supply, the regional pariah Saddam had elevated to a 
global menace.  From an Iraqi perspective, Kuwait had it coming.  The world, in large part, 
saw otherwise.  
Before the invasion, Saddam lamented to U.S. Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie that 
Kuwait was “engaging in economic warfare with Iraq by maintaining a high rate of oil 
production.”260  In time, Saddam expanded his argument to include several reasons for his 
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decision to occupy Kuwait: Kuwait was historically part of Iraq; Kuwait was stealing $2.4 
billion of Iraqi oil by “slant drilling” across their shared border; Kuwait was overproducing 
oil in violation of OPEC’s mandate and keeping oil prices down (which hurt the Iraqi 
economy); and Kuwait refused to forgive loans which Saddam had used to finance his war 
against Iran—Iraqi blood that had also protected Kuwait from Iran.261   The enmity towards 
Kuwait was not exclusive to Saddam.  Iraqi general officers likewise “had nothing but 
contempt for the Kuwaitis and resented the prosperity the Kuwaitis enjoyed” while the Iraqi 
population, in general, rejoiced when “Kuwaitis entered their dark night as members of Iraq’s 
‘Nineteenth Province.’”262 
From a U.S. perspective, the Iraqi invasion, aside from being a violation of Kuwaiti 
sovereignty, was threatening on a global scale.   As noted by U.S. officials, “every American 
president since Franklin D. Roosevelt had insisted that the security of the Persian Gulf oil 
supply was a vital interest” and “Iraqi domination of one-fifth the world’s oil supply (Iraq’s 
share plus that of Kuwait) threatened U.S. strategic interests and economic well-being.”263  
Further, as early as 1943, President Roosevelt had proclaimed, “the defense of Saudi Arabia 
is vital to the defense of the United States,” and Iraqi forces were well within striking range 
of increasing their share of the world’s oil supply as they occupied Kuwait.264  While Saddam 
would claim that he was not clearly warned off the invasion and would say publicly that he 
perceived a “green light” for the invasion from Glaspie, the validity of this claim is 
inconsistent with these geostrategic circumstances and has been challenged in recent 
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scholarship that suggests Saddam and his advisors felt the invasion would lead to 
confrontation with the United States.
265
  
The Pariah Saddam Defies the United Nations 
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait was brutal.  Presidential candidate Bill Clinton would 
later criticize the Bush administration for not pursuing war crimes.  A Pentagon report from 
January 1992 claimed that 1,082 Kuwaitis had been killed by execution and torture during 
the Iraqi occupation and that Iraq had abused the prisoners of war it captured, especially the 
Jewish ones.
266
  Audio tapes recovered after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 confirm that 
Saddam was aware of the tactics being used and supported them.  For example, to gain 
compliance from Kuwaiti officers, Saddam’s forces interrogated them, tortured them (as an 
officer reported to Saddam, “after we completed the interrogation, we treated them harshly, 
really harshly”), killed them, and concluded at their residences where Iraqi forces “brought 
out the women, killed them, and then burned the house.”267  These regime-endorsed murders 
of prisoners and other non-combatants were not the only atrocities by any means.   
The international response to the situation was atypically unified, partly because the 
Soviet Union was on the decline and needed Western support.  With Moscow’s cooperation, 
“U.S. diplomats won United Nations Security Council approval of a series of resolutions 
calling for an Iraqi withdrawal and imposing harsh economic and military sanctions on 
Baghdad.”268  Saddam remained defiant and kept Western hostages in Bagdad and around 
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weapons sites as “human shields” to deter attack.269  Finally, on November 29, 1990, the UN 
Security Council passed Resolution 678, which authorized the coalition to evict Iraqi troops 
from Kuwait by “all necessary means” (e.g., by military force) if the Iraqis did not withdraw 
from Kuwait by January 15, 1991.
270
  
A Short but Dirty War 
Iraqi forces did not withdraw as mandated by the United Nations and coalition strikes on 
Iraqi targets began on January 17, 1991.  The U.S.-led operation enjoyed high legitimacy 
with its UN authorization for force.  36 nations provided military assistance and/or billions of 
dollars of funding, including Japan and Germany.
271
  After an air campaign that lasted just 
over a month, the “100-hour” ground war commenced.  Iraqi forces were routed and Kuwait 
was quickly liberated.  U.S. forces occupied southern parts of Iraq to the disgust of Iraqi 
leaders.   
Several of Saddam’s choices during the war would make postwar cooperation with him 
even more difficult for some to consider than it already was.  From the second day of the 
war, Iraq fired Scud missiles into Israeli population centers—a total of 40 launches against 
Israel between January 18 and February 25—partly in an effort to bring Israel into the war 
and, thereby, fracture the U.S.-Arab coalition; and partly because Saddam was highly anti-
Semitic and saw an opportunity to strike.
272
  Iraqi forces also engaged in what some might 
call environmental terrorism.   As U.S. marines infiltrated into Kuwait days before the 
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official allied ground offensive, Iraqi troops set fire to more than a thousand Kuwaiti oil 
wells.
273
  They also “caused more than 250 million gallons of oil to pour into the Persian 
Gulf.”274  Further, in attempt to start a ground war, Saddam launched a limited offensive into 
Saudi Arabia on January 29, 1991, in what would be called the Battle of Khafji.  While Iraq 
suffered a stunning defeat at the hands of coalition forces, Iraq threatened and embarrassed 
its Saudi neighbors in the process instead of withdrawing from Kuwait as mandated by the 
United Nations.
275
  Lastly, there were failed Iraqi attempts at terrorist attacks against 
American commercial targets and government buildings in Manila and Jakarta,
276
 and 
Americans witnessed battered coalition prisoners of war whose “confessions” were televised 
by Saddam’s forces.   
The U.S.-led coalition went after the Iraqi leadership but took measures to protect its 
image amongst the regional population by, for instance, timing the war to avoid Ramadan 
and the Haj and avoiding the targeting of holy sites as it went after Iraqi leadership targets in 
urban centers.  “Bush had no apparent reservations about going after the Iraqi leadership or 
Baath party headquarters, but wanted to make sure that American air strikes would not anger 
the Iraqi people or the Arab masses.”277  Even then, deadly incidents provided propaganda 
opportunities for Saddam to attack American image.  One such incident was the air attack on 
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Al Firdos bunker.  On February 13, intelligence failures led U.S. forces to strike Al Firdos air 
raid shelter in Baghdad, which was thought to hold Iraqi leadership.  After the strike, 
Baghdad announced that hundreds of civilians had been killed and the public relations fallout 
caused the United States to increase its restrictions on urban targeting.
278
  Also, as the Iraqis 
retreated from Kuwait towards the end of the Gulf War (but before the ceasefire), fallout 
from the “highway of death” incident became another concern.  “News reports were 
beginning to refer to a ‘turkey shoot’ of the retreating Iraqi forces” along the “highway of 
death,” potentially casting the victimizer of Kuwait as the victim and tarnishing U.S. 
image.
279
  In part, to avoid making the impression that the United States was killing Iraqis 
just for the sake of killing them, the United States prematurely ended the allied ground 
campaign and let go a future menace.
280
   
Saddam Survives the War to Menace Again 
When Bush called for a ceasefire 43 days into the war, Kuwait had been liberated and 
Iraq was severely damaged.  It was a very lopsided victory.  By one account there were 348 
coalition deaths and approximately 100,000 Iraqi soldier deaths and 35,000 Iraqi civilian 
deaths.
281
  Additionally, most of Saddam’s residences and military command centers were 
destroyed, the Iraqi electrical grid was down, Iraqi telecommunications links were largely 
                                                 
278
 GT 1995, 324-327.  
279
 GT 1995, 404-416.  
280
 GT 1995, 423.   
281
 Brands 2008, 64.  
177 
 
severed, several bridges were dropped and roads destroyed, and more than 90 percent of Iraqi 
oil refining capacity (the foundation of their economy) was destroyed.
282
 
Despite this, Saddam emerged from the war alive, defiant, and undeterred.  His 
Republican Guard forces survived to reform and threaten again, contrary to the original 
coalition goals and thanks to the premature ending of the ground campaign.  Those forces 
would eventually be used to help sustain Saddam’s regime and to quash the Shiite and Kurd 
rebellions that challenged Saddam’s rule.  Further, Iraqi weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) capability was insufficiently reduced.  “Iraq had preserved enough of its nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons programs to necessitate an open-ended program of United 
Nations inspections” and much of its Scud missile force, used to deliver that WMD vast 
distances, was unaccounted for.”283    
And so, at the war’s end, Saddam had been defeated on the battlefield and discredited in 
the eyes of military professionals, but still “held fast to the reins of power in Baghdad.”284  
The pariah Saddam remained in power to threaten his domestic population and neighbors.  
President Bush captured the essence of these lingering issues and foreshadowed the problems 
to come when he replied to a reporter’s question about his somber attitude just two days after 
announcing the ceasefire:  
“You know, to be very honest with you, I haven’t yet felt this wonderfully 
euphoric feeling that many of the American people feel.  And I’m beginning 
to.  I feel much better today than I did yesterday.  But I think it’s that I want to 
see an end.  You mentioned World War II—there was a definitive end to that 
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conflict.  And now we have Saddam Hussein still there—the man that 
wreaked this havoc upon his neighbors.”285   
1991-2001: Persistent “Postwar” Conflict Lays a Foundation for the Next War 
Reporter: “Mr. President, you’ve always said that you were not targeting 
Saddam…” 
President Bush: “We are not targeting Saddam…”286 
Saddam’s overthrow was not an explicit coalition objective of Operation Desert Storm 
and the Bush administration consistently denied that there was ever a plan to assassinate 
Saddam.  While Saddam’s removal was desired, and while Iraq’s military leadership (e.g., 
the military dictator Saddam) was a “target of opportunity” within the laws of war, the 
United States was willing to end the war without Iraqi regime change.  The coalition’s 
explicit objectives were, in part, to liberate Kuwait and to “incapacitate the Saddam Hussein 
regime and loosen its hold on power.”287  That said, since the end of the Gulf War and 
throughout the interwar period, “the American desideratum [was], implicitly or 
explicitly,…regime change” and the American strategy was to contain and weaken Saddam 
and let Iraqi domestic forces (specifically a military coup friendly to U.S. interests) depose 
Saddam.
288
   But, Saddam’s hold on power proved strong. 
The Pariah Brutally Crushes Shiite and Kurdish Rebellions 
In March 1991, while coalition forces still occupied portions of southern Iraq, Saddam’s 
attention turned towards domestic threats to his rule.  Uprisings had grown since February 
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and Shiites and Kurds were in rebellion.  Saddam’s forces crushed the Shiite rebellion first 
“with extraordinary brutality.”289  
The Shiites of southern Iraq and the Baathist regime shared a bloody history.  “Shiites 
had a history of asserting themselves when they thought there was a weakening of central 
authority” and, in the 1970s, “antigovernment demonstrations in the Shiite cities of the 
Euphrates were brutally put down, Shiite clerics and their families were executed, and tens of 
thousands of Shiites were exiled to Iran.”  Shiite demonstrations surfaced again during the air 
campaign of Desert Storm and crowds in An Najaf chanted “there is no God but God” and 
“Saddam is the enemy of God.”290 
Many argue that the United States encouraged the rebellion.
291
  Through various radio 
venues, the Shiite leaders in An Najaf learned of “both the magnitude of the Iraqi defeat and 
President Bush’s call for the ouster of Saddam Hussein.”292  In his news conference on 
March 1, President Bush said “In my own view I've always said that it would be—that the 
Iraqi people should put him aside, and that would facilitate the resolution of all these 
problems that exist and certainly would facilitate the acceptance of Iraq back into the family 
of peace-loving nations.”293  What the Bush administration wanted was a military coup to 
replace Saddam with another Iraqi strongman who would hold Iraq together, not ethnic 
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uprisings.
294
  Regardless, the message received by some Shiites and Kurds was a call for 
rebellion.    
Saddam took advantage of his surviving Republican Guard, WMD, and apparent 
loopholes in the ceasefire agreement to brutally crush the rebellions.  The ceasefire 
agreement lacked provisions to protect the Shiites and Kurds and, during the ceasefire 
negotiations, Commanding General H. Norman Schwarzkopf agreed to a seemingly 
innocuous request by the defeated Iraqi military to allow helicopter flights in southern Iraq 
due to the war damage to roads and bridges.  Saddam, using his surviving ground forces 
(including tanks, rockets, and mortars) and the helicopter loophole, was merciless in putting 
down the rebellion.  This created a steady stream of refugees heading south, “looking for 
medical aid and shelter, seeking protection in the shadow of the American Army and telling 
tales of atrocities in Basra, Karbala, and An Najaf.”295  More than a decade later, American 
intelligence would learn that these ferocious helicopter attacks included the use of chemical 
weapons.
296
    
The Coalition response was underwhelming.  Shiite leaders from An Najaf sought 
support from the allied liberators of Kuwait but the Americans (as well as the French) 
refused to get involved militarily.  Although they provided some humanitarian services to 
refugees, the Americans “stood by while the rebels were slaughtered.”297  The United States 
struggled to compensate for the quick collapse of the Iraqi military effort and was not 
                                                 
294
 GT 1995, 449-450, 456.    
295
 GT 1995, 444-449.   
296
 For instance, one report assessed that “twelve to thirty-two Sarin bombs were dropped from MI-8 
helicopters” in an attack in early March 1991 (see GT 2006, 75, 604n16, and 610-611n17).   
297
 Quote from Ricks 2006, 6; see also GT 1995, 449. 
181 
 
prepared at that time to aid a Shiite rebellion.  There was concern from the State Department, 
which worried about potential Shiite ties to Iran and Hezbollah, and from generals who had 
reservations about forfeiting a military victory by sticking their nose in a messy domestic 
fight.  They successfully resisted “providing any measure of protection for the Shiites, who 
had been encouraged to battle Saddam Hussein,” until the 1992 U.S. presidential election 
season, although President Bush did publicly denounce the Iraqi helicopter attacks on the 
Shiites as a violation of the ceasefire agreement and threatened that the permanence of the 
ceasefire was in jeopardy if the attacks did not stop.  Tellingly, one Shiite who fled Saddam’s 
troops said, “Bush told us to revolt against Saddam.  We revolt against Saddam.  But where 
is Bush?  Where is he?”298 
After pummeling the Shiites into submission, the Iraqis turned their full attention to the 
Kurds in northern Iraq and crushed their uprising.  Coalition support for the Kurds was more 
substantial and comparatively swift.   
The Coalition Responds 
Recognizing Saddam’s continued international and domestic threat, the UN Security 
Council passed two key resolutions just a month after the ceasefire that put coalition forces 
back in harm’s way.  On April 3, 1991, UN Security Council Resolution 687 was passed and 
directed Iraq to destroy its WMD and long range missiles and stop pursuing nuclear 
weapons.
299
  To support this resolution, the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) 
was created to monitor Iraqi disarmament.  The resolution also reaffirmed economic 
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sanctions against Iraq and “banned all commerce other than for humanitarian needs (mainly 
food and medicine).”300  On April 5, 1991, UN Security Council Resolution 688 was passed 
and directed Iraq to cease repressing all Iraqis—its own civilians.301  In support of these 
resolutions, “Britain, France, and the United States established a ‘no-fly zone’ over northern 
Iraq” that was designed “to protect terrorized Iraqi Kurds and to enable U.S. reconnaissance 
flights to monitor disarmament.”302  This was an open-ended police action that often involved 
the use of deadly force on both sides.
303
 
The United States took additional action.  After Saddam crushed the Shiite and Kurd 
uprisings, “Bush ordered the CIA to try and get rid of Saddam by giving money to anyone 
(including family members or close aides) who could pull off a coup d’état.”304  In May, 
Bush announced that economic sanctions would be maintained until Saddam was out of 
power.
305
  What followed were eleven years of severe economic sanctions—part of “the 
harshest set of sanctions ever imposed on a modern state.”306  Additionally, in August 1992, 
the Shiites were granted some protection.  “A year and a half after the Bush administration 
decided not to help the Shiites in the south, it reversed itself and imposed a no-flight zone in 
southern Iraq to protect the Shiites from air attack and demonstrate that Iraq would not have 
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full sovereignty over its territory as long as Saddam Hussein remained in power.”307  And 
that is precisely what happened—U.S. aircrews and their coalition partners dominated the 
skies over northern and southern Iraq until Saddam was no more.  For many on the front lines 
of this conflict, it seemed as if the war never ended.  As one scholar retrospectively noted, 
“Hussein and the United States never reconciled.”308 
Contain and Wait: Cat and Mouse Games 
What followed was a decade of varied levels of conflict between the United States and 
Iraq.  Three U.S. administrations evaluated the situation and ultimately came to the same 
conclusion regarding Saddam—his regime had to go.  What varied was what each 
administration was willing to do towards those ends.  In the earlier years, the United States 
was willing to contain Iraq (or “dual contain” both Iran and Iraq as seen during the Clinton 
administration) and indirectly promote regime change.  In the latter years, there was a 
growing sense that a more substantial and direct U.S. role would be required for regime 
change.   
In late 1992, “Baghdad challenged the no-flight zones in northern and southern Iraq and 
sought to block demands for United Nations weapons inspections.”  The Bush 
administration, in its last weeks of power, engaged in a series of retaliatory attacks on Iraqi 
air defense sites and on a military factory that made components for Iraq’s nuclear 
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program.”309  The cat-and-mouse, tit-for-tat conflict that would dominate the subsequent 
decade was well underway.   
In 1993, the Clinton administration arrived and reevaluated the U.S. relationship with 
Iraq.  Ultimately Clinton “insisted that the sanctions be maintained…and carried on the Bush 
administration’s pattern of limited strikes.”310  In April 1993, Iraqi agents attempted to 
assassinate former president Bush in Kuwait with a car bomb.
311
  Clinton responded with a 
cruise missile strike on Baghdad’s intelligence headquarters.312  While “there had been some 
talk early in Clinton’s presidency about the United States doing business with a reformed 
Hussein,” Hussein’s attempt to assassinate former president Bush and his persistent 
noncompliance with UN sanctions “proved to Clinton that there could be no reconciliation 
with the Iraqi leader.”313  Additionally, the Soviet fall continued and was so pronounced that 
it allowed the Clinton administration to adopt a “dual containment” strategy in early 1994—
to “no longer curry favor with Iran or Iraq” but instead to “curb the aspirations of both” 
because the administration was “no longer worried that a disaffected Iran or Iraq might seek 
accommodation with Moscow.”314  
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Later in 1994, Saddam ordered a large Iraqi military mobilization (80,000 troops) on the 
Kuwaiti border, “threatening another invasion.”315  Saddam explained to his advisors that he 
ordered this deployment to purposely create a crisis to facilitate the end of sanctions.
316
  
There was preexisting concern in the leadership of U.S. Central Command over a “Basra 
breakout” where Saddam might rush Kuwait before the Americans could respond and, in 
October, some of the same units that “defeated” the Iraqis in 1991 were ordered back to the 
Gulf to prevent a possible second Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
317
   
The flaws of the “contain and wait” strategy became more and more evident.  It was 
costly and made Washington dependent on corrupt, authoritarian regimes in the region.  
Clinton’s advisors considered more aggressive measures to topple Saddam’s regime instead 
of just restraining it. In 1995, Clinton approved an increase in covert anti-Saddam programs 
such as cultivating internal resistance, supporting exile groups (e.g., the Iraqi National 
Congress), and aiding Kurdish factions that were opposed to Saddam’s rule.  The hope was 
for a quick coup by dissident army officers or a rebellion by Kurdish forces.  These hopes 
were setback in 1996 when Iraqi armor moved into Irbil where Iraqi forces killed or detained 
more than a hundred leaders from the Iraqi National Congress and cracked down on Kurdish 
rebels in the north.  Clinton retaliated with strikes on air defense sites in southern and central 
Iraq. He also expanded the southern no-fly zone.  This episode embarrassed Clinton.  Forces 
within his administration grew convinced that Saddam would continue to challenge the 
coalition and that only a change in Iraqi government could stabilize the region.  “Encouraged 
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by a group of senators, congressmen, academics, and former officials, the administration 
resolved to make a concerted effort at regime change.”318   
1996 also saw the advent of additional accommodations that were intended to relieve 
suffering amongst the Iraqi public.  Sanctions on Iraq were crimping Saddam’s military 
supply lines, but they were also hurting ordinary Iraqis.  Besides, Saddam was cheating on 
the sanctions by smuggling oil through neighboring states.  In 1996, the Oil-for-Food 
program began, allowing Saddam to sell oil and deposit the revenues into a UN-administered 
account which could be accessed only for permissible items.  Regardless, Saddam was able 
to circumvent this constraint and seized control of billions in oil revenues “which he used to 
buy diplomatic support, and to import banned items, including military relevant goods.”319  
By 1997, the international coalition that stood against Saddam in the Gulf War was 
showing cracks.  Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin was seeking closer ties with Iraq 
and, in October 1997, France and Russia did not support Clinton in his efforts to punish Iraqi 
interference with UN weapons inspections.  This crisis passed “only when Russian 
negotiators brokered a deal allowing UN inspectors to reenter the country.”320  
Interestingly, between 1994 and 1998, senior Iraqis repeatedly told the most senior 
UNSCOM weapons inspectors that “they wanted to enter into a dialog with the United States 
and were prepared to be the United States’ ‘best friend in the region bar none’…The United 
States, however, was reportedly uninterested.”321  These cooperative overtures were certainly 
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not consistent with Iraq’s persistent obstructive behavior towards the UN mandates.  By 
1998, the Clinton administration had determined that a full invasion would be necessary to 
topple Saddam.  Clinton de-emphasized his regime change stance and “took a low profile on 
Iraq, waiting for a grievous sanctions violation that would demonstrate Hussein’s 
intractability.”322  He did not have to wait long.   
In August 1998, Saddam suspended UN inspections and challenged them again in 
October and November.  “This time, France and Russia backed Clinton’s threat of military 
action, and the Iraqi president retreated at the last minute.”323  However, when Saddam 
kicked the UNSCOM inspectors out of Iraq in December, Clinton ordered Operation Desert 
Fox and did not bother going to the UN Security Council for approval, to the dismay of the 
Russians.
324
  Saddam’s deliberate obstructionism, intended to exploit friction and corruption 
in the UN sanctions regime, precipitated Operation Desert Fox, which was no small affair.
325
  
For four days, the United States, with only British assistance, attacked Iraqi targets.
326
  A 
total of 415 cruise missiles and 600 bombs struck 97 targets, including facilities for the 
storage and production of chemical weapons, missiles that could deliver such munitions, 
government command and control facilities, and intelligence and secret police 
headquarters.
327
  “The Pentagon later estimated that it had killed 1,400 members of Iraq’s 
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Republican Guard.”328  Even after these attacks Saddam was defiant and sought to “redress 
the affront to his sovereignty by shooting down one of the American and British aircraft that 
were patrolling the northern and southern swaths of his country.”329  For the next four years, 
Iraq fired on patrolling U.S and U.K aircraft almost daily.
330
  
The Iraqi Liberation Act of 1998 emerged in the midst of this more recent of ongoing 
crises regarding Iraq.  This bipartisan congressional act, which passed with a vote of 360 to 
38 in the House and unanimously in the Senate, committed the United States to pursue 
regime change in Iraq and “required the president to increase support to seven anti-Hussein 
groups.”331  Clinton was reluctant to support the act and halfheartedly endorsed it in early 
1999.  Although administration officials explicitly acknowledged regime change as a goal, 
“Clinton made no meaningful attempt to topple Saddam.”332  A factor of Clinton’s reluctance 
to support the act was the dissolution of the original anti-Hussein Gulf War coalition.  By 
1999, France and Russia were increasing their calls to end sanctions against Iraq and Arab 
support was waning.  The international consensus and multilateralism that once existed on 
Iraq was destroyed.
333
  Importantly, another player with mass appeal in certain segments of 
the Arab world also challenged the sanctions against Iraq—Osama bin Laden labeled the 
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sanctions a design of the “Crusader-Zionist alliance” to “annihilate what is left of this [Arab] 
people.”334 
In December 1999, the United Nations replaced UNSCOM with the United Nations 
Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), a new weapons 
inspections and monitoring agency designed to appease Saddam.   However, UNMOVIC was 
not supported by UN Security Council members China, France, and Russia, and “for years 
Saddam refused to cooperate with this agency as well.”335 
Campaign season became more prominent in the run-up to the 2000 presidential elections 
and candidate (and later president) George W. Bush campaigned with a platform that urged 
regime change in Iraq.
336
  Three successive U.S. administrations ultimately came to the same 
conclusion regarding Saddam—he was intractable and needed to go. He was not partner 
material.  Administrations had bided their time containing Iraq, mired in endless 
confrontation with weapons of war, and had waited for another mechanism—the Iraqi 
National Congress, a Kurdish rebellion, a military coup—to bring about regime change.  
They lacked the willingness to do what was truly necessary to bring about regime change in 
Iraq…until September 11, 2001.   I choose to end this case’s historical review here, at the 
preamble to the U.S. invasion of Iraq.  The historical review for my next case, which 
explores the relationship between the United States and Iraq after their war in 2003, begins at 
this juncture.   
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Measurement of the Variables 
International Independent Variables 
Spoiler Problems 
The Soviet Union (and, after its dissolution, Russia) and Iran stand out as two potential 
spoilers in this case.  Neither, however, possessed the opportunity, let alone the willingness, 
to preclude a cooperative relationship between the United States and Iraq by force or 
coercion during this case’s timeframe.  It is important to note that U.S. forces occupied parts 
of Iraqi territory at the time of the ceasefire and controlled large portions of Iraqi airspace 
shortly thereafter and for the duration of the case—only a very formidable spoiler would 
have the power to dislodge the United States by force or coercion in this situation.  Also, 
while Saddam’s military suffered significant losses during the war, it maintained substantial 
residual capability (enough to repress substantial uprisings, plus the surviving WMD).  
Further, Saddam’s personal security forces, which helped him survive the war despite 
Coalition targeting, were still intact.  In light of these circumstance, only a very formidable 
spoiler would have the power to coerce or force a headstrong Saddam into altering his 
foreign policy choices (and, in doing so, accomplish what a 36-nation coalition of great 
powers struggled to do through open war, sanctions, and enforcement measures).   
The Soviets were a superpower in massive decline even before the war.  While they had a 
historical relationship with Iraq, they were losing power (which reduced their opportunity to 
spoil) and needed Western cooperation to weather their domestic woes (which reduced their 
willingness to spoil).  As Bush came into office in 1989, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev 
called for continued progress in U.S.-Soviet relations.  “Gorbachev desperately needed to 
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lower defense costs and attract Western economic assistance to keep the Soviet System 
solvent” and in December 1989, Gorbachev announced “the withdrawal of 500,000 Soviet 
troops from Eastern Europe.”337  Instead of standing between the United States and Iraq as 
the world prepared for war, Gorbachev helped win United Nations Security Council approval 
for sanctions and the use of force.
338
  Towards the end of the war, the best that the Soviets 
could do for Saddam was to try and push for a diplomatic settlement that would shield Iraq 
from further humiliation, but Bush was not amenable and the Soviets lacked the power to 
force a solution.  The U.S.-Soviet partnership against Hussein remained unbroken in the 
end.
339
  The Soviet weakness was not lost on Saddam, who lamented during the ground war 
that the Soviets had “tricked” Iraq in suggesting they would play a role in assuring there 
would be no ground operations against the Iraqi army if it withdrew from Kuwait.  Saddam 
sensed the lack of Soviet influence in the situation and felt betrayed.
340
   
After the war, the Soviet decline continued and their domestic issues overwhelmed them 
to the point where, on December 25, 1991, the Soviet state simply ceased to exist.
341
  The 
succeeding “Russian” fall persisted and allowed the Clinton administration to adopt the dual 
containment strategy in 1994.  And while Russia’s Yeltsin administration desired closer ties 
with Baghdad in 1997 (i.e., Russia may have regained the will to spoil), the United States 
was well entrenched at that time and the Russians still lacked meaningful power (i.e., the 
Soviets still lacked the opportunity to spoil).  Russia lacked the influence to preclude the 
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conflict of Operation Desert Fox in 1998, let alone preclude strategic cooperation should the 
United States and Iraq have chosen that path.  This status quo did not change during the 
remainder of this case’s timeframe.   
Iran would likely have been very threatened by strategic cooperation between Iraq, its 
neighbor and historical enemy, and the United States, its enemy since the overthrow of the 
Shah in 1979—it very likely had the willingness to spoil strategic cooperation.  What it 
lacked, however, was the opportunity.  Iran was in the near aftermath of the long and bloody 
Iran-Iraq War and its economy had suffered since the 1979 revolution due to sanctions, brain 
drain, a decline in foreign investment from the West, and reduced oil prices.
342
  It lacked the 
current and projected power to dislodge the already-present United States, a superpower, 
should the United States and Iraq have chosen strategic cooperation.  Also, Saddam had 
recently survived eight years of war with Iran (i.e., Iran was not able to force or coerce him 
then) and retained his personal security force and a defensive military capability after the 
Gulf war.  Plus, he retained the ability to strike Tehran with WMD for much of this case’s 
timeframe.
343
  It is unlikely that the Iranians could have coerced Saddam out of cooperating 
with the United States, should he have chosen this path, for the duration of this case’s 
timeframe.   
Status of spoiler problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the 
duration of this case’s timeframe—no spoiler existed with the opportunity, let alone the 
willingness, to preclude a cooperative relationship between the United States and Iraq.   
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Competitor Problems 
For many of the same reasons outlined in my preceding spoiler discussion, the Soviets 
(Russia) and Iran lacked the opportunity, if not the willingness, to substantively undermine 
cooperation between the United States and Iraq by means of an exclusive and better strategic 
cooperation offer.  Both were severely limited, economically and militarily—neither had the 
capacity to provide more reliable or affordable security and economic benefits to Iraq than 
could the United States.  These limits were recognized by the United States and they 
influence U.S. policy towards Iraq.  Bush had confidence that Iraq could not run to the 
Kremlin for help—that harsh sanctions on Iraq would not push Iraq farther into the Soviet 
sphere.  This provided the United States with more options to deal with Saddam—it could be 
firm and not worry about the Soviets capitalizing on it.
344
  Exclusive offers to the United 
States from either of these sources that would deter U.S. cooperation with Iraq are not 
apparent and were unlikely.  Russia was seeking Western support to mitigate domestic woes 
and Iran was an enemy of the United States.   
France was another potential competitor.  France had a historical trade relationship with 
Iraq, having provided it military hardware, and was of the first on the UN Security Council to 
obstruct action against Iraq for its postwar inspection violations.  It was also of the first in the 
West to push for an end to the sanctions against Iraq.  However, France did not have the 
capacity to provide more reliable or affordable security and economic benefits to Iraq than 
could the United States (lacked the opportunity) and, as a coalition member and the oldest 
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U.S. ally, such an offer would not likely have been exclusive (lacked the willingness).  No 
other competitors are apparent.   
Finally, to the extent that Iraq’s 1994-1998 overtures for rapprochement with the United 
States were genuine, this suggests that exclusive competitive offers were not a hindrance to 
cooperation.   
Status of competitor problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the 
duration of this case’s timeframe—no competitor existed with the opportunity, let alone the 
willingness, to provide a better strategic cooperation offer on an exclusive basis.   
Other International Conditions 
Cooperation, supposedly, reaps gains for those who are cooperating (the incentive for 
strategic cooperation).  Cooperation with the United States would ostensibly increase Iraqi 
power and legitimacy.  In the timeframe of this case, this was an intolerable consequence of 
postwar cooperation with Iraq for the United States.  Stemming from Saddam’s hold on 
power at the conclusion of the war, at least two international conditions were sources of 
credible commitment problems to U.S.-Iraqi cooperation: competing alliances; and untenable 
political situations caused by the image of cooperating with and empowering a pariah. 
The surviving Iraqi regime was a threat to regional U.S. allies, partners, and clients.  
Empowering the Hussein menace would have been very threatening to several regional 
actors.  Saddam had already attacked three of his neighbors in the decade before the war’s 
end (Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War)—it was highly dubious that he 
could credibly commit to not using the gains from U.S. cooperation to harm U.S. regional 
allies and other U.S. friends in the future.   
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Saudi Arabia was an example of one such U.S. ally.  The Saudi’s feared Saddam from 
before the war.  One of their prewar concerns was that the United States might lose resolve 
before ejecting Saddam from Kuwait and “leave the Saudi’s to face Saddam’s wrath 
alone.”345  Secretary of State James Baker recalled that the Saudi royal family “wanted 
[Saddam] destroyed” and strongly supported the resolution to eject Iraq from Kuwait by 
force.
346
  During the war, Saddam’s ground offensive into Khafji “gravely wounded” Saudi 
pride and showed Saddam’s willingness to invade Saudi Arabia.347   As the war was ending, 
the Saudis were “unhappy that Saddam Hussein was still in power and wanted to launch a 
covert program of weapons deliveries to the Shiites.”348  Empowering Saddam would have 
been very threatening to U.S. allies in Saudi Arabia.     
Israel was another example of a regional U.S. ally that would have been threatened by an 
increase in Saddam’s power.  Saddam was considered one of Israel’s greatest enemies and 
his anti-Semitism was “deep and abiding.”349  He issued violent threats to Israel and launched 
Scud missiles into its population centers during the war, terrifying Israeli citizens.   
Other regional partners had concerns as well.
350
  “The decision to invade Kuwait 
shockingly violated Arab norms (which tolerated competition and subversion but not cross-
border invasion) and shocked Arab leaders who had been personally assured by Saddam that 
force would not be used.”  These violations were so grievous that they encouraged Arab 
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leaders to “undertake unprecedented open military cooperation with the United States.”351  
Thus, throughout the region, Saddam’s postwar hold on power was a threat that would 
discourage U.S. cooperation that might bolster that threat. 
Saddam’s threat to his internal population was also a U.S. concern.  The Kurds, and later 
the Shiites, were ostensibly granted a certain level of U.S. protection shortly after the 
ceasefire.
352
  Empowering Saddam through cooperation could further endanger those 
populations.   
Aside from competing with alliances, the image of cooperating with and empowering the 
pariah Saddam created untenable political situations for the United States.  Before the war, 
Saddam had been demonized by his own actions and, in turn, by the West.  Bush had called 
Saddam “worse than Hitler” and claimed the war to be a struggle between good and evil.353  
After the war, Bush assessed Saddam as still “evil” in light of his attacks on his own people 
and was publicly unhappy that Saddam was still in power.  Recall from my historical review 
that Bush was concerned about tarnishing the U.S. image with scenes of brutality from the 
“highway of death.”  He would most certainly have been concerned about the image of 
empowering someone he had compared to Hitler.  When Clinton came to power, he seemed 
open to a “deathbed conversion” by Saddam, despite “criticiz[ing] Bush for not pursuing war 
crimes trials against Iraqi leaders” during his 1992 election campaign.354  In short time, 
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however, the revelation of Saddam’s 1993 assassination attempt on Bush solidified Saddam’s 
untenable image within the Clinton administration.  Then, in the first year of George W. 
Bush’s presidency, Saddam was included in the “axis of evil.”  The image of Saddam the 
pariah was deeply engrained through three U.S. administrations.  He failed to reverse this 
image and could not credibly commit to being a non-pariah in the future.  This conflicted 
with U.S. democratic ideals and it was politically untenable for the U.S. to overtly cooperate 
with and empower one that was so demonized.   
Status of other international conditions: UNFAVORABLE towards qualities of 
cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—Saddam’s surviving regime created 
problems with competing alliances and untenable political situations that undermined 
credible commitment to cooperative relationships between the United States and Iraq.   
Domestic Independent Variables on the U.S. Side 
Disinterest Problems 
It is implausible that the United States was not interested in the gains that it might have 
made through a cooperative relationship with Iraq.  If Iraq could have been co-opted into true 
partnership with the United States, the United States could have, for instance: gained a 
regional ally to counter Iranian influence; gained access to prime geostrategic space; gained 
access to energy resources; and squelched a proven threat to other regional partners.   
Evidence shows that the United States was interested in those strategic cooperation gains.  
Even before the war, the “White House and State Department continued to believe that 
theocratic Iran was the state most likely to challenge the status quo in the Gulf” and a co-
opted Iraq could have been a bulwark against such an Iranian threat.  Further, the “State and 
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Commerce Departments did not wish for American enterprises to miss out on the opportunity 
to participate in Iraqi reconstruction” as Iraq recovered from their long war with Iran.355  
These and other potential gains are perhaps why President George H.W. Bush sought 
rapprochement before the war (demonstrated interest), why President Clinton considered 
rapprochement as he took office after the war, and why Presidents George W. Bush and 
Obama sought to co-opt Iraq after the war in 2003.  Additionally, the United States had 
sought these same gains elsewhere in the region, so if the United States were to choose to not 
cooperate with Iraq, it would not have been because of disinterest in the gains.   
Status of U.S. disinterest problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for 
the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that disinterest 
problems did not exist within the U.S. leadership or its winning coalition.   
Trust Problems 
Trust problems on the U.S. side were both independent sources of credible commitment 
problems and in response to credible commitment problems on the Iraqi side.  Evidence 
suggests that the United States felt these trust problems were immitigable after 1993.     
Before their war, the United States cooperated with Iraq to an extent during the Iran-Iraq 
War—it had found a satisfactory means to mitigate the trust issues surrounding its limited 
bargains with Iraq.  After the Iran-Iraq War, the Bush administration’s attempts to cooperate 
with Iraq suggest that it still felt it could mitigate trust issues.  Soon after, the Bush 
administration changed its identity of Iraq from “enemy capable of change” to “hardened 
enemy.”  This was not because Iraq demonstrated that it would not follow through with 
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strategic cooperation obligations (untrustworthy), but because Iraq had demonstrated hostile 
behavior towards U.S. presence in the gulf (evidence of Iraqi reconciliation problems) and 
because Iraq had invaded Kuwait (creating problems with “other international conditions” as 
previously discussed).  However, Saddam’s use of helicopters after the ceasefire to crush the 
Shiite rebellion (an “other international condition problem,” as previously discussed) was 
seen by the Bush administration as a violation of ceasefire terms and was an early indication 
of Saddam’s willingness and adeptness at circumventing bargain requirements (a 
trustworthiness problem).  For the Bush administration, bargain enforcement measures would 
need to be strong to mitigate trust concerns with Iraq and this was evident in its postwar 
adoption of no-fly zones and weapons inspection mechanisms to monitor UN Security 
Council Resolutions 687 and 688.   
The Clinton administration, despite previous rhetoric equating Iraqi leaders to war 
criminals, considered rapprochement with Iraq early in its tenure which suggests that it 
initially assessed that it could mitigate its trust problems with Iraq.  When the Clinton 
administration soon after re-concluded that Saddam’s regime was a hardened enemy and 
retracted, it was because of the revelation of Saddam’s assassination attempt on former 
President Bush (more evidence of reconciliation problems on the Iraqi side) and Saddam’s 
persistent circumvention of the ceasefire agreement and UNSCOM inspections (a 
trustworthiness problem).  For the Clinton administration, bargain enforcement measures 
would also need to be strong to mitigate trust concerns with Iraq.
356
  By 1998, the Clinton 
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administration had little, if any, confidence in the bargain enforcement measures as seen in 
Operation Desert Fox.  This status quo persisted until the removal of Saddam’s regime.   
This analysis suggests that the U.S. trust problems with Iraq were both independent 
(based on Iraq’s “untrustworthiness”) and in response to other sources of credible 
commitment problems (e.g., Iraq’s demonstrations of reconciliation problems and problems 
of “other international conditions”) at various times during the case.  The analysis suggests 
that the United States felt it could mitigate those trust problems with institutions and 
strategies until sometime after the revelation of Iraq’s 1993 assassination attempt on former 
President Bush.  
Status of U.S. trust problems: UNFAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation after 
1993—a preponderance of evidence suggests that the United States had immitigable trust 
problems with Saddam’s regime after this time.   
Reconciliation Problems 
Reconciliation problems on the U.S. side are also part of this case’s story.  Importantly, 
the U.S. reconciliation problems were with Saddam’s regime and its supporters, not with the 
Iraqi people. 
The Bush administration demonized Saddam during the war and compared him to Hitler.  
Bush lamented that Saddam was still in power as the war was ending, hinting at his lingering 
resentment.  Bush had little opportunity to move past this and reorient Saddam’s “enemy” 
identity before Saddam embarrassed Bush with the brutal repression of the Shiite rebellion.  
It is quite clear and understandable that Bush saw this as unjust and resented Saddam for it, 
as evident in the administration’s continued promotion of regime change in Iraq.  Further, the 
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images of environmental catastrophe and battered coalition prisoners of war certainly did not 
endear Saddam to certain segments of the American public.
357
   
As Clinton came to power, it is clear that he identified Saddam as an enemy, although he 
was open to a “deathbed conversion” by Saddam and considered rapprochement.  While 
Clinton may not have resented Saddam enough personally to prohibit cooperation, he still 
identified Saddam as an enemy and recognized that some in his constituency would need to 
reconcile before cooperation could take place, as suggested by his comment that Saddam first 
uphold UN requirements to change his behavior.
358
  Soon after, Clinton’s position hardened 
as Hussein’s attempt to assassinate Bush came to light and Hussein continued to violate UN 
sanctions, proving “to Clinton that there could be no reconciliation with the Iraqi leader.”359  
Clinton, too, traded hostile actions with Saddam and adopted strategies to promote regime 
change in Iraq throughout his presidency.  By 1998, Congress had formalized their 
reconciliation problem with Saddam’s regime in the form of the bipartisan Iraqi Liberation 
Act.   
President George W. Bush had every reason to resent Saddam (who had tried to 
assassinate his father) and there is little evidence that he did not.  After September 11, 2001, 
his reconciliation problem with Saddam became quite clear, having included Iraq as part of 
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his “Axis of Evil.”360  “We will get this guy [Saddam] at a time and place of our choosing,” 
Bush said to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Shelton after a Camp David meeting 
shortly after September 11, 2001.
361
  Saddam’s open letter to the American people shortly 
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, “in which he declared that the United States 
was getting a taste of the pain it had inflicted upon the Arab world,” certainly did not help 
ameliorate the reconciliation problems of Bush or the American public.
362
   
This analysis suggests that all three U.S. presidential administrations (and/or their 
constituencies) had reconciliation problems with Saddam’s regime throughout the timeframe 
of this study. 
Status of U.S. reconciliation problems: UNFAVORABLE towards qualities of 
cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests 
that reconciliation problems existed within the U.S. presidential administrations and/or their 
constituencies.   
Domestic Independent Variables on Iraq’s Side 
“Iraq is Saddam Hussein and if Saddam says something, Iraq says something.”363 
Before proceeding, I want to explain that this section is primarily focused on Iraq’s 
domestic variables from Saddam’s perspective.  The policy alluded to in the above quote was 
not casual or negotiable.  It was law under Saddam’s regime and was enforced with coercion 
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and violence by Saddam himself, his sons Uday and Qusay, his secret service, and other 
supporters.  Thus, as I examine the domestic variables on Iraq’s side during the interwar 
period, Saddam’s perspective matters most.   
Disinterest Problems 
It is implausible that Iraq was not interested in the gains that might have been made 
through a cooperative relationship with the United States after the war.  Such a relationship 
with the unambiguous hegemon (as Russia declined) and world’s largest consumer could 
have yielded ample economic and security gains for Iraq.   
Evidence shows that Saddam was not satisfied with his security and economic situations 
and was interested in those strategic cooperation gains.  Looking first at economics, Iraq’s 
economy was in dire straits even before the war.  Since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam 
had grown desperate—oil exports had fallen dramatically, Bagdad had amassed debts of $80 
billion, and inflation soared 40 percent annually.  There were calls for elections and there 
were rumors of a possible military coup.
364
  Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait was, after all, 
primarily motivated by economic woes, and those woes were not solved by his invasion.  
During the war, Iraq’s infrastructure (e.g., communications exchanges, bridges and roads, 
and electricity production) was severely damaged and its economic capacity (and, thereby, its 
future economic outlook) was severely degraded.  Iraq’s major oil refineries were destroyed 
in the first five days of the war—more than 90 percent of Iraq’s oil refining capacity was 
knocked out by the war’s end.365  By one account, “U.S. and allied bombing reduced Iraq to 
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industrial levels of the early 1960s.”366  After the war, Saddam’s economic woes were 
exacerbated through years of harsh sanctions that endured throughout the interwar period.  
Saddam circumvented UN mandates by shipping oil through neighboring countries to try and 
remedy some of these woes. 
Saddam’s postwar security situation was clearly less than he would have desired, 
although he retained sufficient forces to protect himself and squash his domestic rebellions.  
Besides the losses from his expenditures during the war, his air defense capabilities were 
“wrecked.”367  His ground forces had lost more than 1,800 tanks, 1,200 of the armored 
personnel carriers and other armored equipment pieces, and 600 artillery pieces that Iraq had 
in the Kuwait Theater before the war.
368
  Desertion rates were as much as fifty percent in 
some of his units.
369
  Saddam could not turn to Russia for help.  Feeling threatened by Iran, 
Saddam pursued, to his peril, a strategy of ambiguity with respect to the status of his 
WMD—he clearly desired gains to his security capability.370 
Status of Iraq’s disinterest problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for 
the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that disinterest 
problems did not exist within Saddam’s regime.  
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Trust Problems 
Trust problems on Iraq’s side of this case were both independent sources of credible 
commitment problems and in response to credible commitment problems on the U.S. side.  
Evidence suggests that Saddam felt he could mitigate these problems to some extent, but the 
independent trust problems were so severe (in Saddam’s eyes, the United States, in 
particular, was exceptionally untrustworthy) that they would likely have adversely affected 
the depth of cooperation between the United States and Iraq for a great while before 
sufficient trust could be built.      
Saddam’s trust problems were deep and predated the war.  From the beginning of his rise 
to prominence in the 1960s, he had “an unshakable sense of insecurity.”371  Some might 
assess this as paranoia, but caution on Saddam’s part was understandable.  Saddam came to 
power through treachery and conspiracy and expected the same from others, as evident in his 
statement to a confidant in 1979: “I know that there are scores of people plotting to kill me, 
and this is not difficult to understand.  After all, did we not seize power by plotting against 
our predecessors?”372  Saddam’s capacity to trust anyone was simply limited.     
Saddam held a deep distrust of the United States in particular for decades until his 
death.
373
  As Brands and Palkki describe, “what is remarkable about Saddam’s view of the 
United States is how consistently and virulently hostile it was. From early on, Saddam 
believed that the United States was unalterably opposed to his Baathist project and that 
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efforts to marginalize and weaken Iraq were at the center of U.S. policy in the region.”374  
Brands and Palkki assess that Saddam “clearly had what political psychologists call a ‘bad 
faith image’ of the United States—a sense that Washington was unalterably duplicitous and 
that its policies had not only the effect but also the intention of harming Iraqi interests.”375  
Further, Saddam and his advisors held a firm belief, from before the war, that the United 
States was trying to overthrow his regime.
376
  During the Gulf War, Saddam commented 
explicitly in a letter to Gorbachev that “the Americans, especially their president, have no 
honor.  We do not trust them.”377  Saddam’s trust problems remained evident after the war.  
Shortly after the war, Saddam felt that, regardless of Iraqi compliance with weapons 
inspections, the United States would pursue regime change.
378
  As time went on, he 
complained (perhaps strategically, in part) that the United States was using the inspections as 
a means to collect targeting data for future attacks and that UNSCOM (which Saddam 
thought was an agent of the United States) “wished to prolong [their] sanctions and 
inspections regardless of Iraqi compliance.”379  He acted on those feelings of mistrust by 
obstructing the weapons inspections.   
Part of Saddam’s mistrust of the United States was fueled by U.S. actions (in response to 
U.S. credible commitment problems) and his animosity towards Israel and Iraq’s traditional 
rival Iran.  Early in his tenure, “Saddam frequently alleged that Washington was conspiring 
                                                 
374
 Brands and Palkki 2012, 626. 
375
 Brands and Palkki 2012, 634. 
376
 See, for example, GT 1995, 197.   
377
 Woods et al. 2011, 197. 
378
 Woods et al. 2011, 257, 326. 
379
 Woods et al. 2011, 256. 
207 
 
with the Shah of Iran to keep Iraq weak and that the Western powers had created Israel as a 
way of dividing and humiliating the Arabs.”380  His mistrust of the United States was 
reinforced by several U.S. actions, such as Washington’s continued support for Israel,381 U.S. 
involvement with Kurdish rebels in the 1970s, the revelations of Irangate, and other U.S. 
attempts at regime change (i.e., evidence of U.S. reconciliation problems).
382
   Learning of 
Irangate, Saddam commented that “The Americans are still conspiring bastards.”  He worried 
that the United States was trying to assassinate him and that it was conspiring with Israel and 
Kuwait to strangle Iraq and topple his regime.
383
  
 Interestingly, this enduring and deep lack of trust “did not prevent Saddam from doing 
business with Washington when his interests dictated,” as was seen, for instance, during the 
Iran-Iraq War and perhaps after the war (to the extent that his 1994-1998 overtures for 
rapprochement through weapons inspectors were genuine).
384
  Saddam also observed, in 
conversation with his advisors, the U.S. affinity for institutions like the United Nations.  This 
suggests that Saddam was able to find ways to mitigate his trust issues with the United States 
for limited bargains when it was in his best interest—that he might be able to trust the United 
States to uphold its end of an agreement, but that the United States might very well work 
other agreements on the side that were inimical to Saddam.   
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This analysis suggests that the Saddam’s trust problems with the United States were 
independent (based on his poor assessment of U.S. trustworthiness) and severe throughout 
the timeframe of this case.  While Saddam had found ways to mitigate these trust issues at 
certain times for certain limited bargains, it is likely that the severity of these trust issues 
would have adversely influenced the depth of cooperation that Iraq was willing to accept 
with the United States.    
Status of Iraqi trust problems: UNFAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the 
duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that the Saddam 
had severe trust problems with the United States that would adversely affect (at least) the 
depth of cooperation.  
Reconciliation Problems 
Reconciliation problems on Iraq’s side were sources of credible commitment problems in 
this case.  There is overwhelming evidence that Saddam strongly resented the United States.  
He persistently identified the United States as an enemy, despite tactical cooperation, and 
“frequently displayed an expectation of an eventual showdown with America.”385  
Saddam’s animosity towards the United States handily predated the war.  Much of what I 
discussed previously about Saddam’s trust problems also created a sense of injustice and 
resentment that contributed to an intractable reconciliation problem.  The U.S. support for the 
Kurds in the 1970s helped fuel these feelings, as did Saddam’s unending suspicion of a U.S.-
Iranian conspiracy during the Iran-Iraq War—“even at the height of bilateral cooperation, 
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Saddam’s animosity toward the United States remained intact.”386  The influence of Irangate 
was severe.  In addition to compounding Saddam’s problems with trust, Irangate infuriated 
Saddam and caused, in his words, a strong sense of anger and betrayal amongst the Iraqis: 
“Saddam was outraged. While the Iraqi leader had never trusted the United States and had 
long speculated that Washington favored Tehran, this top-level public disclosure that Reagan 
had sold Iran the advanced weapons he denied to Baghdad had a jarring impact on the 
regime.”  Saddam remarked that “This level of bad and immoral behavior is a new thing” and 
considered the U.S. assistance to Iran a “stab in the back.”387  Washington’s continued 
support for Israel further exacerbated Saddam’s reconciliation problem and “dovetailed with 
Saddam’s entrenched anti-Semitism to create a permanent lamina of hostility toward the 
United States.”388  For Saddam, the United States was not just an enemy, but was “the most 
powerful of the enemies trying to bring about the ‘psychological collapse’ of the Baathist 
project and the broader Arab nation.”389 
The economic carrots associated with NSD 26, part of the Bush administration’s attempt 
to woo Saddam into better behavior, did not assuage Saddam’s resentment.  While Saddam 
was willing to accept the handouts, the “U.S. policies did little, if anything, to alleviate the 
underlying hostility in Baghdad. The combined weight of Iraqi paranoia, ingrained 
skepticism of American intentions, anger at recent sanctions bills in the U.S. Congress, and 
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concrete experiences with U.S. double-dealing during the 1970s and 1980s was simply too 
great.”390  
“Saddam gave pungent expression to his appraisal of American intentions in 1980, 
calling the United States ‘the arch-Satan.391’”  This identification of the United States seems 
to not have changed much, despite the carrots and limited cooperation before the war.  
Months before his invasion of Kuwait, Saddam discussed potential terrorist operations 
against the United States with Yasser Arafat: “we can send a lot of people to Washington just 
like the old days.  For instance, the person with an explosive belt around him would throw 
himself at Bush’s car.”392  
The war reinforced Saddam’s preexisting feelings of animosity towards the United States.  
He resented the Kuwaitis and felt a sense of injustice from the “economic war” the Kuwaitis 
were waging on Iraq.
393
  It follows that he would feel the same about Kuwait’s defenders.  
The Gulf War was humiliating for Saddam, whose forces were routed.
394
  He felt the U.S. 
response was unjustified, claiming that Bush just wanted to help his own party counter 
Democratic control of Congress by taking military action against Iraq.  Importantly, this 
condemning perception of Saddam’s transcended Bush.  In 1995 (Clinton’s era), Saddam 
debated “whether the American president needs a war before the elections” and did not put it 
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past Clinton to kill Iraqis for domestic political gains.
395
   That is, Saddam saw war as a 
political tool to bolster one’s domestic power and saw Iraq as just a tool for U.S. presidents 
to use for domestic political gain.  This created a sense of injustice and a lack of a sense of 
shared responsibility for conflict (i.e., U.S. presidents picked on Saddam to increase domestic 
power, not because Saddam did anything egregious).  Saddam raged that “Bush’s hands are 
loaded with bloodshed and the killing of innocent people.”396  One could logically surmise 
that U.S. attempts at Saddam’s life during the war (i.e., when striking “leadership targets”) 
did not sit well with Saddam, nor did U.S. attempts to weaken his regime.
397
 
Saddam’s animosity and identity of the United States as an enemy did not subside after 
the war.  He harbored resentment towards Bush, complaining that Bush had messed relations 
up with Iraq since 1984.
398
  He blamed the United States for the substantial uprisings during 
and after the Gulf War in seventeen of his eighteen provinces (including the Shiite and Kurd 
uprisings—only al-Anbar Province remained loyal in Saddam’s eyes).399  He equated the 
United States and UNSCOM as enemies of Iraq in August 1991 while complaining about 
weapons inspections.  While he felt he was not in a position yet “to go to war because of 
this,” he called on his advisors to at least “harass our enemy”—that enemy being the United 
States and its current weapon of war, UNSCOM.
400
  Saddam “expressed satisfaction that 
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Bush lost the 1992 election and pleasure with the role Iraq played in ‘Bush’s fall.’”401  Acting 
on his reconciliation problem, Saddam tried to have Bush assassinated in 1993.  
Saddam’s initial sense of President Clinton was that Clinton was pragmatic (although 
Saddam’s inherent animosity towards the United States in general seems to not have 
wavered).  This is perhaps reflected in his rapprochement offers from 1994 to 1998 through 
senior weapons inspectors (if in earnest).  Regardless, Saddam thought that “U.S. support for 
Israel and its desire for cheap oil would hinder rapprochement.”402  He stated in a 1993 
meeting that “all this animosity toward the United States and all its interests in the Middle 
East are due to—are due to an international and Arab imbalance.”403  That is, in Saddam’s 
eyes, the Arab situation, not just Iraq’s, was unjust and the United States was at least partially 
responsible.  Clinton continued the humiliating no-fly zones and sanctions.  Saddam 
expressed feelings of humiliation and resentment at the sanctions before deploying troops to 
the Kuwaiti border to intentionally precipitate the 1994 crisis.  In Saddam’s words to his 
advisors, “we do not accept that our people will die of hunger and we are just sitting idle 
watching it become like Somalia, or like Haiti…and watch our people receive leftovers 
thrown in by the Westerners in a humiliating manner.”404  One might also surmise that the 
continued U.S. promotion of regime change (e.g., the coup attempt in 1996 that the United 
States halfheartedly supported and the Iraqi Liberation Act of 1998) and military responses 
(e.g., Desert Fox in 1998) did little to assuage Saddam’s reconciliation problems with the 
United States.  By the time President George W. Bush came to office, if not sooner, 
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Saddam’s four decades of hostility towards the United States was ingrained into an 
intractable reconciliation problem.  Saddam simply had no healthy sense of shame or guilt, 
no sense of shared responsibility, and a hyper-sense of injustice towards the United States.   
There is evidence that other segments of Iraqi society had reconciliation problems too, 
but I will only discuss those briefly here since Saddam clearly had reconciliation problems 
(when a brutal dictator has reconciliation problems, one can code this independent variable 
“unfavorable”…).  These other sources of Iraqi reconciliation problems will play a more 
prominent role in my next case and will be discussed more fully there.  Importantly, they 
suggest that, even if Saddam had been removed, the United States may still have needed to 
mitigate reconciliation problems with certain segments of the Iraqi population.   
As Saddam’s son-in-law Hussein Kamil conveyed to Saddam in 1996, “Your Excellency 
knows that we were raised hating the Americans.”405  This sentiment applied to many Iraqis, 
and especially the Baathists, who were specifically targeted in the war in attempt to weaken 
their hold on power.  One might have expected a resentment problem with the Baathists (and 
their mainly Sunni supporters), even if Saddam remained in power.  If Saddam had been 
removed from power by the United States and this segment was, in turn, victimized by other 
segments of Iraqi society, this would have only exacerbated that segment’s reconciliation 
problem with the United States.   
The Iraqi military expressed a sense of enmity and injustice at times as well.  At the 
ceasefire negotiations, military leaders were upset that the coalition went into Iraq even 
though Iraq withdrew from Kuwait.  They were also humiliated by the losses they took 
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during an accidental encounter with U.S. troops after the Iraqis had signaled their general 
retreat.
406
   
The Shiites in southern Iraq suffered greatly when Saddam crushed their uprisings, and 
many felt that the United States coaxed them into those uprisings and implied that the United 
States would support them.  This created a strong sense of distrust for America and, for 
some, a strong sense of betrayal.
407
  If Saddam had remained in power and the United States 
had cooperated with his regime, Saddam’s regime would have been strengthened.  This 
would have threatened the Shiites and Kurds and likely sparked resentment towards the 
United States for empowering their domestic enemy Saddam, whom the United States had 
encouraged them to rebel against.   
For other Iraqis, “The war, and subsequent UN sanctions and enforcement measures, 
increasingly placed the United States on the wrong side of Arab public opinion” in 
general.
408
  “The allies failed to target Baghdad with an effective propaganda campaign 
making it clear that the coalition’s bombs were not intended for the Iraqi people.”409  The 
damage to the Iraqi power grid imposed extra hardship on the Iraqi people that the United 
States was trying to win over.  According to a Harvard team of experts, “the destruction of 
the electrical plants had hampered efforts to purify water and contributed to an alarming 
escalation in infant mortality rates.”410  “During the United Nations (UN) sanctions regime 
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that lasted from 1991 to 2003, Iraqis struggled to sustain themselves and their families as 
large segments of the population experienced economic deprivation, loss of social services 
such as education, and declining health conditions.”411  Saddam built palaces and his people 
suffered.  The war and the sanctions hurt the people, perhaps more than Saddam, and 
provided a strong foundation for them to have reconciliation problems with both Saddam and 
the United States.   
Status of Iraqi reconciliation problems: UNFAVORABLE towards qualities of 
cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests 
that Saddam (as well as other segments of Iraqi society) had severe reconciliation problems 
with the United States.   
State Capacity Problems 
There is little evidence to suggest that Iraq lacked the material capacity, even after the 
war, to meet whatever strategic cooperation obligations that the United States 
(counterfactually) might have required.  After the war, Saddam retained governance and 
control over his agents, unlike other wartime scenarios in which there was a government 
collapse that required help from outside sources (e.g., an occupier).  While his military was 
degraded, Saddam retained enough power to manage the spaces, organizations, and personnel 
that might have been relevant to a strategic cooperation agreement.  This capacity was 
demonstrated handily during Saddam’s crushing of the rebellions after the war—Saddam 
wielded enough control (through brutal dictatorship) to materially meet obligations of 
foreseen cooperative ventures.  Also, counterfactually, with as much as the United States 
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stood to gain from strategic partnership with Iraq (e.g., a bulwark against Iran, petrol 
resources, geostrategic access, and so forth), it is likely that the United States would have 
provided or accommodated whatever material resources were necessary for strategic 
cooperation as it had in other scenarios.   
Status of Iraqi state capacity problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation 
for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that Iraq did 
not have immitigable state capacity problems from a U.S. perspective.   
Political Unification Problems 
There is strong evidence that large portions of the Iraqi population did not identify with 
their government and that influential domestic actors would likely have mounted a credible 
resistance to strategic cooperation.   
Iraqis have a long history of political unification problems.  Eric Davis assesses, in part, 
whether “Iraqis, as is often asserted, are more loyal to tribes, ethnic groups, and religious 
sects than to Iraq as a nation-state.”412  While Davis argues that Iraqis do have a “strong” 
national identity that has, on occasion, led them to band together (typically against an 
external threat, such as was seen during Iran-Iraq War, where Shiite fought Shiite) and that 
weak institutions and sectarian identities are to blame for many of Iraq’s political-unification 
woes, he nonetheless provides ample evidence that, for a vast majority of their history, Iraqis 
have failed to exhibit political unity as I have defined it.
413
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External and internal forces have exploited and exacerbated Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian 
cleavages and have, in turn, fractured Iraqi political unity and perpetuated Iraq’s identity 
problems, often intentionally and to their own ends.  The Ottomans encouraged sectarianism 
by “purposely favor[ing] Iraq’s minority Sunni Arab elite as junior officers in the army, 
policemen, and lower-level bureaucrats during their rule of Iraq, which lasted from the 
seventeenth century until 1918.”  The British followed the Ottoman policy when they created 
the Hashemite monarchy in 1921, which was dominated by Sunni Arab elite until it was 
overthrown in 1958.  The British “pursued the typical colonial policy of divide and conquer 
and within the state tacitly supported traditional Sunni Arab interests that largely excluded 
Shiites and Kurds.”  In the 1930s, the British established the tribal system which competes 
for the loyalty of the Iraqi people still.  This special legal system in Iraq’s tribal regions 
“made tribal shaykhs masters of rural Iraq” so much so that “the state could not enter the 
tribal domain without permission of the paramount shaykh.”414   
After World War II, the Iraqi government cracked down on nationalist movements and 
tensions built up between “Iraqists” (nationalists who promoted cross-ethnic and culturally-
tolerant pluralism) and “pan-Arabists” (nationalists who saw Iraq as part of a bigger Arab 
structure and “sought to privilege Iraq’s minority Sunni Arab community”).   These tensions 
are “only now beginning to be addressed.”  Throughout, Iraqi political elites, for the most 
part, promoted narrow economic and sectarian agendas that have not contributed to the 
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national interest.  When Abdel Karim Qassim took control of Iraq on 1958, he tried to 
embrace Iraqist nationalism and reach out to the Kurds.  The Kurds, however, wanted 
autonomy and attacked Qassim’s army in 1961.  When the Baathists came to power shortly 
thereafter, they suppressed the Iraqist movement.  The Baathists (and especially Saddam) 
favored pan-Arabism, which appealed to the Sunni population but marginalized most Shiites 
and Kurds.  Saddam often promoted state-sponsored sectarianism (e.g., the Anfal campaign 
in the late 1980s).  Subsequently, “when the Arab and Kurdish populations rose against 
Saddam Hussein’s regime in late February and March 1991, Saddam began promoting 
sectarianism” as a means to stay in power.415 
The Coalition’s actions during and after the war did little to rectify Iraq’s preexisting 
political unification problems.  The destruction of the Gulf War, encouragement of uprisings, 
and subsequent 12-year sanction regime weakened the Baathist state and Saddam responded 
by turning to tribes (so-called “retribilization”) and religious groups for support.  As future 
history would demonstrate, “much of the sectarianism that emerged after the U.S. invasion of 
2003 had already developed during the 1990s in response to economic deprivation and 
Saddam’s self-conscious efforts to follow a divide-and-conquer policy” that pitted Iraq’s 
ethic groups against one another.  “The collapse of the economy and educational system and 
the turning inward of Iraqis to traditional organizations based in tribe and religion only 
intensified the policies deployed by the Baathist state,” exacerbating sectarianism.416  
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Further, the no-fly zones protected the Kurds and Shiites, but also “separated” them from 
other segments of Iraq largely along ethnic lines, reinforcing that sectarianism.
417
   
The result of this all is that, during the timeframe of this study, many Iraqis did not 
identify with their government. There was a shadow government—the tribes and religious 
groups.  The Iraqi government did not have a monopoly over the legitimate use of means of 
violence—the violence of sectarian organizations was seen as more legitimate than that of 
the government by large segments of the Iraqi population. 
Given that there was little political unity in Iraq, would influential domestic actors have 
mounted a credible resistance to postwar cooperation between the United States and the Iraqi 
government?  Likely so.  No Iraqi group has historically wanted the other to get too strong, 
and strategic cooperation increases the capacity of some more than others.  Consider that 
cooperation between the United States and the Iraqi government would likely have 
strengthened the incumbent regime and that, if Saddam had remained in power, the Kurds 
and Shiites would have found this very threatening based on Saddam’s behavior.418  These 
groups had demonstrated a strong capacity for organized violence.  If a new regime were to 
have taken over, history shows a propensity for Iraq to behave along sectarian lines and the 
tremendous violence we have seen in Iraq as of late is a testimony to the likely outcome of 
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this scenario—certain groups would likely feel marginalized and react violently to the regime 
and whichever entities support it.   
Status of Iraqi political unification problems: UNFAVORABLE towards qualities of 
cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests 
that Iraq had severe political unification problems and influential domestic actors would 
likely have mounted a credible resistance to cooperation.   
Dependent Variable: The Postwar Qualities of Cooperation between the United States 
and Iraq 
 
The historical record shows that, for the entire timeframe of this case, the United States 
and Iraq never progressed beyond their oft-violated ceasefire agreement to reach an 
agreement with any appreciable depth or endurance of true cooperation.  This is far off the 
mark from the ambition of cooperation that was seen between the United States and West 
Germany after World War II.  The realization of cooperation for the relationship between the 
United States and Iraq was, frankly, even worse than its miniscule ambition of cooperation.  
The United States and Iraq did not realize any appreciable depth of cooperation.  On the 
contrary, they were in constant conflict, not even meeting the terms of their ceasefire 
agreement.  Blood was shed—it was an undeclared war in which Saddam resisted his U.S. 
and UNSCOM “enemy” by any means possible and the United States increasingly pursued 
regime change by destabilizing Saddam’s regime.  Even the undeclared war did not endure—
the two nations were in open war again just 12 years later.
419
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Assessment of the qualities of cooperation:  ABSENT—there was no appreciable 
ambition or realization of postwar cooperation between the United States and Iraq during the 
timeframe of this study.   
Analysis 
This case had unfavorable independent variables at both the international and domestic 
levels throughout its timeframe.  At the international level, it was not spoilers or competitors 
that were sources of credible commitment problems, but other international conditions.  
When Saddam retained power after the war, it created a problem of competing alliances for 
the United States—the United States could not cooperate with Saddam’s persistently hostile 
regime (and thereby strengthen it) without increasing a threat to several U.S friends in the 
region.  Further, Saddam was a pariah—it was politically untenable for the United States to 
cooperate with such types and, thereby, degrade U.S. (or administration) image, 
internationally or domestically.  With such problems at the international level, my theory 
predicts lower qualities of cooperation, and that is exactly what is seen in my dependent 
variable assessment.   
The international problems were enough to preclude attempts at cooperation outright and 
they overshadow the many other problems that existed at the domestic level.  Domestically, 
on the U.S. side, there were problems with trust and reconciliation.  On the Iraqi (Saddam) 
side, there were problems with trust, reconciliation, and political unification.  If the 
international sources of credible commitment problems could have been overcome, the 
United States would likely have proceeded very slowly (if at all) with cooperation due to its 
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lack of trust in Saddam’s regime and its reconciliation problems (the U.S. administrations 
would have had a lot of work to do to reorient the identity of Saddam in their selectorate 
from “Hitler” to “partner”).  If the United States had overcome these problems to where it 
was willing to proceed with cooperation, Saddam’s lack of trust and reconciliation problems 
would likely have undermined his depth of cooperation.  Even if these problems could have 
been resolved, U.S. cooperation with Saddam would have been threatening to domestic Iraqi 
groups and, due to Iraq’s political unification problems, resistance would likely have hurt the 
depth and endurance of cooperation that the United States and Iraq could achieve.  For each 
of these problems at the domestic level, my theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation, 
and that is exactly what is seen in my dependent variable assessment. 
Assessing Alternate Theories 
Similar to the alternate theory I explored in my German case, an alternate theory to my 
explanation above might be that a common external threat is not only required for 
cooperation, but that it promotes cooperation.  In this U.S.-Iraq case, examining the 
relationships with Iran demonstrates the limits of this alternate theory as an explanation. 
As the historical record shows, the United States and Iran were enemies from the 
overthrow of the Shah (and seizure of U.S. hostages for 444 days) in 1979, through the Iran-
Iraq war in which the United States tactically supported Iraq (albeit while also supporting 
Iran), and throughout the remainder of this case’s timeframe, including when Iran was a 
target of Clinton’s “dual containment” strategy.  This was because the United States felt that 
Iran was a threat to its regional interests at least (if not beyond due to Iran’s potential WMD 
and terrorism threat).   
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Iran was also an enemy of Iraq throughout this case’s timeframe.  Recall the terrible 
bloodshed of the eight-year Iran-Iraq War.  And while Saddam evacuated parts of his air 
force to Iran during the Gulf War, his postwar behavior suggests that he still considered Iran 
a threat.  For instance, he pursued “ambiguous disarmament” after the Gulf War and bluffed 
that he possessed WMD to his peril because he feared that signaling weakness would 
“encourage an Iranian or Israeli attack.”420 
If this “external threat” alternate theory were to explain the case of the United States and 
Iraq after the Gulf War, the United States and Iraq should have set their differences aside and 
cooperated because of their common enemy, Iran.  But we know that the United States and 
Iraq continued to engage in deadly conflict, quite the opposite of cooperation.  Clearly, other 
concerns take precedence over external threats and this demonstrates the limits of the 
“external threat” alternate theory.     
Another alternate theory might be that an internal threat would spur cooperation.  As I 
discussed my theory chapter, a political unification problem associated with a threat to the 
government (e.g., an insurgency) could theoretically spur cooperation while the internal 
threat exists.  In this case, Saddam had many internal threats (e.g., the Kurds in the north and 
the Shiites in the south), yet Saddam was combative towards the United States.  Further, to 
compare, Germany had little, if any, internal threats after the war and the United States and 
Germany experienced very high postwar qualities of cooperation.  Clearly other concerns 
take precedence over internal threats and this shows the limits of the “internal threat” 
alternate theory.    
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Summary of Findings 
Overall, the case of the postwar relationship between the United States and Iraq after the 
Gulf War of 1991 supports my theory.  This case had unfavorable conditions for cooperation 
at both the international and domestic levels.  My theory, in this situation, predicts lower 
qualities of cooperation for postwar relations and the “absent” qualities of cooperation 
between the United States and Iraq after the war is consistent with this prediction, unlike the 
alternate theories I discussed regarding the roles of external and internal threats.  Regardless 
of the status of those threats, the sources of credible commitment problems that I have 
identified must be resolved to achieve higher qualities of cooperation.   
More specifically, my finding of the unfavorable “other international conditions” at the 
international level causing lower qualities of cooperation supports my Hypothesis 1.  My 
finding of the unfavorable trust and reconciliation problems on both the American and Iraqi 
sides causing lower qualities of cooperation supports my Hypothesis 2.  My finding of the 
unfavorable political unification problems on the Iraqi side causing lower qualities of 
cooperation supports my Hypothesis 4. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE IRAQ 2003 CASE 
The Relationship between the United States and Iraq after the Iraq War of 2003 
 
In this chapter, I present my case study of the postwar relationship between the United 
States and Iraq after the Iraq War of 2003.  I begin my historical review in 2001, where the 
previous case left off, and move forward to the time of this writing (2014).  My previous case 
is foundational to this case and should be read prior to this case because, for parsimony, some 
relevant analyses from my previous case are not recreated in whole in this case.  
In contrast to previous cases, the Iraq 2003 case is one where international conditions 
were favorable and domestic conditions were unfavorable for higher postwar qualities of 
cooperation up through the time of this writing.  My theory predicts lower qualities of 
cooperation in this situation.   
As I will show, in removing Saddam’s regime from power, the United States remedied 
many of the existing international sources of credible commitment problems.  However, 
while removing Saddam’s regime remedied some of the domestic sources of credible 
commitment problems, other unfavorable domestic conditions for strategic cooperation, 
primarily reconciliation and political unification problems on the Iraqi side, remained 
substantial.  In this situation, my theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation as reflected in 
my Hypotheses 2 and 4.   
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My theory’s prediction holds up in this case.  The postwar relationship between the 
United States and Iraq after 2003 had a moderate level of ambition, but was relatively low in 
its realization of cooperative depth and endurance as compared to more promising cases (e.g., 
the United States and Germany).  The countries struggle to this day to cooperate on a range 
of bilateral, regional, and international issues.   
Pertinent Historical Record 
At the end of my historical review of the previous case, the Bush administration was in 
its early months of office, establishing itself and reviewing threats.  Like previous 
administrations, it had come to the conclusion that Saddam was intractable.  Iraqi regime 
change was desired, but U.S. policymakers struggled over how to bring it about.  The attacks 
of September 11, 2001, brought a new sense of urgency to the matter.  The United States 
invaded Iraq in March 2003 and removed the Saddam Hussein threat.  However, after 
liberating Iraq from Saddam, the United States found itself trapped in a long occupation in 
attempt to establish order and responsible governance in Iraq.  After losing nearly 4,500 
troops and many more Iraqi lives, and expending more than $800 billion towards the war, the 
U.S. military withdrew from Iraq in December 2011.
421
  The United States and Iraq have 
struggled to achieve envisioned levels of postwar cooperation, particularly after the U.S. 
withdrawal.   
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2001-2003: Removing Saddam (and, Thereby, Some Sources of Credible Commitment 
Problems) 
 
In its early months in office, the Bush administration reviewed U.S. policies towards 
regimes that were hostile to the United States such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, and 
Libya.  As with previous administrations, Iraqi regime change was desired and the 
administration struggled with how to bring it about.
422
  It recognized, as did the previous 
administration, that containment was failing and that regime change would require direct 
U.S. involvement—coups and opposition groups were unlikely to solve the problem.423  The 
former Gulf War coalition was waning, as was international support for sanctions.
424
  
September 11, 2001—a Game Changer 
The September 11 attacks brought a new sense of urgency and willingness to use force 
against threats that were actively hostile towards the United States, particularly those who 
supported terrorism and/or aspired for weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
425
  The 
administration chose to solve the Afghanistan problem first by war and defer on the Iraq 
problem.
426
  In the meantime, Bush called for the return of weapons inspections in Iraq, 
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which Saddam summarily rejected.
427
  By summer 2002, Bush administration officials 
considered whether a credible threat of war (not war itself) might induce regime change.
428
  
By fall 2002, the administration was again rallying for international support to decisively 
solve the ongoing Iraq problem.  The international community had already tried “diplomatic 
protests, Security Council resolutions, weapons inspections, economic sanctions, no-fly 
zones, no-drive zones, and limited military strikes.”429  Yet Saddam had violated all sixteen 
UN Security Council resolutions that were adopted between 1991 and 1999 to try and contain 
his aggression and his forces were firing on coalition aircraft daily.
430
  In September 2002, 
President Bush made his “Iraq speech” to the UN General Assembly, outlining the continued 
danger that Saddam’s regime posed and calling on the UN to enforce its already-existing 
resolutions. 
Within days of Bush’s speech, Iraq “announced that it would allow UN weapons 
inspectors back into Iraq for the first time since 1998.”431  On November 8, 2002, the UN 
Security Council unanimously adopted UNSCR 1441, “deploring” Saddam’s previous 
resolution violations, particularly the violations of WMD disclosure, and gave Saddam “a 
final opportunity” to, amongst other things, “comply with its disarmament obligations” or 
“face serious consequences.”432  Saddam followed through with his promise to allow 
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weapons inspections in November.  On December 7, 2002, Iraq submitted its weapons 
declaration, which Secretary of State Colin Powell described in a press conference as “a 
catalogue of recycled information and flagrant omissions.”433  “The interpretation in 
Washington and elsewhere was that [Iraq] was still concealing its activities.”434  After this, 
Bush, in the judgment of administration official Douglas Feith, made the decision to remove 
Saddam’s regime by war.435  Importantly, this would be a “preemptive” war—Saddam had 
not yet used WMD on the United States or given it to terrorists to do so, but was anticipated 
to do so in the future.  This was a departure from previous U.S. deference to sovereignty.
436
  
On January 27, 2003, Hans Blix, the head of UNMOVIC, having conducted on-site 
inspections and reviewed Iraq’s weapons declaration for seven weeks, delivered his report to 
the UN Security Council.  He was not satisfied with Iraq’s transparency—Iraq had not 
genuinely accepted the disarmament demands and had not shared information to resolve 
troubling questions about its WMD program.  Further, weapons inspectors had found 
prohibited items and evidence of undeclared work on chemical and biological weapons.
437
  
On February 5, Powell made his memorable case against Iraq to the United Nations and on 
March 17, Bush extended a formal ultimatum to Saddam and his sons to leave Iraq within 48 
hours to avoid war.
438
  Saddam declined.   
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The Iraq War, March-April 2003  
On March 19, a U.S.-led coalition began its attack on Iraq with an unsuccessful 
decapitation strike on Saddam that might have precluded the need for invasion.
439
  In contrast 
to the Gulf War, the United States gave up on going to the UN Security Council for a 
resolution to authorize war, although the United Nations later recognized the occupation and 
“called on member states to support Iraqi reconstruction.”440  Also, this war had much less 
international support.  Although “the list of coalition members publicly acknowledged by the 
State Department eventually ran to thirty countries,” key U.S. allies France and Germany, 
along with Russia, urged for inspectors to be given more time and there were “massive peace 
demonstrations all over the world.”441 
Iraq was “liberated” a few short weeks later.  Baghdad fell to U.S. forces on April 9 and 
Saddam’s statue in Firdos square was torn down by a jubilant Iraqi population with American 
assistance.
442
  Saddam was ousted, but force levels were inadequate to quell the mayhem that 
followed.
443
  Substantial looting and sackings of government buildings, shootings, and 
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disorder, apparently organized purposefully, in part, by ousted Baathists, took an immediate 
toll on U.S. image and standing.
444
 
April 2003-2011: Exacerbating Other Domestic Sources of Credible Commitment 
Problems 
 
“I think the biggest sin was to change the mission from liberation to 
occupation.  That was the mother of all sins, honestly”—Iraqi Foreign 
Minister Hoshyar Zebari
445
 
From Liberation to Occupation: Sewing More Seeds of Resentment 
In May, Bush appointed former Ambassador Paul Bremer as the senior U.S. civilian 
official in Iraq.  U.S. officials had wrestled with how much to involve the Iraqis in their own 
governance right after the war, but the prewar plan was for a very quick transfer of 
government to Iraqis (that is, to an “Iraqi Interim Authority”).446  On May 12, however, 
Bremer arrived in Baghdad and proceeded to stall the transfer of governance to the Iraqis, 
contrary to the plan Bush had approved.
447
  Bremer chose to run Iraq “as the head of an 
occupation authority while nurturing a Western-style government.”448  He led the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) and created the advisory Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), 
composed of twenty-five members to represent the various groups across Iraqi society.  The 
IGC was established “to assuage Iraqi concerns about the unrepresentative nature of the 
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CPA.”449  Bremer then pursued a strategy that required democratic elections and a 
constitution before he would grant Iraq full sovereignty.
450
  
In short order, Bremer issued two decrees that had a profound influence on the length and 
tone of the occupation.  The first centered on the issue of de-Baathification.  CPA Order No. 
1, issued May 16, barred officials who had served in the top four ranks of the Baath party 
(roughly the top 1 percent of the approximately two-million Baath party members) from 
serving in the new Iraqi government.
451
  While this was the official CPA policy, there were 
several reports in later years that newly-empowered Iraqis enforced de-Baathification in great 
excess of this policy.
452
  CPA Order No. 2, issued May 23, formally dissolved Iraq’s military 
and its national security entities.
453
  Bremer wanted to rebuild Iraq’s army from scratch 
because, as he saw it, Iraq’s current army was top-heavy, corrupt, and featured a mostly-
Sunni officer class that was prone to brutalizing its mostly-Shiite enlisted class.
454
  Further, 
according to Bremer, Kurd leaders threatened to secede if Saddam’s army was recalled to 
duty.
455
  
There were early indications that a lengthy occupation and nation-building exercise 
would meet resistance from Iraqis.  IGC members “grew resentful of the foreigners’ 
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authority” and they wanted the occupation to end.456  In Bremer’s initial meeting with Iraqi 
leaders, one warned him to hasten the political process because the “[Arab] ‘street’ is waiting 
for the freedom you promised.”457  Grand Ayatollah Sistani, the preeminent Shiite cleric in 
Iraq, complicated Bremer’s problems further, threatening a fatwa if appointed (rather than 
elected) Iraqis drafted their constitution.
458
  Bremer, however, was in no hurry to turn over 
the governance of Iraq to Iraqis, doubting the abilities of their political leadership.
459
 
Violence: Insurgency and Other Mayhem 
Postwar violence grew and, by July 2003, ground commanders acknowledged publicly 
that they were facing a “guerrilla-type campaign.”460  Sunnis (mostly) were prosecuting a 
staunch insurgency.  They were “angry that they had been displaced from the top strata of 
Iraqi society and were fearful that they would be marginalized politically” or abused by the 
Shiite majority.
461
  Further, actors like Al-Qaeda wannabe Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who 
would try and ignite a civil war between the Sunnis and Shiites, used the open-ended 
occupation as a recruitment tool.
462
  “The insurgency was able to develop a widening base of 
support from ordinary Iraqis, who came to believe that the United States was in their country 
to exploit them and dominate them, to control their lives and steal their soil.”463  “By 2004, 
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the Sunni insurgents who were making war on the American-led coalition and the Iraqi 
government appeared increasingly to be maneuvering in a warm and inviting sea.”464  That is, 
insurgents had the support of the population for refuge and recruitment.   
These violent actors proved formidable.  In August, for instance, a car-bomb attack 
against UN headquarters in Baghdad killed UN-lead Sergio de Mello and twenty members of 
his staff.
465
  “This, together with later attacks, soon led the United Nations and other 
organizations to withdraw most of their personnel from Iraq.”466  Towards the end of August, 
another bombing killed Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) leader 
Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al-Hakim and four of his fellow Shiite clerics.
467
  U.S. military 
responses to the initial insurgent violence seemed indiscriminant to some and fomented more 
resentment.
468
  Some Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar, however, showed interest in a better 
relationship with the Americans.
469
  While they were rebuffed at this point, their cooperation 
would eventually lead to the “Awakening” a few years later. 
Iraqi Shiites also conducted substantial violence.  By summer 2003, the “fiery anti-
American Shiite cleric” Muqtada al-Sadr, who had ties to Iran, had amassed a strong 
following with his anti-occupation sermons.  He recruited a militia called the Jaish al-Mahdi 
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(a.k.a., JAM or the Mahdi Army) which he used to control neighborhoods and engage in 
violence against coalition forces and domestic rivals.
470
   
In December 2003, Saddam was captured, although the Sunni insurgency that he helped 
enable raged on.  Saddam would be executed in December 2006, as even bloodier sectarian 
fighting raged, for his hand in the murder of 146 citizens of the Shiite village Dujayl.
471
   
The Euphrates valley in Anbar, home of violent hotspots like Fallujah and Ramadi, 
housed 1.2 million Sunni Arabs and was home to several former military bases and retired 
officers who were loyal to the Baath Party.  On March 31, 2004, four U.S. contractors were 
ambushed in Fallujah and, having been abandoned by their Iraqi military escort, were killed.  
Two of their bodies were infamously hung, upside down, on a railroad bridge that spanned 
the Euphrates to discourage Americans from future venturing into the city.  With Zarqawi 
and insurgents running amok in Fallujah, U.S. Marines and a limited number of Iraqi forces 
moved in to pacify the city.  Al-Jazeera broadcasted the carnage, which included many 
civilian dead, leading to denunciation of the effort by the leading Sunni IGC member and 
distancing from the British—the closest U.S. allies in the campaign.  The Americans stopped 
the assault just as they were making progress, only to have to return to Fallujah for a second 
major battle within the year.  Around this time, similar battles between U.S. forces and Sunni 
insurgents were taking place in Ramadi.
472
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Bremer tried to challenge Sadr around this time, suspending the Sadrist Trend’s 
newspaper for “inciting violence against allied troops.”  Sadr was furious and, shortly 
thereafter, denounced the Americans and praised the September 11 attacks in a sermon to his 
faithful masses. The Mahdi Army took to the streets and a violent Sadr City uprising ensued.  
Elsewhere, in cities like Karbala and Najaf, Sadr supporters tried to take control.  By June, 
coalition and Iraqi forces inflicted enough losses for Sadr to call for a ceasefire which, in 
retrospect, allowed his Mahdi Army to regenerate to menace again.
473
 
The Return of Iraqi Sovereignty: Elections and Increasing Sectarian Violence 
President Bush intervened to accelerate Bremer’s transfer of governance to the Iraqis, 
which occurred on June 28.
474
  After more than a year of occupational governance, the CPA 
was dissolved and the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) was established with Ayad Allawi, a 
secular Shiite technocrat, at the helm as the first Iraqi prime minister.   Iraq was 
“sovereign.”475  Regardless, Sunni discontent remained.  A classified memo from a meeting 
of more than a dozen U.S. intelligence agencies noted that “a large number of Sunni Arabs 
still believe they have no stake in the Coalition vision for Iraq”—that Shiites and Kurds were 
taking over the government with U.S. backing and leaving the Sunnis vulnerable to 
retribution.  The memo also noted that the hostile Arab media was drowning out Coalition 
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public relations efforts with “anti-U.S. commentary, false conspiracy theories, and negative 
spin regarding ongoing developments,” further damaging U.S. image amongst Sunnis.476 
In summer 2004, despite Iraq’s “symbolic sovereignty,” the Sunni insurgency was “more 
active than ever.”  Fallujah became a hotspot again, confidence in Allawi’s ability to improve 
the security situation fell, and “the most revered leader in Iraq was Sistani” who repeatedly 
refused to meet with Americans.  Further, Sadr’s ceasefire had broken down and he and his 
Mahdi Army, with the help if an Iranian Quds Force operative, were raising trouble in Najaf.  
Although U.S. forces severely damaged the Mahdi Army, Sistani, who had been in London 
for medical treatment, returned and organized a truce—Sadr and his forces were again 
allowed to escape to again regenerate and cause further strife for U.S. forces.
477
 
Fighting continued in Sadr City; Fallujah was out of control.  With explicit Iraqi 
government sanctioning this time, U.S.-led forces assaulted Fallujah to drive out the 
insurgents and terrorists.  Fallujah was devastated.  Marines estimated that between seven 
and ten thousand of the city’s fifty thousand residences were destroyed, along with sixty 
mosques.  By this time, as many as 200,000 of the city’s approximately 300,000 residents 
were displaced.  While the Americans had killed an estimated 2,175 insurgents in the battle, 
scenes of dogs gnawing on dead insurgent bones did little to bolster U.S. image in the Arab 
world.  Fallujah had been calmed by December 2004, prior to the elections, but many 
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insurgents escaped to other cities like Mosul to conduct violence to threaten the January 
elections.
478
   
The Iraqis held elections in January 2005.  There were concerns from some, including 
Allawi, that Sunnis needed more time to get on board.  Regardless, elections went ahead as 
planned.  Overall, 58 percent of eligible Iraqis voted despite the three hundred election-day 
insurgent attacks.  Sunnis, as Allawi had feared, were grossly underrepresented, with only a 2 
percent voter turnout in Anbar.  The election hardened sectarian divides, with the Shiite 
coalition, “The United Iraqi Alliance,” taking the most seats, the Kurdish parties taking the 
second most seats, and the Sunnis largely boycotting the election.  Allawi fared poorly.  His 
party took only 25 of the 275 parliament seats that would choose the next prime minister.  
From a U.S. perspective, Allawi had been a good partner, cooperating on key events like the 
Fallujah campaign.  He was “action-oriented and eager to cooperate with the United States.”  
That said, he lacked domestic clout and had not secured much support in the elections.
479
  
Ibrahim al-Jaafari, who had fled to Iran during Saddam’s rule, was selected to replace 
Allawi and took the helm in April 2005.  Importantly, as the government was reforming, 
SCIRI machinated to obtain control of the Interior Ministry and, thereby, the Iraqi National 
Police and security forces.  Under Jaafari, a renewed de-Baathification effort transpired and 
SCIRI governors and councils replaced several local police chiefs with Badr Corps militia 
members.  Considering this, the outgoing Interior Minister warned of a great potential for a 
civil war.  Jaafari, however, was seemingly disengaged or disinterested in many of the 
problems facing Iraq.  Iraqi politicians chose him as prime because he posed little threat to 
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their interests.  He was largely “oblivious” to the sectarianism in his security apparatus and 
the threat of civil war.  Sectarian violence worsened over the summer.
480
   
December 2005 saw new elections with little violence as compared to the previous 
election in January.  Sunni leaders appeared ready to put aside their boycott and participate in 
elections, but they also had ties to, and sway over, insurgents.  By early 2006, “Al-Qaeda in 
Iraq was stronger than it had ever been” and Zarqawi was diligently continuing efforts to 
expand ongoing sectarian conflict into a full-blown civil war.  In February 2006, Al-Qaeda 
operatives set off explosives inside Samarra’s Al-Askari Mosque, a Shiite holy site, 
collapsing its famous golden dome.  American leaders feared that Shiite militias would seek 
revenge, but Jaafari was indifferent to American concerns.  The Iraqi government’s response 
was to send Iraqi National Police into Sunni areas, to the horror of Sunnis, one Sheikh 
lamenting that “you’re bringing the devil into our homes.”  Sectarian violence spiraled with 
attacks and revenge killings.
481
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2006-2008: Maliki’s Rise and the Fight against Civil War 
The American-led coalition was unhappy with Jaafari’s persistent lack of leadership on 
the sectarian issue and supported Nuri-al Maliki, Iraq’s prime minister from May 2006 to the 
time of this writing, to replace him.  Maliki was seen as more action-oriented than Jaafari, 
but was also seen as partial to Shiite concerns.
482
   
About the time of Maliki’s assumption of the lead, American forces were struggling with 
recent atrocities committed by American troops, sure to foment resentment to a wide 
audience with the help of prolific and hostile media.  Two years earlier had been the Abu 
Grhaib scandal, in which U.S. forces abused detainees.  More recently, a Marine unit was 
under investigation, accused of murdering twenty four civilians in Haditha after one of their 
Marines was killed by an improvised explosive device (IED).  And in Yusafiya, Army 
soldiers were accused of raping a 14-year old girl, killing her and three of her family 
members, and setting their house on fire.  This is not to say that abuses were not being 
conducted by the Iraqi government as well.  After discoveries of abuse at Jadriya Bunker,
483
 
American forces began inspecting other Interior Ministry detention facilities in Baghdad, 
finding “widespread beatings and rape and an attitude among the staff that there was nothing 
wrong with it.”484   
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U.S. forces also struggled to preclude a full-blown sectarian civil war.
485
  In June 2006, 
American forces killed Zarqawi and learned that Al-Qaeda thought that the “Americans were 
winning the battle” in important Sunni areas.  The Iraqis launched, with U.S. support, 
Operation Together Forward to quell the violence in Baghdad, but U.S. officials felt that the 
Iraqi government was biased and not doing enough to address Shiite-perpetrated violence.  
Worse, there were clear indications that the Iraqi government was complicit in the sectarian 
violence.  Yet Maliki, as was the case with his predecessor, did not address his government’s 
role in stoking the sectarian violence.
486
   
By September 2006, tribal leaders in Anbar, fed up with Al-Qaeda’s abuse of their lands 
and people, were aligning with American forces to drive out the terrorists.  As one Sunni 
cleric explained, the Americans, while an unwelcome occupying force, had been determined 
not to be a threat to their faith and way of life.  Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, was.  This 
became known as the Sunni “Awakening” and was a key element in the fight to quell civil 
war.
487
   
The U.S. surge was another key element in the fight to quell civil war.  In January 2007, 
President Bush, going against the advice of some military and administration officials, 
convinced a reluctant Maliki to ask for more troops and ordered a surge of some 33,000 
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additional U.S. troops into Iraq to help quell the civil war.
488
  In February 2007, surge troops 
started to arrive and the monthly ethno-sectarian civilian deaths in Baghdad fell sharply.
489
     
In June 2007, the Askari Mosque in Samarra was bombed again.  This time the Iraqi 
government took action by ordering a curfew; resurging sectarian violence was averted.  
Maliki did take the opportunity, however, to fire the commander in Samarra and replace him 
with a National Police commander who had known Sadrist connections—“a fresh reminder 
of the virulent and seemingly intractable sectarianism of the Maliki government.”490   
By summer 2007, the Awakening was gaining traction.  “The surge served as a catalyst 
that encouraged the Awakening to spread to Sunni areas beyond Anbar.”  The Awakening’s 
“Sons of Iraq” forces would eventually be put on a payroll and compliment U.S. efforts to 
fight Al-Qaeda.  The Maliki government was content with this as long as the efforts were 
focused on Al-Qaeda and stayed “in Sunni areas away from Baghdad.”  Although the 
insurgency was weakening, the Shiite militias became more active as the surging American 
forces took the offensive to root out sectarian violence.  Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
talked with Maliki in Baghdad about the continuing problems that Iraq faced, which Maliki 
downplayed.  Gates noted that Maliki “seemed out of touch with reality.”491  That September, 
a leading figure in the Awakening, Sheikh Abd al-Sattar, expressed gratitude to a visiting 
President Bush, telling Bush that “he and the Sunni population he represented would always 
                                                 
488
 See GT 2012, 301-309 and Gates 2014, 42 and 574; see Sylvan and Majeski 2009, 141 for troop numbers. 
489
 In Baghdad, overall civilian deaths fell from approximately 3,600 in December 2006 and January 2007 (pre-
surge) to 2,300 in February 2007 (post-surge).  Ethno-sectarian deaths fell from approximately 1,550 in 
December 2006 and January 2007 to 800 in February and 500 in March (GT 2012, 338).   
490
 GT 2012, 368. 
491
 Gates 2014, 34. 
243 
 
remember the sacrifice American families had made in sending their sons and daughters to 
Iraq.”  Ten days later, Sattar was killed in an attack for which Al-Qaeda claimed 
responsibility.  Also in September, Sadr called for another ceasefire (which some Shiites did 
not obey) and Shiite violence levels began to drop.  By the end of 2007, the American 
military had “yanked Iraq back from the brink of civil war.”492 
Maliki seized opportunities to increase his power in early 2008.  Basra was overrun with 
violent Shiite militias and gangs.  Maliki went there personally in March to restore order 
(with robust Coalition air support), having either grown tired of the Mahdi Army and its 
criminal offshoots or, perhaps more likely, having perceived a threat to his rule.  Importantly, 
it was perceived by some as hope for a less sectarian stance from Maliki.
493
  Shortly after 
returning from Basra, Maliki “handily fended off” a renewed push for a no-confidence vote 
that the Sadrists had been plotting to challenge his rule.  The Mahdi Army became highly 
active and violence sprung up in many Shiite areas, including Sadr City, which was home to 
more than two million Iraqi citizens.  Having previously “asserted his sovereignty and 
prevented the Americans from having a free hand in Sadr City, Maliki was no longer 
sovereign” of these sprawling neighborhoods that were overrun by Sadrists.  From Sadr City, 
Maliki’s enemies launched attacks on Americans and the Iraqi Government; Maliki sent in 
Iraqi forces along with the Americans to take on the militias.  By showing his willingness to 
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go after the militias in Basra and Sadr City, Maliki earned the support of most in Baghdad 
except, of course, the Iranian Ambassador and Sadr himself.
494
   
2008-2011: Pre-Withdrawal Normalization 
In late 2007, the United States began pursuing a bilateral Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA) with Iraq to replace the UN Security Council resolution that authorized U.S. military 
presence in Iraq, which was set to expire by the end of 2008.
495
  The Americans wanted, 
amongst other things, “legal immunity for civilian contractors, airtight legal protections for 
the troops, and the assurance that American forces would be able to operate in Iraq as they 
deemed necessary.”496  The Iraqis wanted, amongst other things, U.S. commitments to 
“defend Iraq against attack,” to “defend their regime against a potential coup,” to “work to 
have Iraq’s international debts from the Saddam era forgiven,” and to strenuously work “to 
ensure that United Nations sanctions from that period were lifted.”497  A traditional SOFA 
captured the troop protective measures and a Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA, see 
Appendix A) was created to capture the other desired forms of cooperation. 
Procedurally, and primarily for political reasons, Maliki chose to submit the agreements 
to the Iraqi parliament.  This procedure proved critical in the subsequent SOFA negotiations 
three years later.  Maliki also feared that Sadr and Iran would exploit the SOFA negotiations 
for political gain.  The Iraqis demanded a withdrawal date on the SOFA.  In a compromise, 
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Bush and Maliki agreed on goals to withdraw American forces from Iraqi towns and cities by 
June 2009 (which Maliki wanted in order to demonstrate Iraqi sovereignty and to give him 
latitude to go after his enemies without U.S. interference) and to remove all American troops 
from Iraq by the end of 2011, conditions permitting.  The SOFA passed the Iraqi parliament 
149 to 35, with 91 abstaining or not present.  All but five of the nay votes came from 
Sadrists.  It had been a struggle to draft a mutually acceptable SOFA and it was more than a 
year in the making.  It took a lot of personal involvement from both Bush and Maliki.  In 
December 2008, when Bush and Maliki stood together in front of cameras to sign these very 
important accords, a man in the audience hurled a shoe at Bush, one of the gravest insults in 
the Arab world.
498
   
President Obama took office in January 2009 and began to implement his vision of 
extricating the United States from Iraq.  Realizing he could not responsibly implement his 
16-month withdrawal plan, he eventually chose to end the American combat mission in Iraq 
by August 31, 2010, nineteen months later.  The United States began pulling back surge 
troops although, at times, Maliki expressed reservations that the Americans were 
withdrawing too fast and, thereby, creating opportunity for Al-Qaeda and insurgents to 
attack.
499
 
In April 2009, after a two month ambassadorial vacancy, Ambassador Chris Hill arrived 
in Baghdad with a much different agenda than former Ambassador Crocker.  Hill wanted to 
wrest the lead role in Iraq from the military, put more responsibility on the Iraqis, and 
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normalize the U.S. relationship with Iraq.  Early on, Maliki expressed to Hill a desire for a 
strong relationship with the Obama administration.  Hill had a favorable view of Maliki and 
thought little of Maliki’s Sunni and Kurd rivals.  However, when Maliki went to Washington 
to talk with Obama in the summer of 2009, he deviated sharply from the agenda Hill had 
arranged.  Instead of using the visit to launch the SFA as had been coordinated, Maliki 
threatened Obama by “playing the Iran card: if the United States could not persuade the 
Sunni Arab countries to stop rallying the Sunnis, the Iranians would have an excuse to 
intervene in Iraqi politics.”  Maliki also expressed discontent that U.S. military 
representatives had met with exiled Baathists in Turkey, an event that stoked Maliki’s 
inherent fear of Baathist conspiracies.  This uncoordinated complaining angered Hill and, 
privately, Maliki’s “position was unmistakable: if the Americans did not respect his 
concerns, they could get the hell out of Iraq.”500 
As the Americans proceeded with their withdrawal from Iraqi cities leading up to the 
June 2009 deadline, Maliki had several Awakening leaders arrested, the very ones that had 
allied with the Americans.  Further, the Iraqi government had a habit of deferring payments 
to Awakening volunteers and Iraqi security forces were disproportionately targeting Sunni’s 
in other areas.
501
  
Parliamentary elections were scheduled for March 2010.  “Under American pressure, the 
de-Baathification campaign had been defused” and “the Sunnis had decided not to boycott 
the election.”  U.S. officials expressed concern that Maliki would not leave power if he lost, 
but might rather stage a coup and refuse to honor the balloting.  “62 percent of the electorate 
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voted” and Allawi’s party won 91 seats while Maliki’s party won 89 seats.  Both were short 
of the 163 seats required to control the 325-seat parliament, but Maliki, by challenging the 
constitution, calling for recounts, and reinvigorating de-Baathification to disqualify rival 
candidates, merged the Shiite factions (with Sadr’s support) into a mega-bloc that was 
deemed constitutionally sufficient to establish the government to the shock of Sunnis.  The 
Obama administration worked to facilitate suitable power-sharing amongst the key leadership 
positions but, in the end, Maliki retained his prime ministership and broke nearly all the 
agreements and promises that were made to keep him there.  Still, “for all his flaws, Maliki, 
Hill thought, was somebody with whom the United States could work.”  The White House 
agreed to stick with Maliki and “try to soothe hurt feelings all over Baghdad.”502   
On September 1, 2010, America declared the end of its “combat mission” at a formal 
ceremony in Baghdad.  “Fifty thousand U.S. troops would remain in Iraq, deployed in six 
‘advise and assist’ training brigades.”503  One week later, American “train, advise, and assist” 
forces, to include Stryker platoons, Special Forces, attack helicopters, and fighter aircraft, 
were called in to assist Iraqi soldiers and police that were under heavy attack.
504
   
In the summer of 2011, with the 2008 SOFA set to expire in December 2011, U.S. 
diplomats began discussions with Iraq for a new SOFA so that the United States could keep 
several thousand troops in Iraq to continue to “train Iraq’s armed forces, protect its skies, and 
conduct joint counterterrorism operations” beyond 2011.505  This was a politically sticky 
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issue for Obama, who had “campaigned on Iraq being the wrong war,” since leaving troops 
might have been considered by some as a departure from his campaign promises.
506
  
However, several key actors on both sides, including top U.S. and Iraqi military 
commanders, Allawi, the Kurdish leader Barzani, and even Maliki himself, considered it 
wise if not vital to keep U.S. forces present.  Maliki was willing to support continued U.S. 
military presence if he could garner enough domestic support but was doubtful that he could 
get Council of Representatives approval.
507
 
U.S. officials had spent the early months of 2011 debating about how many troops to 
leave in Iraq beyond 2011, with the U.S. commander in Iraq initially calling for up to 24,000 
troops and the White House countering with options for 8,000 to 16,000 troops.  In June, 
Maliki and his advisors discussed the possibility of 20,000 U.S. troops.  President Obama 
eventually proposed a new plan of 3,500-5,000 troops.  In the end, however, the debate over 
troop levels was overcome by the fact that the United States and Iraq could not reach an 
agreement on the SOFA.  In a June 2011 videoconference with Maliki, Obama had levied a 
requirement that the Iraqi parliament would need to approve any agreement for U.S. troop 
presence beyond 2011.  The Iraqis officially “asked” for U.S. troops to stay in August 2011, 
and in October the Iraqi parliament “approved U.S. military trainers but ruled out 
immunities.  Only the Kurds supported the U.S. immunities requirement.”  “Maliki was just 
too fearful of the political consequences” of trying to push through an agreement for 
continued U.S. military presence—it was a democracy and most Iraqis wanted U.S. forces to 
leave.  Shortly thereafter, Obama had another videoconference with Maliki to tell him that 
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the SOFA negotiations were over and that all American troops would be coming home.  This 
critical event was embarrassing and politically costly for the United States, perilous for the 
Iraqis, detrimental to bilateral cooperation, and a win for Iran.
508
   
As the United States prepared to withdraw, the violence that once wracked Iraq was at a 
record low.  On December 15, 2011, “the American command in Iraq formally cased its 
colors in a ceremony that Maliki and [Iraqi President] Talabani, both invited, did not attend.”  
The last U.S. military convoy left Iraq on December 18, 2011.  Iraq was fully and 
unequivocally sovereign.
509
 
2012-Present: Iraqi Regression and Disappointing Strategic “Cooperation” 
Since the U.S. withdrawal, Maliki has been accused of centralizing power, aligning with 
Iran, and stoking sectarianism; Iraq has regressed to alarming levels of violence.  
Approaching the U.S. withdrawal, nearly a thousand Iraqis were detained by the Maliki 
government as suspected Baathists.  Other Iraqi military members who were seen as “too 
close” with the American military were pushed out, their services no longer needed, and 
Maliki ordered tanks “to take up positions near the residences of” Sunni politicians.510  This 
behavior continued in earnest after the U.S. withdrawal.  Maliki issued an arrest warrant for 
his lone Sunni vice president, Tariq al-Hashimi, who fled.  Hashimi was later sentenced to 
death in abstentia by Iraqi courts.
511
  Recently, Sadr withdrew from the government and 
described Maliki as a “‘tyrant’ who heads a ‘corrupt’ government and suppresses his 
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opponents.”512  Maliki’s alignment with Iran is less clear, although he has clearly sought 
favor with both the United States and Iran.  The United States witnessed Maliki’s deference 
to Iranian interests during the occupation when Maliki, on behalf of Iranian-supported Shiites 
or Iranian agents, interfered with U.S. security operations on several occasions.
513
  After the 
U.S. withdrawal, Iran certainly capitalized on the situation, further clouding the alignment 
issue.  As Maliki’s deputy prime minister recently lamented, “we were listening to Mr. 
Obama when he was saying, ‘we will withdraw [from Iraq], but withdraw in a responsible 
way.’ But in fact, the way he did it was irresponsible.   Because he left a vacuum behind him 
that was filled by the Iranians.”514 
Maliki’s past and current policies have been accused of stoking the recent alarming 
increase in sectarian violence in Iraq.  According to one scholar, “with two-thirds of Iraq’s 
provinces in open conflict with the capital, Nouri al-Maliki is resorting to Saddam Hussein’s 
playbook to keep the country together.”515  7,818 Iraqi civilians were killed in 2013, making 
it the deadliest year in Iraq since 2008, when 6,787 Iraqis were killed.  This is a sharp 
increase to the roughly 3,000 Iraqi civilians killed each year from 2009 through 2012.  
Abhorrent body counts in the early months of 2014 suggest that the violence has not 
abated.
516
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The U.S.-Iraqi relationship has struggled since the withdrawal.  On the positive side, 
there has been progress on several major weapons purchases and the semi-autonomous Kurds 
have signed major oil exploration deals with U.S. companies.
517
  However, there have been 
notable and persistent problems with cooperation as well.   
The civil war in Syria has been a substantial source of conflict between the United States 
and Iraq. By 2012 alone, Iran had flown “about two hundred tons of arms—rockets, 
ammunition, mortar rounds, heavy machine guns, and assault rifles—through Iraqi airspace 
to Damascus.”518  The United States and its Arab allies unequivocally condemned Syrian 
President Bashar Assad’s repression of his people and President Obama came close to 
committing troops to Syria to address the problem.  Efforts to get Iraq to support the interests 
of the United States and its Arab neighbors in this matter, however, have highlighted the 
troubles within the partnership.  In early 2012, Ambassador Jeffrey launched a strenuous 
objection to Maliki about the Iranian use of Iraqi space to support Assad.  This was followed 
up with a request by Vice President Biden in August.  In March 2013, Secretary of State 
Kerry informed reporters that he had a “very spirited discussion” with Maliki about the 
Iranian overflights of Iraqi territory to help sustain Assad’s regime, a regime the Obama 
administration had urged to step down.  According to Kerry, he told Maliki that “there are 
members of Congress and people in America who increasingly are watching what Iraq is 
doing and wondering how it is that a partner in the efforts for democracy and a partner for 
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whom Americans feel they have tried so hard to be helpful…can be, in fact, doing something 
that makes it more difficult to achieve our common goals.”519 
More recently, there has been conflict over the timing of weapons deliveries and other 
U.S. support to Iraq that Maliki wishes to expedite to help quell Iraq’s recent increase in 
domestic violence.  Iraq has requested substantial defense-related transfers from the United 
States and “the United States has delivered more than $14 billion in equipment, services and 
training to the Iraqi military and security forces since 2005,” to include six C-130J transport 
aircraft, a Rapid Avenger surface-to-air missile battery, 140 M1A1 tanks, Hellfire missiles, 
assault rifles, and ammunition.
520
  However, Iraq also ordered a total of 36 F-16 fighter 
aircraft and, although some Iraqi pilots have trained at U.S. bases to fly these aircraft, the 
aircraft have not yet been delivered.  Further, Iraq agreed to purchase 24 Apache attack 
helicopters and lease another six, yet the “leased helicopters aren't scheduled to arrive in Iraq 
until the summer [2014] and the purchased Apaches haven't even been built yet.”521   
With mounting domestic violence, Maliki met with President Obama in November 2013 
to request early delivery of these systems and military aid, to include “more American 
intelligence and other forms of counterterrorism support like reconnaissance drones that 
would be operated by Americans.”522  While the Department of Defense has accelerated the 
delivery of some equipment, U.S. policymakers and others, including prominent Iraqis (e.g., 
Kurdish leader Barzani), have expressed concerns over how this and other equipment might 
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be used, foreseeing a possibility that Maliki’s government might use the attack aircraft to 
oppress Sunnis and Kurds.
523
  The sentiment was strong enough that President Obama 
recently found it necessary to appeal to Congress to lift their ongoing block on the Apache 
deliveries.
524
 
Maliki has recently increased his appeals for U.S. assistance and, apparently, sought 
equipment from Iran in violation of UN sanctions.
525
  Reuters reported that Iran signed 
contracts in late November 2013 “to sell Iraq arms and ammunition worth $195 million,” just 
weeks after Maliki met with Obama to request amplified and expedited aid.  Several Iraqi 
lawmakers claim the deal was made because Maliki was “fed up with delays in U.S. arms 
deliveries” while others more directly accused the Americans of purposely “dragging their 
feet” on their already-signed arms deals.526   
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Measurement of the Variables 
International Independent Variables 
Spoiler Problems 
As with the previous case, Russia and Iran stand out as potential spoilers in this case.  
Both likely had the willingness to preclude strategic cooperation at times in this case, but 
both lacked the opportunity to do so.  It is important to note that the United States occupied 
Iraq with substantial military force for more than eight years following its invasion and 
provided credible personal security protection to Iraqi leaders—only a very formidable 
spoiler would have been able to block cooperation between the United States and Iraq by 
force or coercion in this situation.  More likely, instances of uncooperative behavior between 
Iraq and the United States were matters of choice rather than force from an external source.   
Russia regained some of its former strength during this case’s timeframe, and Russian 
leader Vladimir Putin demonstrated a new willingness for aggressive Russian behavior in 
more recent years as seen with Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014.  
However, these are neighboring lands and this demonstration of Russian power, while 
unwise to ignore, is far from the power required to dislodge the United States from far-away 
Iraq.
527
 
Iran certainly had a persistent influence in Iraq that cannot be ignored, but fell short of 
the power required to spoil strategic cooperation between the United States and Iraq.  Iran 
wanted a weak Iraq, but not a full disaster that would bleed over to cause Iran problems.  
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Iran, therefore, accepted a certain level of cooperation that strengthened Iraq while resisting 
otherwise.  As the historical record showed, Iran exercised its influence by, according to 
Arab leaders, providing Shiite organizations like SCIRI and the Dawa Party (Maliki’s 
political party) with “funds, material, refuge, and other support.”528  During the U.S. 
occupation, Iran’s Quds and Revolutionary Guard forces infiltrated Iraq and organized, 
armed, and participated in resistance to U.S. interests, to include lethal attacks on Americans 
in Iraq.
529
  During the 2008 SOFA negotiations, an Iranian general was arrested in Iraq “for 
bribing legislators with $250,000 each to vote against the SOFA” and the leader of the 
Iranian Quds Force told Iraqi President Talabani that Iraq should not sign any agreement with 
Bush.
530
  However, the historical record also shows that U.S. and Iraqi leaders were aware of 
Iran’s generally deleterious influence, took steps to mitigate it, and had the power to 
overcome it when they had a mind to.
531
  For example, U.S. Special Forces once captured 
Iranian officers who were suspected of anti-Coalition activity and the Iraqi government 
pressured for their release.  In January 2007, however, U.S. officials received a promise from 
Maliki that they would not be forced to release captured Iranian Quds Force operatives in the 
future.  Soon after, U.S. Special Forces captured five Quds operatives in Irbil.  Iran, 
subsequently, “locked down its Iraqi consulates and pulled most of its Quds Force officers 
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out of the country.”532  U.S. forces compounded that blow with a defeat of Iranian proxies in 
Sadr City in 2008.
533
  Clearly Maliki did not want trouble with his neighbor to the East and 
courted support from Iran, as well as from the United States, but Iran’s power was not 
sufficient to force Maliki to eschew cooperation with the United States against Maliki’s 
will.
534
  The 2008 SOFA was signed, despite Iran’s machinations against it. 
Status of spoiler problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the 
duration of this case’s timeframe—no spoiler existed with the opportunity to preclude a 
cooperative relationship between the United States and Iraq. 
Competitor Problems 
Referencing my previous case, potential competitors such as Russia and Iran still lacked 
the opportunity to substantively undermine cooperation between the United States and Iraq 
by means of an exclusive and better strategic cooperation offer, although Russia may have 
had more willingness to do so in this timeframe.  The United States remained a hegemon and 
these other nations, while perhaps improving in capacity, still paled in comparison to the 
United States.  Further, the demonstrated postwar U.S. contribution to Iraqi security and 
humanitarian, economic, and political development was, as concise as can be stated, 
staggering in terms of lives, dollars, and attention.   
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Status of competitor problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the 
duration of this case’s timeframe—no competitor existed with the opportunity to provide a 
better strategic cooperation offer on an exclusive basis.   
Other International Conditions 
The removal of Saddam’s regime alleviated some of the other international conditions 
that conspired against U.S.-Iraqi cooperation, such as competing alliances (i.e., strengthening 
Saddam through cooperation would have alarmed other regional U.S. allies) and untenable 
political situations caused by the image of cooperating with a pariah.  Certain aspects of the 
post-Saddam situation did not sit well with some regional powers.  For instance, a democracy 
in the region did not necessarily appeal to theocratic Iran (not that Iran’s discomfort would 
make cooperation with Iraq any less appealing to the United States).
535
  Further, “the Saudis 
and other authoritarian Sunni states were deeply suspicious of a Shiite-dominated and 
potentially democratic Iraq.”536  However, while these potential issues over democracy’s 
influence were a concern to some regional U.S. allies, they paled in significance to other 
potential international conditions such as those posed previously by Saddam’s regime or the 
Cold War structure.  More concerning were the sectarian and authoritarian tendencies 
demonstrated by Maliki (such that U.S. cooperation with Iraq might have enabled him to 
oppress his people), coupled with his deference towards Iranian interests (such that U.S. 
cooperation with Iraq might have indirectly, or worse, directly, empowered Iran), which 
became even more apparent after the U.S. withdrawal in 2011.  Although Maliki is far from 
Saddam (so far) with respect to authoritarianism and, alignment-wise, Iraq is, collectively, far 
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from being a “Warsaw Pact” ally of Iran, these concerns and the threats that they pose for 
U.S. image and interests have been noted by U.S. officials and have caused some to be 
increasingly cautious about cooperating with Iraq.   
Status of other international conditions: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation 
though late 2011, then AMBIGUOUS for the remainder of this case’s timeframe—while 
removing Saddam mitigated many problems with other international conditions in postwar 
Iraq, Maliki’s behavior, particularly approaching the U.S. withdrawal in 2011 and after, has 
raised significant questions amongst U.S. policymakers about the future effects that 
cooperation with Iraq would have on U.S. interests, image, and Iranian power.
537
   
Domestic Independent Variables on the U.S. Side 
Disinterest Problems 
As with the previous case, it is implausible that the United States was not interested in the 
gains that could be made through a cooperative relationship with Iraq.  In line with my 
previous evidence, which endures, a co-opted Iraq might have resolved once and for all the 
anxiety over current or future Iraqi WMD capability and would have recruited an ally in the 
war against violent extremism.
538
  A democracy in Iraq might have had a domino effect 
throughout the rest of the region “that would dramatically improve the U.S. security posture,” 
especially with respect to threats in Iran and Syria.
539
   As Gates took over as Secretary of 
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Defense, he urged that “developments in Iraq” would “shape the entire Middle East and 
greatly influence global geopolitics for years to come.”  The violence in Iraq and the 
potential of it to spread throughout the region made it clear to Gates that it was important to 
work with Iraq to protect U.S. regional long-term interests.
540
  So, as time went on, U.S. 
interest in the potential gains that could be made from cooperation with Iraq did not wane 
(although, perhaps, the U.S. assessment of whether those gains were attainable changed).  
The historical record shows that the United States was so interested in those gains that it 
expended enormous resources to try and achieve them.   
Status of U.S. disinterest problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for 
the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that disinterest 
problems did not exist within the U.S. leadership or its winning coalition.   
Trust Problems 
In contrast to the previous case, with Saddam gone, trust problems on the U.S. side were 
clearly mitigable until perhaps the latter years of this case’s timeframe.  In the latter years, 
U.S. trust problems emerged in response to Iraqi reconciliation and political unification 
problems and there are currently questions with U.S. policymakers over whether those trust 
problems are mitigable.   
                                                                                                                                                       
a worthy model for other post-Arab Spring bilateral relations, especially with Egypt” (Feaver in Fontaine and 
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The historical record shows that the United States had questions about Maliki’s character 
since before he became prime minister, which could have developed into a trust issue.
541
  
Instead, the United States and Iraq mitigated these and other trust problems through 
institutions such as the 2008 SOFA and SFA.  Both states carefully drafted these agreements 
over an extended timeframe, suggesting that they felt them to be “more than paper” and 
expected themselves and the other signatory to honor those agreements.
542
  In general, they 
reinforced mutual trust by honoring those agreements.  However, the historical record shows 
that Iraqi behavior leading up to the failure of the SOFA in 2011 and after has caused several 
prominent U.S. policymakers to question whether Iraq would abide by its key commitments 
to strengthen and develop its democracy and play a constructive role in the region as 
generally described in the SFA.  Reconciliation problems on the Iraqi side, in part, caused the 
failure of the 2011 SOFA and caused the United States to reevaluate its position in Iraq and 
how much it could trust the Iraqis to behave as “partners.”  Likewise, significant Iraqi 
political unification problems, as evidenced by Iraq’s persistent and often violent 
sectarianism (which I will discuss in detail shortly), caused some U.S. policymakers to 
question whether the Iraqi government would continue the SFA’s path towards democracy or 
use the gains from U.S. cooperation to consolidate authoritarian power and undemocratically 
repress its own people.  The Maliki government’s overtures towards Iran, motivated, in part, 
by sectarianism, exacerbated these potential trust problems.     
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Status of U.S. trust problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation until 2011, 
then AMBIGUOUS for the remainder of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of 
evidence suggests that the United States felt it could mitigate its trust problems with Iraq 
until 2011, after which time the ability to mitigate those trust problems has been questioned 
by prominent U.S. policymakers.
543
    
Reconciliation Problems 
Reconciliation problems on the U.S. side were largely remedied by the removal of 
Saddam’s regime, although there is a heightened potential for these problems to resurface in 
the future in light of recent Iraqi behavior. 
There was little preexisting U.S. resentment towards post-Saddam Iraq.  Leading up to 
the war in 2003, U.S. administrations were careful to vilify Saddam, not the Iraqi people.  
President Bush specifically gave Saddam and his sons Uday and Qusay 48 hours to leave 
Iraq, carefully distancing their sins from the rest of the Iraqi population.  The Bush 
administration seemed to hold the Iraqi people in high regard to the end; those who opposed 
the war or occupation seemed to resent U.S. policy, not the Iraqi people.   
The U.S. mission in Iraq was called “Operation IRAQI FREEDOM” and U.S. forces 
were sent in as “liberators.”  Unlike previous wars with Germany and Japan, an official 
narrative did not have to be created to eradicate denigrating stereotypes and reorient 
identities of former adversary populations. Had Americans been treated as liberators 
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throughout the occupation and reconstruction period, reconciliation problems on the U.S. 
side likely would have remained unambiguously favorable.  But this is not the case.  U.S. 
forces were treated as occupiers and paid a deadly price during their attempts to put Iraq on a 
stable trajectory, due in large part to reconciliation problems and political unification 
problems on the Iraqi side.  While U.S. forces were eventually successful at reducing 
violence and greatly improved Iraqi stability leading up to the U.S. withdrawal, perceived 
slights, such as the embarrassing failure of the SOFA in 2011, Iraqi deference to Iran, and the 
lack of Iraqi support for U.S. interests in Syria, have encouraged resentment amongst some 
Americans who are bitter about unappreciated U.S. sacrifices.
544
  This sentiment could 
manifest into a larger reconciliation problem if not corrected.   
Status of U.S. reconciliation problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation 
until 2012 (circa the crisis in Syria), then AMBIGUOUS—a preponderance of evidence 
suggests that reconciliation problems did not exist within the U.S. administrations or their 
winning coalitions initially, but U.S. resentment seems to be growing in recent years. 
Domestic Independent Variables on Iraq’s Side 
Disinterest Problems 
As with the previous case, it is implausible that Iraq was not interested in the gains that 
might have been made through a cooperative postwar relationship with the United States.  
Post-Saddam Iraq retained its preexisting economic and security problems as previously 
described, many of which were exacerbated by war damage and, after the war, as a result of 
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de-Baathification, the dissolution of the Iraqi army, and the looting and mayhem that 
followed.  Furthermore, the Iraqis were put on a path towards democratic governance and 
needed support for their political consolidation.  This interest in the gains that could be made 
through cooperation persisted throughout the timeframe of this case as seen, for example, in 
the explicit language of the SFA, Iraqi requests for support, Maliki’s recent threats to turn 
U.S. rivals (i.e., Iran) for such gains, and persistent subnational extra-legal measures to 
compensate for deficiencies (e.g., the Mahdi Army, which sought a wide range of support 
from Iran). 
Status of Iraq’s disinterest problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for 
the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that disinterest 
problems did not exist.  
Trust Problems 
In contrast to the previous case, trust problems on Iraq’s side were much less of a factor 
in this case.  The removal of Saddam, a paranoid conspiracy theorist who had little capacity 
to trust anyone, created opportunity for institutions to help mitigate trust problems as they do 
for many other international endeavors.  The Iraqis, especially Maliki, put a lot of stock in 
agreements like the SFA and SOFA to mitigate trust issues, as I previously explained.  
However, in more recent months, Maliki and other Iraqis have complained that the United 
States has stalled on its deliveries of military aid and hardware as per contractual agreements.  
This may indicate or result in an emerging immitigable trust problem.   
One issue that must be analyzed carefully is the general effect of the Obama 
administration on Iraqi trust.  Iraqi leaders such as Maliki grew accustomed to significant 
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personal U.S. presidential involvement during the Bush era.  Bush visited Iraq frequently, 
had weekly conversations with Maliki, and took measures to protect Maliki from those who 
militated for his ouster.  Bush personally worked with Maliki on the U.S. troop surge and the 
2008 SOFA and SFA.  At one point, Bush vetoed a U.S. bill that could have resulted in 
claims against the current Iraqi government for Saddam-era injustices, something that greatly 
concerned Maliki.  This action “reflected the strength of Bush’s commitment to Iraq, even if 
it meant political costs at home.”545  The Obama administration set quite a different tone with 
the Iraqis—Iraq was the “bad” war and Democrats made several attempts to remove U.S. 
troops from Iraq faster, regardless of the situation on the ground.
546
  As a Senator, Obama 
introduced a bill that would remove American combat brigades by March 2008 and, as a 
candidate, Obama proposed a withdrawal plan that was time-based, not conditions-based—
that is, the United States would withdraw, whether or not its security commitments to Iraq 
were fulfilled.
547
  As Obama took office, the personal presidential attention, to which Maliki 
was accustomed, waned.  Obama had only two secure videoconferences with Maliki in 
2011—quite a departure from the weekly conversations Maliki had with the previous U.S. 
president.
548
  This likely raised Iraqi concerns over a possible change in U.S. commitment to 
their security as seen, for example, by Maliki’s expressions of concern that the U.S. was 
withdrawing too fast and creating space for Al Qaeda.  While this change in atmosphere 
between administrations may have created a substantial trust problem in other settings, here it 
did not.  The reason is that many Iraqis wanted U.S. forces to leave, torn between that and the 
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danger it posed.  Overtures for withdrawal were welcomed, and many Iraqis ignored the 
implications that these overtures had for the credibility of U.S. commitments and Iraqi 
security.  Aside from this issue of the U.S. withdrawal, the Obama administration essentially 
followed the path agreed to by Bush in the 2008 SFA, thereby honoring those U.S. 
commitments and encouraging trust.
549
   
Status of Iraqi trust problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation for the 
duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that immitigable 
trust problems did not exist within the Iraqi leadership or its winning coalition, although very 
recent concerns over the delivery of military aid and hardware could reflect, or result in, an 
immitigable trust issue.   
Reconciliation Problems 
In this case, as with my previous case, reconciliation problems on the Iraqi side were a 
substantial source of credible commitment problems.  The removal of Saddam remedied his 
reconciliation problems, but many others remained threaded throughout several segments of 
Iraqi society.  The war and postwar occupation only exacerbated these reconciliation 
problems.   
As I explained in the previous case, reconciliation problems amongst various segments of 
Iraqi society predated the war.  Arab opinion of the West was generally and persistently low 
to begin with.
550
  The Baathists considered the United States an enemy.  Many Shiites 
                                                 
549
 Gates 2014, 297. 
550
 See, for example: Lynch 2013; Hal Brands 2008 (246), who explains that globalization has led to internet 
pornography and U.S. movies being piped into homes of devout Muslims in the Middle East, challenging their 
values and norms and “provoking a sharp reaction from jihadist groups;” Jamal in Lust 2011 (208-209) on how 
“U.S. support for oppressive and authoritarian regimes” has fueled resentment and bolstered Islamist 
266 
 
strongly resented that, in their mind, the United States had betrayed them, encouraging their 
revolt against Saddam in 1991 and then refusing to help when Saddam horrifically repressed 
them.
551
  Saddam shaped Iraqi opinion against Americans for decades and Iraqis, in general, 
resented the years of suffering under sanctions.  The Iraqis who least had reconciliation 
problems with the United States were perhaps the Kurds and Iraqi exiles, longstanding U.S. 
partners against Saddam, but they comprised only 20 percent of the Iraqi population. 
“In general, the war resulted in a marked upswing in anti-U.S. opinion in the Middle 
East.”552  More specifically, the war exacerbated problems with Sunnis who became angry 
over being displaced from their position of primacy and, importantly, resented the Americans 
for being the agent of that change.
553
   
Events after the war only added to and exacerbated Iraqi reconciliation problems.  
Americans were soon seen as unjust occupiers, not liberators as had been promised, and large 
segments of Iraqi society were all too willing to demonstrate their associated resentment in 
lethal ways.
554
  The delays in the transfer of sovereignty only aggravated their animosity.
555
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The de-Baathification process was “poisonous” and was conducted in excess by some 
opportunistic Iraqis, nonetheless tarnishing the Americans who had initiated the process.
556
  
The CPAs’ dissolution of the Iraqi army, national police, and 125,000 public sector workers 
adversely affected (by loss of salary at the least) six to ten million of Iraq’s estimated twenty-
six million citizens (that is, according to Iraqi estimates, roughly 20-40 percent of the 
population) and was seen as a blow to Iraqi national pride.
557
  Humiliation at the hands of 
U.S. contractors and perceived injustices at Fallujah, Abu Ghraib, and elsewhere further 
fueled resentment in an Iraqi population that was primed for decades to see the worst in their 
American occupiers and equate the inevitable bad behavior of a few to that of many.
558
 
These reconciliation problems were evident in the persistent attacks that some Iraqis 
conducted against Americans throughout the occupation and by the support that the attackers 
received from large portions of the Iraqi population to do so.  As another example, when the 
time came to renew the SOFA in 2011, Iraqi leaders were hesitant about such an 
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agreement.
559
  Why?  Iraq was supposedly on the path to democracy and cooperating with the 
Americans on the SOFA could cost votes and jeopardize political survival.  Why?  Because 
Americans were resented amongst significant portions of the Iraqi population and opponents 
could politicize the issue of cooperation with Americans to successfully attack Iraqi 
politicians.
560
   
In sum, many Iraqis lacked a healthy sense of shame, guilt, or shared responsibility for 
the war for many reasons.  Many Iraqis felt the war was unjust and felt unjustly treated 
before, during, and after the war.  This fomented a formidable reconciliation problem within 
many segments of Iraqi society and this was demonstrated unequivocally.
561
   
Status of Iraqi reconciliation problems: UNFAVORABLE towards qualities of 
cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests 
that severe reconciliation problems existed within significant segments of Iraqi society, 
including Maliki’s winning coalition and perhaps Maliki himself.   
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State Capacity Problems 
Iraq’s material capacity after the war was limited, but sufficient to meet the strategic 
cooperation obligations that the United States required. After the war, the United States, rich 
in resources, expected little materially from the Iraqi side other than cooperation and 
permission to help stabilize the country.  The initial U.S.-administrated government was 
followed with U.S. advisors that were imbedded up through the ministries.  The United 
States, essentially,  provided a bulk of Iraqi state capacity and, counterfactually, would likely 
have continued to do so if the 2011 SOFA had been accepted, considering all that the United 
States stood to gain from Iraqi strategic cooperation. 
Status of Iraqi state capacity problems: FAVORABLE towards qualities of cooperation 
for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests that Iraq did 
not have immitigable state capacity problems from a U.S. perspective.   
Political Unification Problems 
“My friend, here is something you need to understand about Iraq.  We say ‘me 
against my brother…me and my brother against our cousin…my family 
against your family.’  This is our way.”—General Muhammad, 2010, 
assassinated in April 2011 
The substantial political unification problems that I described in my last case persisted 
and were exacerbated in this case.  There is strong evidence that significant portions of the 
Iraqi population did not identify with their government and considered non-governmental 
violence to be legitimate.  Influential domestic actors capitalized on this dynamic and 
mounted a credible resistance to strategic cooperation.   
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The quote above is my best recollection of a lesson an Iraqi general taught me in 
Baghdad when I was an American advisor to the Iraqi military.  It was his prediction of 
events to come—as soon as we Americans left, Iraqi brother would earnestly get back to the 
business of killing Iraqi brother.  From my perspective, Muhammad’s insight of the hyper-
ingrained sectarianism that dominates Iraq, at the expense of Iraqi political unification, has 
been revalidated by the resurgence of Iraqi sectarian violence in recent years since the U.S. 
withdrawal.
562
  Some see little hope for improvement.  According to SCIRI leader Abd al-
Aziz al-Hakim, it might be possible for the various Shiite militias to reconcile, but they 
would “never reconcile with the Saddamists” who were “killing us for the last thirty-five 
years, and now we are paying them back.”563 
The staunch political unification problems that I discussed in the previous case predated 
the Iraq War and were exacerbated during and after the war.
564
  As Ambassador Crocker 
explained, after thirty-five years of Saddam, Iraq’s people had been reduced to their fears—
“they were sectarian” and this “cycle of fear” would take a long time to break.565  While the 
United States tried to establish a plural government, Sadr, Zarqawi, and other influential 
domestic actors militated along sectarian lines.  They politicized and conducted violence 
against cooperation between the United States and the Iraqi Government.  Further, some U.S. 
choices exacerbated Iraq’s political unification problems.  The IGC, for instance, was 
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“structured along explicitly sectarian lines” and “sent a message to all Iraq’s major political 
actors and organizations that sectarian-based politics was the new order of the day.”566  Eric 
Davis argues that the dissolution of the Iraqi Army, which was ethnically integrated, 
exacerbated sectarianism.
567
  De-Baathification hurt political unification as well—with the 
old construct gone and the current construct in turmoil due to loss of Baathist technocrats and 
rampant insecurity, Iraqis fell back on two things: “the mosque and their family, which was 
the clan, the tribe.”568  
The new Iraqi government exacerbated sectarianism as well.  Shortly after the war, the 
United States was focused on fighting the insurgency and inadvertently enabled a sectarian 
government that encouraged Iraqis to “take refuge in their sectarian and ethic identities.”569  
Iraqi politicians as a whole were considered “parochial rather than nationalist” by some U.S. 
intelligence officials and used de-Baathification for personal gain.
570
  The historical record is 
rife with examples of the Jaafari and Maliki governments stoking sectarianism with bias in 
favor of Shiite concerns.  Maliki did counter this perception temporarily with his “Charge of 
the Knights” into Basra, but Maliki’s sectarian stance resurged.  In 2008, while negotiating 
the SOFA, an Iraqi Special Forces unit went after a Sunni political opponent of Maliki’s 
government and Iraqi troops initiated a standoff with Kurdish Peshmerga, raising renewed 
fears of sectarianism and accusations of “dictatorial tendencies” against Maliki from Kurd 
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leaders.  Maliki’s behavior was not unnoticed by the Sunnis either, many of whom felt the 
government was sectarian and “out to crush them.”571  Approaching the U.S. withdrawal and 
after, Maliki’s alarming behavior (e.g., the tanks parked near the residences of Sunni political 
opponents) further encouraged sectarianism. Maliki’s behavior was not lost on U.S. officials 
who have recently expressed concern about the ramifications of supporting a sectarian Maliki 
government.   
The Iraqi people also played a role in exacerbating sectarianism.  Many of them 
submitted to it and conducted or supported violence on its behalf.  The January 2005 election 
results were largely along sectarian lines, showing that few thought outside sectarian frames.  
In 2008, Cooley wrote that “the Iraqi party system remains politically fragmented and was 
founded along ethnic and sectarian lines.”572  The horrific sectarian violence leading up to 
2008 was conducted by masses of Iraqis in militias and insurgent groups and, even though it 
temporarily subsided, it has strongly resurged in the years after the U.S. withdrawal. 
An important ingredient for political unification is that the government has a monopoly 
on the legitimate use of violence, which was not the situation in Iraq where non-
governmental violence was considered legitimate by substantial portions of the population.  
Coupled with deep sectarianism, the result was bloody.  No sectarian group wanted another 
group to get too powerful.  Any policy that favored one group over the other met with 
extremely violent, publicly-sanctioned opposition.
573
  These conditions also created 
opportunity for influential actors to credibly resist Iraqi cooperation with the United States.  
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The credible insurgency is one example—many Iraqi Sunnis strongly feared a sectarian 
Shiite government, especially one with ties to Iran, and violently resisted U.S.-Iraqi 
cooperation that might strengthen that Iraqi government.  Sadr and his followers wanted U.S. 
forces to leave.  Sadr commanded his sectarian forces to resist, and that resistance was 
formidable.
574
  Sistani also held much more sway than the government over many Shiites.  
With one fatwa, these religious figures could incite and sanction non-governmental violence 
or, conversely, suppress much of that violence.  
In sum, significant portions of the Iraqi people did not identify with their Baghdad 
government.  Iraq’s government did not have a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence 
and Iraq’s influential domestic actors used these circumstances to mount credible resistance 
to U.S.-Iraqi cooperation. 
Status of Iraqi political unification problems: UNFAVORABLE towards qualities of 
cooperation for the duration of this case’s timeframe—a preponderance of evidence suggests 
that Iraq had severe political unification problems and influential domestic actors mounted a 
credible resistance to cooperation.   
Dependent Variable: The Postwar Qualities of Cooperation between the United States 
and Iraq 
 
The historical record shows a moderate postwar cooperative ambition between the United 
States and Iraq as compared to other postwar scenarios.  Unlike some other scenarios (e.g., 
the United States and East Germany or Vietnam), the two states were able to come to an 
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agreement to generally cooperate in a variety of areas, including regional security, 
economics, and politics, as evident with the SFA.  Substantial weapons purchases (e.g., 
capable fighters and attack helicopters) and economic ventures (e.g., oil exploration) have 
been agreed upon.  However, unlike some more ambitious scenarios (e.g., the United States 
and Germany or Japan after World War II), there is no agreement for a formal alliance or 
continued presence of U.S. forces—the relationship has not yet been envisioned as a deep 
security partnership like the one built to take on the Soviet threat.  It was not envisioned to be 
a deep economic partnership that would help rebuild the region (i.e., like with Germany and 
its coal after WWII).  It was, however, envisioned to be politically deep through cooperation 
in democratization (and, thereby, alignment with West) and regional stability.  The SFA 
specifies an open-ended “long-term” cooperative relationship between the states, testifying to 
its high ambition of cooperative endurance.   
The realization of the depth of cooperation has fallen short of these moderate goals.  In 
the realm of security cooperation, the states have had difficulties simply cooperating to 
address problems with Iraq’s domestic violence, with the Jaafari and Maliki governments 
interfering with U.S. security efforts and behaving in biased, sectarian ways during and after 
the occupation.  The states were not able to cooperate effectively and come to an accord on 
the 2011 SOFA, something that exacerbated the security problem in Iraq and, perhaps, 
neighboring lands as well.  As Maliki now attempts to quell the sectarian violence that he, in 
part, bears responsibility for, the two states find it difficult to cooperate on deliveries of 
military aid and hardware.  In the realm of political cooperation, the two states have found 
themselves in conflict on vital issues.  They are on opposite sides of a war between Assad 
and the Syrian rebels.  Iraq has accommodated Iranian overflights to arm Assad, despite 
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strenuous U.S. objections, and has turned to Iran for arms in violation of UN sanctions, 
alarming U.S. policymakers over Iraq’s possible alignment with Iran, a U.S. enemy.575  Also, 
Maliki’s authoritarian centralization of power and his general backsliding on democracy have 
been a concern for many.
576
  A moderate level of cooperation has yet to be achieved, let 
alone endure.  Frederick and Kimberly Kagan sum up the relationship’s qualities of 
cooperation harshly:  Iraq “is not a partner of the United States on any of the key issues in the 
region: from its evasion of economic sanctions on Iran to its support for the Syrian regime of 
Bashar Assad, Iraq stands in Tehran’s camp, not Washington’s.”577 
Assessment of the qualities of cooperation:  UNCOOPERATIVE—the relationship had 
moderate ambition for postwar cooperation, but has failed to realize many of its ambitions.  
The relationship was often uncooperative.  Further, there is substantial concern that the 
existing cooperative relationship, such that it is, has failed or is failing.   
Analysis 
This case had unfavorable independent variables at the domestic level throughout its 
timeframe.  There were substantial reconciliation and political unification problems on the 
Iraqi side which, aside from their direct effects, interactively spurred issues with other 
sources of credible commitment problems.  For each of these problems at the domestic level, 
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my theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation, and that is exactly what is seen in my 
dependent variable assessment.   
The removal of Saddam remedied several international and domestic sources of credible 
commitment problems.  However, preexisting reconciliation and political unification 
problems on the Iraqi side were not remedied.  Worse, they were exacerbated by the war and 
postwar events.   
Iraqi political unification problems were most evident by Iraq’s violent sectarianism and 
played both a direct and interactive role against cooperation between the United States and 
Iraq.  In a direct role, Iraq’s political unification problems enabled actors like Sadr and 
Zarqawi to mount a credible resistance to U.S.-Iraqi cooperation for various reasons, such as 
resentment, nationalism, and opportunism, and to do so with the support of significant 
portions of the population.  In an interactive role, political unification problems may be 
creating problems with other international conditions—the United States does not want to be 
seen as helping a sectarian government oppress its people and violent sectarianism has 
caused Maliki to go to Iran for support, raising questions of Iraqi alignment and reducing 
U.S. willingness to cooperate.  Political unification problems contributed to a difficult U.S. 
occupation and, thereby, increased reconciliation problems on the Iraqi side.
578
  Iraq’s 
sectarianism may be creating trust problems on the U.S. side—U.S. policymakers have 
recently questioned whether Iraq will abide by its commitment towards democracy or 
backslide and whether Iraq will maintain a Western alignment or join Iran’s camp.  Finally, 
Iraq’s political unification problems may be creating a reconciliation problem on the U.S. 
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side—Maliki’s sectarian gravitation towards Iran has been seen as a slap in the face by some 
Americans and resentment on the U.S. side could build and make cooperation tougher.
579
 
Likewise, Iraq’s reconciliation problems played both a direct and interactive role against 
cooperation between the United States and Iraq.  In a direct role, reconciliation problems 
caused some Iraqis to resist occupation, making the occupation more difficult and, thereby, 
reinforcing those reconciliation problems and fomenting new ones.  Reconciliation problems 
amongst Iraqi policymakers and their constituents caused Iraq to hesitate on the 2011 SOFA 
agreement, directly limiting U.S. ability to cooperate on important security efforts.  In an 
interactive role, the failed SOFA agreement has given Maliki more cause to gravitate toward 
Iran, potentially creating problems with other international conditions over Iraq’s alignment 
and, in turn, potentially creating trust problems on the U.S. side over whether Iraq will abide 
by the cooperative platitudes in the SFA.  The failed SOFA also signaled Iraqi reconciliation 
problems to the U.S. side which highlighted, amongst other things, the possibility of revenge 
prosecutions against U.S. troops and militated against U.S. trust.   
Assessing Alternate Theories 
The alternate theory that Iran was too powerful and drove events in Iraq as either a 
spoiler or competitor has been dispelled in my previous analysis.  Iraqi gravitation towards 
Iran was a matter of Iraqi choice (due, in part, to Iraqi political unification problems—
sectarianism on behalf of a biased Shiite government—and reconciliation problems), not 
Iranian force or a better Iranian offer.  The United States and Iraq demonstrated the ability to 
sideline Iran when they wanted to. 
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The alternate theory that a common external threat promotes cooperation would fail to 
explain why Iraqi Sunnis and the Americans did not cooperate earlier and more enduringly 
against the Iranians after the war, although the theory is supported by the reduced 
cooperation between the United States and the sectarian Maliki government, which is 
courting Iran rather than treating it as a common enemy.
580
  The theory that an internal threat 
would spur cooperation fails to explain why the Maliki government did not advocate more 
strongly for U.S. presence during the 2011 SOFA negotiations or court U.S. favor more 
strongly (e.g., by clearing up alignment questions and cooperating with the United States on 
its Syria policy) to gain support against the substantial internal threat that has resurged in 
recent years.   
A final alternate theory that I will address is that the low postwar cooperation between 
the United States and Iraq was because the U.S. public (and/or the Obama administration) 
simply “wanted out of Iraq.”  This theory is incomplete and ignores the important role that 
Iraqis played in the U.S.-Iraqi relationship.  It is evident that the initial American support for 
the war to “liberate” Iraq waned as the occupation progressed to the point where, in 2008, 
Americans elected a president that promised to extricate them from Iraq.
581
  However, just 
because some Americans wanted U.S. troops out of Iraq did not mean that those Americans 
did not want the United States to cooperate with Iraq as partners.  Additionally, while this 
sentiment may have been strong in some circles, it was not overwhelming—many prominent 
policymakers, including President Obama, saw the wisdom in keeping U.S. troops in Iraq 
and pursued the 2011 SOFA to enable troops to remain.  Lastly, to the extent that this 
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sentiment grew strong enough to discourage U.S. cooperation, one must ask why.  Important 
factors in this were Iraqi political unification and reconciliation problems, which contributed 
to a difficult and costly occupation for the Americans.  Christopher Gelpi et al. (2009) find 
that the American public’s most important consideration for whether it will support military 
force is whether there is an expectation of success, even if the cost is great.
582
  As the 
occupation progressed and Iraqi resistance mounted, the American public’s expectation for 
success quickly declined and support predictably waned.  Thus, Iraqi credible commitment 
problems were a strong contributor to the “get-us-out-of-Iraq” sentiment.   
Summary of Findings 
Overall, the case of the postwar relationship between the United States and Iraq after the 
Iraq War of 2003 supports my theory.  This case had unfavorable conditions for cooperation 
at the domestic level.  My theory, in this situation, predicts lower qualities of cooperation for 
postwar relations and the “uncooperative” postwar qualities of cooperation between the 
United States and Iraq is consistent with this prediction, unlike the alternate theories I 
discussed regarding the roles of external and internal threats.  Also, while Iran militated 
against U.S.-Iraqi cooperation and some Americans wanted U.S. troops out of Iraq, the 
strength of these confounders against cooperation was driven by Iraqi choices—by Iraqi 
political unification and reconciliation problems that caused some Iraqis to violently resist 
American presence and gravitate towards Iran.  Regardless of the status of those actors or 
threats, the sources of credible commitment problems that I have identified must be resolved 
to achieve higher qualities of cooperation.   
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More specifically, my finding of the unfavorable reconciliation problems in the Iraqi side 
causing lower qualities of cooperation supports my Hypothesis 2.  My finding of the 
unfavorable political unification problems on the Iraqi side causing lower qualities of 
cooperation supports my Hypothesis 4.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
With Brief Case Studies of Serbia and an Iraq 2003 Counterfactual 
 
I have presented a bargaining theory of strategic cooperation that focuses on the influence 
of credible commitment problems to explain variation in strategic cooperation outcomes.  I 
chose to focus on U.S. postwar scenarios in hopes that explaining the variation in strategic 
cooperation outcomes between the United States and its former adversaries would help 
policymakers to better assess the costs, benefits, and risks of this postwar strategy choice and 
thereby, ideally, reduce loss and suffering in the future for all parties.  I also hope to spark 
academic interest in this important national policy topic.   
I argued that variations in a relationship’s qualities of cooperation are primarily explained 
by credible commitment problems at the international and domestic levels.  A state’s 
government must be willing to and have the opportunity to credibly commit to a strategic 
cooperation agreement in order to promote deep and enduring cooperation.  From my theory, 
I identified three sources of credible commitment problems at the international level (spoiler 
problems, competitor problems, and other international conditions) and five sources of 
credible commitment problems at the domestic level (disinterest, trust, reconciliation, state 
capacity, and political unification problems) that might undermine a relationship’s qualities 
of cooperation.  I argued that the two most likely sources of domestic credible commitment 
problems in U.S. postwar contexts are reconciliation problems and political unification 
problems within the former U.S. adversary.  In these contexts, if former adversary leaders or 
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their winning coalitions have reconciliation problems with the United States, the 
relationship’s qualities of cooperation will more likely suffer.  If those leaders and their 
winning coalitions do not have reconciliation problems with the United States, then the 
relationship’s qualities of cooperation depend primarily on the presence of political 
unification problems within the former adversary state.  Where political unification is higher, 
the qualities of cooperation will more likely be higher.  Where political unification is lower 
and influential domestic actors resist cooperation with the United States (likely the case), the 
qualities of cooperation will more likely be lower.    
Findings 
I tested four hypotheses in a restricted universe of cases to explore the validity of my 
theory.  Hypothesis 1 focused on the international level and stated that an increase in 
credible commitment problems at the international level (from spoilers, competitors, or 
otherwise) would cause a decrease in a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.  My case 
analyses support Hypothesis 1.  In the case of the United States and Germany after World 
War II, where international (and domestic) conditions were favorable (i.e., West Germany 
and reunified Germany), qualities of cooperation were high.  Conversely, where international 
conditions were unfavorable (i.e., East Germany before reunification due to a spoiler or Iraq 
1991 due to other international conditions), qualities of cooperation were low.  Hypothesis 2 
focused at the domestic level and stated that an increase in disinterest, trust, or 
reconciliation problems within a state’s leadership or its winning coalition would cause a 
decrease in a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.  My case analyses support Hypothesis 
2.  In the case of the United States and Germany after World War II, where all domestic (and 
international) variables (including those listed in Hypothesis 2) were favorable (i.e., West 
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Germany and reunified Germany), qualities of cooperation were high.  Conversely, where 
reconciliation problems were unfavorable (e.g., Iraq 1991, although several other variables 
were also unfavorable; and Iraq 2003, although political unification problems were also 
unfavorable), qualities of cooperation were low.  Hypothesis 3 focused at the domestic level 
and stated that an increase in state capacity problems would cause a decrease in a 
relationship’s qualities of cooperation.  My case analyses were unable to assess Hypothesis 
3.  While the German case, in which all variables (including state capacity) were favorable, 
had a high quality of cooperation, there were no cases where state capacity was unfavorable 
to assess its supposed negative effects.  Lastly, Hypothesis 4 focused at the domestic level 
and stated that an increase in political unification problems, when influential domestic 
actor(s) resist cooperation, would cause a decrease in a relationship’s qualities of 
cooperation.  My case analyses support Hypothesis 4.  In the case of the United States and 
Germany after World War II, where all domestic (and international) variables (including 
political unification) were favorable (i.e., West Germany and reunified Germany), qualities 
of cooperation were high.  Conversely, where political unification problems were 
unfavorable (e.g., Iraq 1991, although several other variables were also unfavorable, and Iraq 
2003, although reconciliation problems were also unfavorable), qualities of cooperation were 
low.  
Altogether, the case support for my hypotheses affirms my theoretical argument that 
international and domestic conditions both matter to qualities of cooperation and, in turn, to 
strategic cooperation outcomes.  Problems at either or both levels can have a substantial 
negative effect on a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.  Problems at the international 
level alone were shown to have a substantial negative effect in the German case, in which 
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qualities of cooperation were low because just spoiler problems were unfavorable (i.e., East 
Germany) and high when all variables at the international and domestic levels were favorable 
(i.e., West Germany).  Problems at the domestic level alone were shown to have a substantial 
negative effect in the Iraq 2003 case, in which qualities of cooperation were low because 
reconciliation and political unification problems were unfavorable and, in turn, were the root 
causes of problems in other areas.  Problems at both the international and domestic levels 
were shown to have a negative effect on a relationship’s qualities of cooperation in the Iraq 
1991 case.   
The cases also demonstrated the power of several of the specific variables that I identified 
in my theory.  At the international level, the power of spoilers was demonstrated in the (East) 
German case and the power of other international conditions, such as competing alliances 
and untenable political situations (e.g., due to empowering a pariah or a repressive 
government), was demonstrated in the Iraq 1991 case.  In no case was the power of 
competitors demonstrated.  At the domestic level, the power of immitigable independent trust 
problems was demonstrated in the Iraq 1991 case and the power of reconciliation and 
political unification problems was demonstrated best in the Iraq 2003 case.  In no case was 
the power of disinterest or state capacity problems demonstrated.   
What about the effects of my primary domestic variables of interest—political unification 
problems and reconciliation problems on the former U.S. adversary side—as demonstrated 
independent of each other?  While I was able to demonstrate their effects in tandem in the 
Iraq 2003 case, it would be useful to witness the strength of these primary variables of 
interest without the confounding influence of the other.  I pause here to conduct two brief 
applications of my theory in hopes to demonstrate those effects.  With my restricted universe 
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of cases, the best I can do to demonstrate the independent effect of reconciliation problems 
on the former U.S. adversary side is to analyze the relationship of the United States and 
Serbia after the War for Kosovo.  The best I can do to demonstrate the independent effect of 
political unification problems is to counterfactually analyze the relationship of the United 
States and Iraq after the Iraq War of 2003, having counterfactually assumed that the status of 
reconciliation problems on the Iraqi side was favorable.   
The Serbian Case  
A brief application of my theoretical framework to the relationship between the United 
States and Serbia after the War for Kosovo helps to illuminate the effect of reconciliation 
problems independent of political unification problems.  Serbia, led by Slobodan Milosevic 
from 1989 to 2000, committed several atrocities after the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991.  In 
1999, the United States, acting as a member of NATO, attacked Serbia to stop ethnic 
cleansing in Kosovo.  Shortly after the war, the war criminal Milosevic was voted out of 
power and turned over to war crimes tribunals.  Yet, unlike many of its neighbors, Serbia has 
eschewed opportunities for deeper cooperation with the United States in the postwar period.  
A primary reason for this is reconciliation problems on the Serbian side.   
A Brief History 
In the decades leading up to the war, Yugoslavia was not a member of the Warsaw Pact, 
although it had long historical ties to Russia and utilized Russian military hardware.  The 
Serbian republic within Yugoslavia, in particular, gravitated towards Russia, its Slavic 
relative.  As the Soviet Union disintegrated in the early 1990’s, and without the late 
strongman Josip Broz Tito at the helm to repress factious nationalism throughout Yugoslavia, 
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Yugoslavia broke apart with Slovenia and Croatia, and later others, declaring their 
independence in 1991.  Serbia was soon identified by both the George H.W. Bush and 
Clinton administrations as an aggressor in the region that was trying to victimize the other 
former-Yugoslav republics in pursuit Milosevic’s expansionist “Greater Serbia” policy.583   
Years of conflict between the West and Serbia followed, which included attempts to curb 
Serbian aggression through resolutions, sanctions, and embargos.  Regardless, Serbia pursued 
a policy of ethnic cleansing and committed several atrocities in Bosnia and elsewhere.  In 
1995 alone, Serb forces shelled Sarajevo, took 350 UN peacekeepers hostage, and committed 
the infamous Srebrenica massacre which the West suspected to have been tacitly supported 
by Milosevic and his Army of Republika Srpska.  This elicited a substantial military response 
from the United States through NATO in the form of sustained air strikes.
584
   
Kosovo was a semi-autonomous region of the Serbian republic with a population that was 
roughly 90 percent ethnic Albanian Muslim and 10 percent ethnic Serb Orthodox.  Serbia 
and Kosovo were in conflict over how much autonomy Kosovo would have.  Serbia 
demanded territorial integrity and feared for the safety of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo.  Milosevic 
“treated the province as a conquered territory,” attempting to “Serbianize” Kosovo by 
“replacing Albanian officeholders with Serbs and stationing 60,000 police and soldiers in the 
province.”585  Many from the Albanian majority increasingly felt that independence from 
Serbia was the only solution to Serb oppression.  By the mid-1990s, the Kosovo Liberation 
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Army (KLA) was in sporadic conflict with Serbian security forces.  The U.S. State 
Department sums up the subsequent history succinctly:  
“In late 1998, Milosevic unleashed a brutal police and military campaign 
against the KLA, which included widespread atrocities against civilians.  As 
Milosevic's ethnic cleansing campaign progressed, over 800,000 ethnic 
Albanians were forced from their homes in Kosovo.  Intense international 
mediation efforts led to the Rambouillet Accords, which called for Kosovo 
autonomy and the insertion of NATO troops to preserve the peace.  
Milosevic's failure to agree to the Rambouillet Accords triggered a NATO 
military campaign to halt the violence in Kosovo.  This campaign consisted 
primarily of aerial bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.), 
including Belgrade, and continued from March through June 1999.  After 78 
days, Milosevic capitulated.  Shortly thereafter, the UN Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1244 (1999), which suspended Belgrade's governance 
over Kosovo, established the United Nations Interim Administration Mission 
in Kosovo (UNMIK), and authorized a NATO peacekeeping force.  
Resolution 1244 also envisioned a political process designed to determine 
Kosovo's future status. 
As ethnic Albanians returned to their homes, elements of the KLA conducted 
reprisal killings and abductions of ethnic Serbs and Roma in Kosovo.  
Thousands of ethnic Serbs, Roma, and other minorities fled from their homes 
during the latter half of 1999, and many remain displaced.”586 
The postwar relationship between the United States and Serbia has been precarious, often 
undermined by events in Kosovo.  Milosevic was voted out of power in 2000 and was 
delivered to The Hague where he defiantly faced a war crimes tribunal, but died in 2006 
before verdicts were reached.  U.S. diplomatic presence was reestablished in Belgrade in 
2000 and the United States lifted its sanctions on Serbia in 2001.  However, violence against 
Serbians in Kosovo continued and, in 2004, a flare-up resulted in deaths, displacements, and 
the torching of Serbian monasteries and churches to the alarm and protest of Serbians and 
others.
587
  Notably, nationalist Albanians had also attacked “symbols of the UNMIK 
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presence, including the UN’s iconic white vehicles,” in their frustration over the lack of 
progress towards self-determination.
588
  By 2008, Kosovo declared its independence.  
Kosovo’s independence was recognized by the United States and, eventually, by more than 
100 other countries with the notable exception of Serbia, which summarily rejected Kosovo’s 
independence.  In response, Serbia withdrew its Ambassador to the United States in protest 
for several months in 2008 and Serb protestors attacked the American Embassy in 
Belgrade.
589
 
Normalization between Serbia and the West has been slow.  Serbia had long pursued EU 
accession as a matter of economic survival, but the EU (with U.S. support) made it clear that 
the Kosovo issue must be resolved before accession.  In 2013, Serbia and Kosovo finally 
reached an initial agreement on normalization and in early 2014, almost a full generation 
after the War for Kosovo, the EU opened accession talks with Serbia.
590
  While Serbia has 
been a member of NATO’s Partners for Peace program since 2006, Serbia has kept its 
distance and refrained from joining the Alliance, unlike many of its surrounding neighbors.
591
 
Measurement of the Variables 
At the international level, Russia stood out as a potential spoiler and competitor.  Russia 
considered Serbia to be its “turf” and, reciprocally, felt a connection to Serbian Slavs—it 
certainly had the willingness to undermine cooperation between Serbia and the United States 
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in both capacities.
592
  However, its opportunity to do so was less clear.  Russia’s capacity to 
spoil was limited by its decline in power and by the geographic position of Serbia.
593
  While 
Russia had a limited number of military forces in the area to help with peacekeeping 
operations, forces that were sufficient to seize Pristina airport for a time as Kosovo was being 
occupied by NATO peacekeeping forces, Russian power was not sufficient to credibly spoil 
strategic cooperation should the United States and Serbia have desired to cooperate.  There is 
evidence of an exclusive competitive offer from Russia.  Russia adamantly opposed the 
NATO action against Serbia, precluded a UN Security Council authorization for war, and 
was a strong advocate for Serbian territorial integrity.
594
  Russia eventually made it clear to 
Serbia that Russia’s continued support for Serbian retention of Kosovo was contingent upon 
Serbia staying out of NATO.
595
  While Russia could not rival the United States by offering 
better security or economic benefits to Serbia on an exclusive basis, it was prepared to offer 
Serbia something that the United States refused to offer—support to retain sovereignty over 
Kosovo.  Thus, the strength of the competitive Russian offer depended on what Serbia valued 
most—improved economics and security or nominal sovereignty over Kosovo (NATO made 
it clear with its continued presence of peacekeepers that Serbia would never again have a free 
hand in Kosovo).  That said, Andrew Konitzer argues that Serbian political actors have been 
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able to court both the West (EU) and Russia, “simultaneously acquiring the benefits of 
relations with both while avoiding serious costs in terms of broken ties.”596  It would 
therefore seem that Serbia, to an extent, found ways to mitigate other potential problems 
stemming from competitors.   
Other international conditions were also a factor.  Most importantly was the issue of 
Milosevic, a pariah and war criminal in Western (but not necessarily Serbian) eyes.  
Cooperation with such a type would have created an untenable political situation for the 
United States and strengthening him and those who advocated his policies through 
cooperation would have posed a threat to U.S. interests and allies in the region.  When 
Serbians voted Milosevic out of power in 2000 and submitted him to The Hague, they went a 
long way to remedy this barrier to cooperation.  However, Serbian nationalism and sentiment 
for a “Greater Serbia” persisted in the population, as seen by Serbia’s enduring resistance to 
normalize relations with Kosovo.  Only very recently has this barrier to EU accession—
accession that the United States supports and that would foster greater cooperation with the 
West—begun to truly be addressed by Serbians.   
Overall, I assess the status of these international variables as follows: Spoiler problems 
were FAVORABLE; Competitor problems were AMBIGUOUS; and Other International 
Conditions were AMBIGUOUS (after 2000) for cooperation (until, perhaps, very recently).     
At the domestic level on the U.S. side, disinterest was not a problem.  For example, the 
United States pursued cooperative relationships and, in some cases, military basing 
arrangements, with several of Serbia’s immediate neighbors to support its global efforts 
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against terrorism.  Gains from a cooperative relationship with Serbia could have helped in 
those efforts as well.  Trust problems existed, but were mitigated through institutions that 
were generally respected by both sides (e.g., the United Nations International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, or “ICTY,” and the EU) and tit-for-tat strategies (e.g., if 
Serbia normalized relations with Kosovo, the United States would support deeper Western 
cooperation) once Milosevic was ousted.
597
  Reconciliation problems were tied to Milosevic 
and his henchmen who ordered atrocities, but not to the Serbian people as long as they 
renounced the atrocities and cooperated with the ICTY.
598
  Once Serbians turned over 
Milosevic and, eventually, other war criminals to The Hague, many of these potential 
problems were mitigated.   
Overall, I assess the status of domestic variables on the U.S. side as follows: Disinterest 
problems were FAVORABLE; Trust and Reconciliation problems were FAVORABLE after 
2000. 
At the domestic level on the Serbian side, disinterest, trust, and state capacity problems 
were not substantial.  Serbia had been hurt by sanctions and sustained considerable war 
damage during the 78 days of bombing—Serbia’s economic and security situations were less 
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 See the remarks of William Burns, U.S. State Department Under Secretary for Political Affairs, titled “U.S.-
EU Unfinished Business in the Balkans,” given at the Croatia Summit, July 8, 2011, available at 
http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2011/167938.htm.   
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 As Clinton explained shortly after the NATO bombing campaign, Serbs were “going to have to come to 
grips with what Mr. Milosevic ordered in Kosovo. They're just going to have to come to grips with it, and 
they're going to have to get out of denial. They're going to have to come to grips with it. And then they're going 
to have to decide whether they support his leadership or not, whether they think it's okay that all those tens of 
thousands of people were killed and all those hundreds of thousands of people were run out of their homes and 
all those little girls were raped and all those little boys were murdered.  They're going to have to decide if they 
think that is okay…  And if they think it's okay, they can make that decision.  But I wouldn't give them one red 
cent for reconstruction if they think it's okay, because I don't think it's okay, and I don't think that's the world 
we're trying to build for our children” (President Clinton’s News Conference, June 25, 1999, available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=57792).  See also the remarks of William Burns, referenced 
previously. 
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than it desired and it was interested in gains to improve them, eventually seeking EU 
accession as a mechanism to bring some of this about.  As described with respect to the U.S. 
side, trust problems were mitigated through institutions and tit-for-tat strategies after 
Milosevic was ousted.  Lastly, while Serbia sustained damage to its state capacity during the 
war, its government did not collapse and it maintained enough material capacity to govern its 
spaces, control its agents, and even threaten its neighbors should it have chosen.  Further, as 
with other cases, it is unlikely that the United States would have required much more than 
perhaps access to territory and restraint from repressive behavior (towards Kosovo and 
elsewhere) as the Serbian contribution to a strategic cooperation agreement.   
Even after Yugoslavia broke apart and Serbia became a largely homogenous state, 
political unification was still a problem until Kosovo was effectively “separated” from 
Serbia, initially under the occupational protection of NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) in 
1999, then as a recognized independent state in 2008.  A large majority of Kosovars did not 
identify with the Serbian government.  It is unclear whether influential domestic (ethnic 
Albanian) actors would have resisted cooperation between the United States and Serbia, but 
it is clear that non-governmental violence (e.g., by the KLA), at least against Serbian 
interests, was considered legitimate by large segments of the Albanian Kosovar population 
beginning in the mid-1990s when violent resistance against Serbian security forces began in 
earnest.   
Reconciliation problems on the Serbian side stand out as the most significant and 
persistent barrier to cooperation with the United States.  There was a strong element of 
nationalism in Serbia and a lasting appreciation of Milosevic’s “Greater Serbia” vision by 
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many Serbians.
599
  The United States and Serbian worldviews on Kosovo and elsewhere were 
at a fundamental impasse and remained so until perhaps very recently when Serbia took 
initial steps to normalize relations with Kosovo.  From some Serb perspectives, they were 
wrongly accused of genocide, attacked without UN Security Council authorization, and 
suffered unjust losses in the war.
600
  Further, in their mind, the United States had sided with 
KLA terrorists who had oppressed Serbs in Kosovo and the United States and its 
peacekeepers (along with other NATO forces) had failed to protect Kosovar Serbs from 
reprisal as Kosovar Albanians returned after the war.  The continued U.S. support for 
Kosovo’s autonomy and, later, Kosovo’s independence has only perpetuated Serbian feelings 
of injustice and resentment after the war.  This resentment was reflected in persistent hostile 
feelings towards NATO (seen as an agent of the United States) and the mob attack by angry 
Serb demonstrators on the American Embassy in Belgrade after the U.S. recognition of 
Kosovo’s independence.601  Serbian resentment has been politicized at times such that deeper 
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of stronger cooperation is made by the fact that NATO bombarded FRY in 1999” (59).  Also, the NATO aerial 
campaign included dual-use targets that were used by both civilians and the military, including bridges, power 
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'was not genocide,'” September 7, 2001, BBC).   
601
 For instance, “66.9% of the Serbian population express[ed] ‘hostility’ towards NATO in a 2009 Gallup poll” 
(Konitzer 2011, 115).  See also Gallup’s Balkan Monitor “2010 Summary of Findings,” http://www.balkan-
monitor.eu/files/BalkanMonitor-2010_Summary_of_Findings.pdf.  For the Embassy attack, see Finn and 
Wright 2008.   
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cooperation with NATO (and, thereby, with the United States) has been politically 
untenable.
602
    
Overall, I assess the status of domestic variables on the Serbian side as follows: 
Disinterest, Trust, and State Capacity problems were FAVORABLE; Political Unification 
problems were AMBIGIOUS until, at the latest, 2008 (if not much sooner), then 
FAVORABLE; Reconciliation problems were UNFAVORABLE. 
In assessing the dependent variable—the postwar qualities of cooperation between the 
United States and Serbia—one sees very limited evidence of cooperation.  Overall, I assess a 
low ambition and low realization of cooperative depth during a bulk of this case’s timeframe.  
Looking at cooperation in the security and political dimensions, Serbia has been a standoffish 
member of NATO’s Partners for Peace Program (so has Russia, attesting to the limited depth 
of that program) and has eschewed potentially deeper forms of cooperation such as 
membership in the NATO Alliance.  Further, Serbia has yet to recognize Kosovo’s 
independence despite U.S. prodding and has only recently taken initial steps towards 
normalization with Kosovo, which has limited the envisioned depth of cooperation that the 
nations (and the EU) would agree to.  The realization of cooperation between the United 
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States and Serbia has been commensurately low.  While there has been cooperation with war 
crimes tribunals, the relationship has been conflictual when it comes to the status of Kosovo.    
Overall, I assess the qualities of cooperation as (comparatively) ABSENT until perhaps 
very recently. 
Analysis and Findings 
This case had favorable to ambiguous independent variables at the international level 
after Milosevic was removed in 2000, but a clearly unfavorable variable at the domestic level 
throughout its timeframe.  My theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation in this situation 
and that is exactly what is seen in my dependent variable assessment.  The most evident 
problem at the domestic level was Serbian reconciliation problems.  Because of these 
problems, caused by perceived U.S. injustices during the war and continued U.S. support for 
Kosovo’s autonomy and independence (and, thereby, U.S. non-support for Serbian territorial 
integrity), cooperation between the United States and Serbia was politicized, making such 
cooperation politically untenable in Belgrade.  This, in turn, has limited the depth of 
cooperation that Serbian politicians would agree to and support.  This case supports my 
Hypothesis 2 and, accordingly, my theory.  Further, it demonstrates that reconciliation 
problems on the former U.S. adversary side can significantly undermine cooperation even 
when the status of former adversary political unification is supportive.   
Iraq 2003, Counterfactual 
The best I can do to illuminate the effect of political unification problems independent of 
reconciliation problems is to analyze my Iraq 2003 case (Chapter 6) counterfactually.  
Holding everything else constant, if one counterfactually assumes that reconciliation 
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problems did not exist within the Iraqi leadership or its winning coalition, what would be the 
likely change in outcome with respect to the postwar qualities of cooperation between the 
United States and Iraq?  To do this, I will briefly reassess the variables and reanalyze the case 
in light of this assumption.   
Counterfactual Measurement of the Variables 
At the international level, the favorable reconciliation assumption would not change the 
favorable assessments of spoiler and competitor problems.  Regarding other international 
conditions, there may have been less (but not zero) U.S. concern over Iraqi alignment with 
Iran.  The reason for this is that, without reconciliation problems amongst the Iraqi leadership 
or its winning coalition, there would have been a higher probability that the 2011 SOFA 
would have passed so that U.S. troops would have remained in Iraq.  These troops, 
presumably, could have deterred Iran from using Iraqi space to support Assad in Syria and, 
thereby, could have precluded that specific rift between the United States and Iraq.  This may 
have mitigated some associated U.S. concerns regarding Iraqi alignment.  That said, Iraqi 
political unification problems, as seen in its violent sectarianism, also caused U.S. concerns 
over Iraqi alignment.  Maliki led in sectarian ways and this drew him to Iran for support, as 
seen before and after the U.S. withdrawal.  Further, emerging U.S. concerns that it might be 
empowering a sectarian regime that would oppress its people would not be resolved by the 
elimination of U.S.-Iraqi reconciliation problems alone—political unification problems 
would still have to be addressed.   
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Status of international variables: no change from the previous case.  Spoiler and 
Competitor problems remain FAVORABLE and Other International Conditions remain 
AMBIGUOUS (after 2011) towards the qualities of cooperation.   
At the domestic level on the U.S. side, the reconciliation assumption would not change 
the favorable assessment of disinterest problems.  Regarding trust problems, the U.S. 
concerns caused by Iraq’s possible Iranian alignment may have been reduced (but not 
eliminated) through a successful 2011 SOFA as previously described.  However, 
sectarianism would likely still have created concerns over alignment and whether the Iraqi 
government would continue the SFA’s path towards democracy.  Without the slaps in the 
face over the 2011 SOFA failure and Syria policy, recently emerging U.S. reconciliation 
problems would less likely have occurred.   
Status of domestic variables on the U.S. side: Disinterest problems remain 
FAVORABLE; Trust problems remain FAVORABLE until recent years as sectarianism 
increasingly raises concerns; Reconciliation problems change to FAVORABLE for the 
duration of this case’s timeframe. 
At the domestic level on the Iraqi side, the favorable reconciliation assumption would not 
change the favorable assessments of disinterest, trust, or state capacity problems.  The 
assessment of reconciliation problems would change to favorable as per the assumption.  
Because of this, one would expect less resistance to the occupation and a higher likelihood 
that the 2011 SOFA would have passed as previously explained.  The status of political 
unification problems would have remained unfavorable and would have been the lone 
primary driver of problems with the other variables that I assessed as less than favorable.     
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Status of domestic variables on the Iraqi side: Disinterest, Trust, and State Capacity 
problems remain FAVORABLE; Reconciliation problems change to FAVORABLE; and 
Political Unification Problems remain UNFAVORABLE for the duration of this case’s 
timeframe.   
In assessing the dependent variable—the postwar qualities of cooperation between the 
United States and Iraq—the elimination of Iraqi reconciliation problems would likely have 
changed some aspects of the qualities of cooperation for the better.  However, Iraqi political 
unification problems would still have militated against those qualities of cooperation.   
The ambition of cooperative depth would likely have remained moderate or increased.  
The SFA would likely still have been signed, and may have been more substantial.  The 
weapons purchases and economic agreements would likely have remained and there would 
have been an increased chance that the 2011 SOFA would have passed, allowing a limited 
number of U.S. troops to remain.  Troop levels would likely have remained modest (recall 
that President Obama’s latest figures were for 3,500-5,000 troops) because of the legacy of a 
still-difficult occupation.
603
  Additionally, some influential Iraqis resisted cooperation with 
the United States so that they could have a freer sectarian hand and some still had a sectarian 
desire to court Iran for support against their domestic foes.  These problems would remain 
despite the remedy to the reconciliation problems and would make a full alliance and 
indefinite U.S. presence less likely.  The ambition of cooperative endurance for this 
counterfactual depth of endurance would likely have remained “long-term” (indefinite) as per 
the SFA.     
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  The occupation was difficult in part due to reconciliation problems within the Iraqi leadership and its 
winning coalition that are assumed to be remedied in this scenario, but also very much due to Iraqi political 
unification problems that would remain in this scenario.   
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The realization of cooperative depth would have improved in some areas but still would 
have suffered in other areas, especially over time as Iraqi political unification problems (i.e., 
sectarianism) took greater effect.  That is, the relationship’s counterfactual realization of 
cooperation would still fall short of its modest counterfactual ambition, although the 
relationship may not have been as blatantly conflictual.  It is likely that there would still have 
been a formidable resistance to the occupation that would have been orchestrated by 
influential domestic actors who would have taken advantage of political unification problems 
to resist U.S.-Iraqi cooperation and its commensurate strengthening of the new Iraqi 
government.  This is essentially what took place during the U.S.-friendly Allawi 
administration (when Fallujah and Sadr City were engulfed in anti-Coalition violence).  It is 
likely that sectarian voting would still have resulted in a Jaafari/Maliki-type remaining in 
office and allowing or pressing a sectarian agenda.  As such, there would still have been great 
challenges in cooperation towards basic Iraqi internal security as seen in the Jaafari/Maliki 
years due to government-sponsored sectarianism.  Thus, much of the pre-2011 realization of 
cooperation would have remained unchanged in this counterfactual scenario.  There would 
likely have been greater cooperation during the 2011 SOFA negotiations and this may have 
resulted in a small post-2011 U.S. presence (which would have been wholly insufficient to 
combat the sectarianism).  In more recent years, sectarianism would likely still have 
continued to push a Maliki-type against U.S. regional interests with regards to Iran and Syria 
and this would, eventually, have caused the same U.S. concerns about empowering a 
repressive government that was aligning with Iran and supporting Assad, thereby militating 
against cooperation.   
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Assessment of the qualities of cooperation: UNCOOPERATIVE to SEMI-
COOPERATIVE—sectarianism would still have militated against cooperation and the 
relationship, in turn, would have failed to realize many of its ambitions.  Blatant 
uncooperative behavior may have been less prominent and, without such strong evidence of 
uncooperative behavior, qualities of cooperation may have improved from uncooperative to 
semi-cooperative.   
Counterfactual Analysis and Findings 
Overall, this counterfactual case had favorable to ambiguous variables at the international 
level, but a clearly unfavorable variable at the domestic level throughout its timeframe.  My 
theory predicts lower qualities of cooperation in this situation and that is what is expected in 
my counterfactual dependent variable assessment.  The most evident problem at the domestic 
level was Iraqi political unification problems.  Despite the counterfactual absence of 
reconciliation problems amongst the Iraqi leadership and its winning coalition, these political 
unification problems would enable influential domestic actors, for various reasons including 
resentment, nationalism, and opportunism, to capitalize on the situation and mount a credible 
resistance to U.S.-Iraqi cooperation (including cooperation to strengthen the Iraqi 
government), and to do so with the support of significant portions of the population.  The 
occupation would still be difficult.  The Iraqi government would still behave in sectarian 
ways and seek external support for its sectarian desires which, in this case, would cause it to 
gravitate towards Iran.  This would breed more resistance from “out groups” in the 
population.  While the SFA and perhaps the 2011 SOFA would pass, political unification 
problems would eventually take their toll on the partnership as U.S. concerns about 
repressive governance, Iranian alignment, and Iraqi support for U.S. regional interests (i.e., 
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Syria policy) emerged.  This would all combine to cause U.S. policymakers to be 
increasingly cautious with their cooperation, thereby reducing the relationship’s qualities of 
cooperation.  This counterfactual case supports my Hypothesis 4 and, in turn, my theory.  
Further, it demonstrates that political unification problems on the former U.S. adversary side 
can significantly undermine cooperation even when the status of former adversary 
reconciliation problems is supportive.   
Other Takeaways and Implications 
In light of my case analyses, findings, and additional analysis on my primary variables of 
interest, there are several other takeaways and implications of my theory.  However, as a note 
of caution, one should be careful about generalizing some of these takeaways and 
implications too broadly.  The internal validity of this study should be strong—almost the 
entire universe of cases (U.S. wars from World War II to present) was examined to some 
extent in this study.  External validity is less strong because the United States had such 
particular attributes during the timeframe of this study.  With that in mind, here are several 
key takeaways and implications to consider: 
1) Postwar relationships with higher qualities of cooperation might be rare in the 
future.  My analysis shows that conditions at both the international and domestic 
levels must be (perhaps atypically) supportive for cooperation to prosper and that 
even one unfavorable variable can have a substantial negative effect on a 
relationship’s qualities of cooperation.  Achieving such favorable conditions is even 
more challenging in the postwar environment and this all combines to reduce the 
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likelihood of higher postwar qualities of cooperation.  The World War II cases may 
have been anomalies.   
2) State leadership is crucial.  My analysis demonstrates that leaders have a profound 
influence on postwar qualities of cooperation.  Former adversary leaders could remain 
in power and the relationship still enjoy higher postwar qualities of cooperation as 
long as those leaders renounced their previous “evil” ways and supported cooperation 
with the United States (e.g., the Emperor of Japan).  Where this did not happen (e.g., 
Saddam after the Gulf War and Milosevic after the War for Kosovo), problems with 
other international conditions and other domestic variables severely undermined 
cooperation.  Even when regime change was accomplished, the postwar qualities of 
cooperation were greatly influenced by the new former-adversary leadership.  Where 
that leadership was eager to cooperate with the United States (e.g., Adenauer and 
Allawi), qualities of cooperation improved.  Where that leadership was ambivalent 
towards cooperation or against it (e.g., Milosevic, Saddam, Jaafari, and Maliki), 
cooperation suffered.   
3) The winning coalition matters.  Do not ignore the “will of the people.”  The German 
winning coalition was willing to support cooperation with the United States; the Iraqi 
winning coalition was not and, worse, contributed to the breakdown in the rule of law 
and the legitimization of non-governmental violence.  These winning coalitions were 
able to influence the postwar relationship’s outcome towards their divergent 
preferences.   
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4) Democracy may be counterproductive to higher postwar qualities of cooperation.  In 
line with the above insights is the mechanism with which leaders are chosen.  Regime 
type matters.  The larger the winning coalition, the more opportunity for barriers to 
cooperation to manifest.  It would be nice for the victor if the vanquished population 
willingly and persistently elected friendly rulers that were eager to cooperate with the 
victor.  But democracy creates uncertainty and may spell trouble for postwar 
cooperation.  If Schumacher had been elected leader of postwar West Germany 
instead of Adenauer, the relationship between the United States and West Germany 
may have been much less cooperative.  If Allawi had been elected leader of postwar 
Iraq instead of Jaafari and, later, Maliki, the relationship between the United States 
and Iraq may have been much more cooperative.  A cooperative strongman or cult of 
personality that could influence or suppress the will of the population, or repress 
influential domestic actors who resist strategic cooperation, could eliminate some of 
this uncertainty, at least in the short term.  However, while installing a friendly 
strongman may resolve barriers to cooperation with the former adversary, it could 
also subject a victor to losses in other areas through reputation costs and so forth.  
Thus, there may be no viable solution that allows a victor to both achieve high 
postwar qualities of cooperation with its former adversary and also protect interests 
elsewhere.
604
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  Similarly, Cooley finds that there is “tension inherent in the current U.S. strategy of promoting democracy 
abroad while maintaining an extensive global basing presence—the pursuit of one may actually undermine the 
viability of the other in any given base host” (2008, 4).  Accordingly, democratically increasing the selectorate, 
as is often done after U.S. wars where there is regime change, may actually increase the voice of an unwilling 
population and decrease the qualities of strategic cooperation in certain circumstances.   
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5) Political unification problems are a key consideration and may be intractable.  Some 
influential domestic actors will likely resist strategic cooperation; political unification 
will determine if those actors are successful.  Each case had an influential domestic 
actor of some sort who resisted strategic cooperation.  Someone usually profits in 
some way from promoting an “opposition.”  Germany had its Schumachers.  Serbia 
had its Milosevics.  Iraq had its Sadrs.  Their success in resisting strategic cooperation 
against the will of the state leadership and its winning coalition depended upon their 
ability to wield force and coercion.  This, in turn, depended upon support from a 
population that would sanction their violence.  Where the population did not identify 
with the government and saw non-governmental violence as legitimate (Iraq), 
influential domestic actors were able to mount a very credible resistance to 
cooperation.  There were no cases where preexisting political unification problems 
were overcome—Iraq had them prior to war and kept them.   
6) Reconciliation problems are a key consideration and may be intractable.  Where 
reconciliation problems existed within the leadership or its winning coalition (e.g., 
Iraq and Serbia), cooperation suffered.  Elsewhere (e.g., Germany), cooperation 
flourished.  Occupations were a double-edged sword.  Occupation helped ameliorate 
reconciliation problems in Germany where U.S. forces were seen as providers and 
protectors.  Conversely, occupation helped exacerbate reconciliation problems in Iraq 
where U.S. forces were seen as invaders.  One, therefore, may be forced into a no-win 
scenario where one must occupy to prevent a failed state, but in doing so exacerbate 
reconciliation problems.  Regardless of the choice, postwar qualities of cooperation 
would suffer.  Also, “Berlin Airlift moments” help—the opportunity to be seen as the 
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hero and demonstrate one’s commitment to the other is extremely important for 
reorientation of identities in these scenarios.   
7) Independent trust problems are not always mitigable.  Saddam had extreme trust 
issues, and although his deeply-entrenched paranoia was perhaps rare (yet, perhaps 
not unique considering North Korean leadership), his case shows that independent 
trust problems are more of a factor than I theorized and that institutions, while 
important to mitigate trust issues, may have their limits in these extreme cases. 
8) Disinterest and state capacity problems are not as likely in these scenarios.  These 
problems seemed theoretically unlikely and were not factors in practice.  Of all the 
takeaways, this is perhaps the least generalizable because of the abundance of U.S. 
resources in my universe of cases.   
Recommendations for (U.S.) Policymakers 
My takeaways and implications highlight the challenging nature of postwar strategic 
cooperation.  It is precarious—several conditions could derail it and just one problem area 
can have a substantial negative effect on a relationship’s qualities of cooperation.  In general, 
for strategic cooperation, policymakers should plan early, plan often, execute accordingly, 
and have an out option.  More specifically, my analysis shows that former adversary 
reconciliation problems and political unification problems are extremely difficult for even a 
hegemon to overcome, and U.S. policymakers should pay particular attention to these 
conditions.   
1) Policymakers should identify their desire for strategic cooperation as early as 
possible and shape the environment accordingly.  If U.S. policymakers could have 
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foreseen the future U.S. desire to become strategic partners with Iraq in the 2000s, 
how different would U.S. policy towards Iraq have been during the Iran-Iraq War, 
during the Shiite uprisings in 1991, or during the post-2003 occupation?  Efforts to 
prevent or remedy reconciliation problems and political unification problems need not 
wait until war has erupted.   
2) Policymakers should select their war strategy based on an attainable postwar 
relationship.  There has been much criticism over U.S. planning on how to end wars 
once started (exit strategies).  I would argue that even this is short-sighted—
policymakers need to think not only about how they will initiate war, conduct war, 
and end war, but how they will achieve their most-preferred “attainable postwar 
relationship” with their adversary.  Using my theory’s framework to analyze 
conditions at the international and domestic levels, policymakers should assess the 
likely qualities of cooperation for postwar strategic cooperation scenarios—what is 
the likely range of possible cooperation outcomes (e.g., absent to highly cooperative, 
absent to semi-cooperative, or just plain absent)?  In their analyses, policymakers 
should be particularly wary of preexisting reconciliation and political unification 
problems.  How will they mitigate those and other preexisting problems and not 
create new problems during and after the war?  Who will lead the former adversary 
state, will the winning coalition keep a U.S.-friendly leader in power, and how will 
the effects of influential domestic actors who would resist strategic cooperation be 
mitigated?  While policymakers might prefer a highly cooperative postwar 
relationship, such a relationship may seem overly optimistic after this analysis.  
Conversely, policymakers might identify a permissive environment that affords them 
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a wide range of desirable strategic cooperation outcomes.  From this analysis of the 
likely range of possible outcomes, policymakers can run their cost/benefit/risk 
analyses to determine their most preferred strategy.  A permissive environment with 
the full range of attainable strategic cooperation outcomes will offer policymakers 
great latitude to choose a variety of viable strategies.  Do policymakers care if the 
states remain enemies?  Are they satisfied with a simple cessation of hostilities and a 
state of ambivalence towards each other?   Or do they wish to embark upon a 
friendship that is characterized by deep and enduring cooperation?   Which plausibly 
attainable end state, on this continuous spectrum of conflict resolution outcomes, and 
in light of their analysis, is most preferred?   If the cost/benefit/risk analyses bode 
poorly for the attainable strategic cooperation outcomes, policymakers should 
consider one of Ikenberry’s other postwar strategies—abandonment, domination, or a 
different institutional arrangement—that creates less vulnerability for their forces.   
3) Policymakers should ensure that prewar, war, and postwar decisions and actions 
support their chosen postwar relationship.  This would suggest that, if strategic 
cooperation is the desired end state, U.S. policymakers should be prepared to identify 
and neutralize spoilers, outbid competitors, and mitigate other international 
conditions.  At the domestic level, those policymakers should be prepared to mitigate 
any disinterest, trust, or reconciliation problems within their own population.  They 
should also be prepared to offer desirable gains to the former adversary to eliminate 
disinterest problems, establish credible institutions to mitigate inevitable trust issues, 
and commit enough resources to ensure that the former adversary has the required 
state capacity to meet future strategic cooperation responsibilities.  Many items on 
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this laundry list are within U.S. control.  Finally, policymakers should be prepared to 
counter preexisting and emerging former adversary reconciliation problems and 
political unification problems as rapidly and effectively as possible.  As forces carry 
out the war and postwar policies, policymakers should minimize the opportunity for 
such problems to be created or exacerbated.   
4) Policymakers should regularly reevaluate the attainability of various postwar 
relationships. War plans never survive the first shot, as they say.  In light of the many 
conditions that could militate against qualities of cooperation, policymakers should be 
prepared to act quickly to reduce the vulnerability of their forces if circumstances 
warrant.  Conversely, in light of everything there is to gain from strategic cooperation 
with a former adversary (e.g., at the very least, minimizing the chance of recurring 
war), if the international and domestic conditions change to favor higher qualities of 
cooperation, policymakers should be prepared to capitalize on the opportunity.     
5) Policymakers should be dubious about trying to solve former adversary 
reconciliation problems and political unification problems with aid.  A policymaker 
may be tempted to think that, if they give their former adversary enough stuff, they 
will fix their strategic cooperation problems and get a more capable partner.  
However, there is also a strong possibility in these unfavorable scenarios that the 
former adversary will simply pocket the gifts and, sooner or later, use them to counter 
the policymaker’s interests.   
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Future Research 
Moving forward from this study, there are several options for future research.  One might 
open up the universe of cases to look at permutations beyond just U.S. wars.  What are the 
keys to strategic cooperation outcomes in all postwar scenarios?  What are the keys to 
strategic cooperation outcomes in non-war scenarios?  One might also examine the 
relationship between reputation and strategic cooperation outcomes.  If one has a favorable 
reputation as a partner, does this change subsequent strategic cooperation outcomes?  Is the 
ambition for cooperation higher and does this, in turn, translate into higher realized 
cooperation as might be anticipated?  What about the reverse scenario?  Also, what is the 
effect of exceeding expectations (i.e., were the Germans pleasantly surprised and did a sense 
of “mercy” encourage strategic cooperation?) or failing to meet them (i.e., did Iraqis expect 
the Marshall Plan and were they disappointed enough to undermine strategic cooperation 
when they didn’t get it?)?  One could examine broken strategic-cooperation relationships and 
explore the reasons that some relationships are restored (e.g., the United States and the 
United Kingdom) and others are not (e.g., the United States and Iran).  Finally, one might 
practically examine how to overcome a combination of political unification and 
reconciliation problems in these scenarios.  If both are unfavorable, does the order of their 
remedy matter?  If so, would it be best to first establish political unification at all costs (e.g., 
through domination if necessary) and then try and reconcile with the former adversary 
population?  Much is left to answer.   
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